We have then, in matters of trade, great variations of system between the different communities of the Empire, and great differences of opinion within each of the communities themselves.
Does this conflict of thought upon trade policy present an insuperable obstacle to national unity? There are those who claim that mutually advantageous trade relations furnish the only basis on which it is worth while to discuss Imperial Federation with any hope of practical result. This opinion is held alike by some who look to preferential treatment, and {294} others who look to exceptional freedom of interchange within the Empire for the necessary bond.
With this extreme view I have never been able to agree. Even without trade advantage between its parts there are decisive reasons why the nation should present a united front to the world. Unity is essential to safety, as I have tried to prove, and at any moment the outbreak of a great war may make safe trade of more vital consequence for British people than either Free Trade or trade depending on tariffs. The wealth created by either must be defended, and with the least possible burden on the individual community. A common system of defence therefore seems of itself a sufficient justification for close political union. This is a permanent condition.
On the other hand, it can scarcely be questioned that ideas on trade policy all around the world are in a state of flux. That systems now existing may be modified, perhaps reversed, within a few years, is not only possible, but highly probable. The greater freedom or greater restriction of trade is a temporary condition[2].
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That the temporary difficulty of conflicting tariffs should be a bar to the attainment of permanent national security, seems, on the face of it, absurd.
In any attempt at Federal organization it would probably at first be necessary to leave to each community the choice of the method by which its revenues are raised. To do so would not apparently put too great a strain on the admitted flexibility of the Federal system. But it can scarcely be doubted that one of the first effects of a close political union, in which common ends are constantly kept in view, and the strength and prosperity of each part are an immediate concern to all, would be to break down by degrees all existing barriers to the advantageous movement of inter-imperial commerce.
[1] On this point Lord Dunraven says—Nineteenth Century, March, 1891: 'The duty on wheat in France in 1882 was only 2 8d. per cwt.; in 1885 it was raised to 15d. per cwt., or 536 per cent. According to some economists, the price of wheat should have gone up in like proportion, and the masses have had to pay dearer for their bread. But what are the facts 1 The price of wheat actually fell from an average of 10.085. per cwt. in 1883, the year following the low duty, to 9.295. in 1886, the year following the increased duty, or 8 per cent. Instead of the poor man in France having to pay dearer for his bread, he paid less in 1886 than in 1883, as the following table shows:—
BREAD 1883 1884 1885 1886
First Quality 1.57 1.49 1.39 1.39
Second Quality 1.35 1.26 1.17 1.22
Third Quality 1.17 1.13 1.04 1.09
In Germany, too, I find the same results follow from increased duties. Wheat went down from 10.30s. per cwt. in 1882, when the duty was 6d. per cwt., to 9.39s. per cwt. in 1889, or 9 per cent. when the duty was 2s. 6d., per cwt—or 500 per cent. higher, while bread remained at about the same price. Internal development appears in both these cases to have more than compensated for any restriction of foreign imports, and it is only fair to remember that the resources of the British Empire in respect of food supply are immeasurably greater than those of France or Germany.'