The invasion of Asia by Alexander the Great, though it found the Persians unready, was by no means of the nature of a surprise. The design had been openly proclaimed by Philip in the year B.C. 338, when he forced the Grecian States to appoint him generalissimo of their armies, which he promised to lead to the conquest of the East.[14350] Darius Codomannus had thus ample warning of what he had to expect, and abundant opportunity to make the fullest preparations for defence. During the years B.C. 338 and 337, while Philip was still alive, he did do something towards organising defensive measures, collected troops and ships, and tried to foment discontent and encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.[14351] But the death of Philip by the dagger of Pausanias caused him most imprudently to relax his efforts, to consider the danger past, and to suspend the operations, which he had commenced, until he should see whether Alexander had either the will or the power to carry into effect his father’s projects. The events of the years B.C. 336 and 335, the successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Boeotia,[14352] woke him from his fool’s paradise to some sense of the realities of the situation. In B.C. 335 the preparations for defence were resumed. Orders were issued to the satraps of Phrygia and Lydia to draw together their troops towards the north-western corner of Asia Minor, and to take the offensive against the Macedonian force which had crossed the straits before Philip’s death. The Persian garrisons in this quarter were strongly reinforced with troops of a good quality, drawn from the remoter provinces of the empire, as from Persia Proper, Media, Hyrcania, and Bactria. Notice was given to the Phoenicians to prepare a considerable fleet, and hold it in readiness for active service. Above all, Memnon the Rhodian was given a command on the Asiatic seaboard, and entrusted with a body of five thousand Greek mercenaries, which he was empowered to use at his discretion.[14353]
But these steps, though in the right direction, were quite inadequate under the circumstances. Everything that was possible should have been done to prevent Alexander from crossing to Asia in force. The fleet should not only have been commanded to hold itself in readiness, but should have been brought up. Four hundred or five hundred vessels,[14354] from Phoenicia, Cyprus, Egypt, Lycia, and Cilicia, should have been moved into the northern Egean and the Propontis, and have kept watch on every Grecian port. Alexander was unable to muster for the transport of his army across the Straits a larger number than 160 triremes.[14355] Persia should have met them with a fleet three times as large. Had Memnon been given from the first a free hand at sea, instead of satrapial power on land, it is quite conceivable that the invasion of Asia by Alexander might have proved as abortive an enterprise as the contemplated invasion of England by Napoleon.
As it was, the fleet of Persia, composed mainly of Phoenician vessels, did not appear in the northern Egean waters until some weeks after Alexander had transported his grand army into Asia, and fought at the Granicus, so that when it arrived it was of comparatively little service. Too late even to save Miletus, it had to be a tame spectator of the siege and capture of that important town.[14356] It was then withdrawn to Halicarnassus, where its presence greatly helped the defence, but not to the extent of wholly baffling the besiegers. Halicarnassus fell, like Miletus, after a while, being entered from the land side; but the fleet saved the troops, the stores, and the inhabitants.[14357]
During the early part of the ensuing year, B.C. 333, while Alexander was engaged in conquering the interior of Asia Minor, the Persian fleet under Memnon at last took the aggressive, and, advancing northwards, employed itself in establishing Persian influence over the whole of the Egean, and especially in reducing the important islands of Chios and Lesbos.[14358] Memnon was now in full command. Fortune smiled on him; and it seemed more than probable that the war would be, at least partially, transferred into Greece, where the Spartans only waited for Memnon’s appearance to commence an anti-Macedonian movement. The presence of a powerful fleet in Greek waters, and Memnon’s almost unlimited command of Persian gold, might in a short time have raised such a flame in Greece as to necessitate Alexander’s return in order to extinguish it.[14359] The invasion of Asia might have been arrested in mid course; Alexander might have proved as powerless as Agesilaus to effect any great change in the relations of the two continents; but, at the critical moment, the sudden and unexpected death of the Rhodian chief cast all these hopes to the ground,[14360] and deprived Persia of her last chance of baffling the invader.
Thus, first by mismanagement and then by an unhappy accident, the Phoenicians were precluded from rendering Persia any effective service in the time of her great necessity. Wiser than Napoleon, Alexander would not contest the sovereignty of the seas with the great naval power of the day, and he even, when he once felt himself strongly lodged in Asia, disbanded his naval force,[14361] that so it might be impossible for disaster at sea to tarnish his prestige. He was convinced that Asia could be won by the land force which he had been permitted to disembark on its shores, and probably anticipated the transfer of naval supremacy which almost immediately followed on the victory of Issus. The complete defeat of the great army of Codomannus, and its retirement on the Euphrates,[14362] left the entire seaboard of Syria and Phoenicia open to him. He resolved at once to take advantage of the opportunity, and to detach from Persia the three countries of Phoenicia, Egypt, and Cyprus. If he could transfer to himself the navies of these powers, his maritime supremacy would be incontestable. He would render his communications with Macedonia absolutely secure. He would have nothing to fear from revolt or disturbance at home, however deeply he might plunge into the Asiatic continent. If the worst happened to him in Asia, he would have assured himself a safe return.
Accordingly, no sooner was the retreat of Darius upon the line of the Euphrates, and his abandonment of Syria, ascertained, than Alexander, after despatching a detachment of his army to Damascus, marched in person into Phoenicia.[14363] The Phoenicians were placed between two dangers. On the one hand, Alexander might ravage their territory, capture and pillage their cities, massacre or sell for slaves the greater portion of their citizens, and destroy their very existence as a people; on the other hand, Darius held as hostages for their fidelity the crews and captains of their triremes, which formed a portion of his fleet, and had on board a large number of their chief men, and even some of their kings.[14364] It was impossible, however, to temporise; a choice had necessarily to be made; and when Alexander entered Phoenicia, the cities, in almost every case, decided on submitting to him. First Strato, the son of Ger-astartus, king of Aradus, who was serving on board the Phoenician contingent to the Persian fleet, went out to meet Alexander, and surrendered into his hands the four cities of Aradus, Marathus, Sigon, and Mariamme.[14365] Then Byblus, whose king was also absent with the fleet, opened its gates to the Macedonians.[14366] Next Sidon, mindful of her recent wrongs, sent envoys to invite Alexander’s approach, and joyfully embraced his cause.[14367] Even Tyre nominally made submission, and declared itself ready to obey Alexander’s commands;[14368] and the transfer of Phoenicia to the side of Alexander might have been made without bloodshed, had the Macedonian monarch been content to leave their island city, which was their true capital, and their pride and glory, unmolested. But Alexander could not brook anything that in any degree savoured of opposition to his will. When therefore, on his expressing a wish to sacrifice to Melkarth in their island town, the Tyrians declined to receive him within the walls, and suggested that his pious design might be sufficiently accomplished by his making his intended offering in Palæ-Tyrus, where there was a temple of the same god, which was older (they said) and more venerable than their own, Alexander’s pride was touched, and he became violently enraged.[14369] Dismissing the envoys with angry threats, he at once began preparations for an attack upon the town.
The Tyrians have been accused of extreme rashness and folly in not making an unqualified submission to the demands preferred by Alexander,[14370] but the reproach scarcely appears to be deserved. They had on previous occasions resisted for years the entire power of Assyria, and of Babylon; they naturally deemed themselves only assailable by sea; their fortifications were of immense strength; and they possessed a navy much superior to any of which Alexander could boast at the time when he threatened them. Their own vessels were eighty in number; those of their kinsmen upon the continent were likewise eighty; Cyprus, which for centuries had been closely allied with them, and which was more than half Phoenician in blood, could furnish a hundred and twenty; Carthage, if she chose, could send to their aid, without any difficulty, as many as two hundred.[14371] Alexander had never been able to collect from the Greek states which owned his sway a fleet of more than one hundred and sixty sail; and, having disbanded this fleet, he could not readily have mustered from the cities and countries accessible to him, exclusive of Cyprus and Phoenicia, so many as a hundred.[14372] The Tyrians, when they took their resolution to oppose Alexander, had a right to expect that their kindred would either assist them, or at any rate not serve against them, and that thus they would be sure to maintain their supremacy at sea. As for Alexander’s design to join the island Tyre to the continent by means of a mole, they cannot have had the slightest suspicion of it, since no work of the kind had ever previously been accomplished, or even attempted; for the demonstration of Xerxes against Salamis was not seriously intended.[14373] They naturally counted on the struggle being entirely by sea, and may well have thought that on their own element they would not be worsted. Even if the continental towns forsook them and went over to the enemy, why might they not do as they had done in Shalmaneser’s time, defeat their unnatural countrymen, and retain their naval supremacy? Moreover, if they made a gallant fight, might not Persia be expected to second their efforts? Would she not attack Alexander from the flanks of Lebanon, intercept his supplies, cut off his foragers, and make his position untenable; the Tyrians could scarcely anticipate that Persia would sit with folded hands, a calm spectator of a seven months’ siege, and do absolutely nothing.
Having determined on resistance to the demands of Alexander, the Tyrians lost no time in placing their city in a position to resist attack. They summoned their king, Azemilcus, from the Persian fleet, and required him to hasten home with the entire squadron which he commanded.[14374] They collected triremes and lighter vessels from various quarters. They distributed along the walls of the city upon every side a number of engines of war, constructed to hurl darts and stones, and amply provided them with missiles.[14375] The skilled workmen and engineers resident in the town were called upon not merely to furnish additional engines of the old type, but to exercise their ingenuity in devising new and unheard of structures.[14376] They armed all the young and vigorous among the people, and appointed them their several stations at the walls. Finally, to diminish the number of mouths to be fed, and to save themselves from distracting cares, they sent away to Carthage a number of their aged men, their women, and their children, who were readily received and supported by the rich and friendly colonists.[14377]
Meantime Alexander had taken his resolution. Either recollecting what Xerxes had threatened to do at Salamis, or prompted merely by his own inventive genius, he determined on the construction of a great mole, or embankment, which should be carried out from the Asiatic mainland across the half-mile of channel to the very walls of the recalcitrant city, and should thus join the island to the Syrian shore. The width of the embankment he fixed at two plethra, or nearly seventy yards.[14378] Material for the construction was abundant. The great city of Palæ-Tyrus was close at hand, partly in ruins, and with many of the houses deserted by their inhabitants. Its walls would furnish abundance of stone, mortar, and rubble. Behind Palæ-Tyrus lay the flanks of Lebanon, cultivated in orchards, while beyond were its dense and inexhaustible forests of fir, pine, and cedar. Human labour could be obtained to almost any extent, for the neighbourhood was populous, and Alexander’s authority acknowledged by all. Accordingly the work, once commenced, for a while made fair progress. Piles were cut in the mountain, which were driven with much ease into the soft mud of the channel, which was shallow near the shore,[14379] and completely under the control of the Macedonians, since the Tyrian vessels could not approach it for fear of sticking in the ooze. Between the piles, towards the edge of the mole, were sunk stones, trunks of trees, and material of the more solid character, while the central part was filled up with rubble and rubbish of every sort and kind. Still, the operation was toilsome and tedious, even from the first, while the further that the mole was advanced into the sea, the more difficult and dangerous became its construction. The channel deepened gradually from a few feet towards the shore to eighteen or twenty,[14380] as it approached the island. The Tyrians in their vessels were soon able to act. In small boats at first, and afterwards in their triremes, they attacked and annoyed the workmen, perpetually hindered their work, and occasionally destroyed portions of it.[14381] Damage was also inflicted by the wind and waves; and the rate of progress became, in consequence, exceedingly slow. A strong current set through the channel, and this was continually working its way among the interstices of the mole, washing holes in its sides and face, and loosening the interior of the structure. When a storm arose, the surf broke over the top of the work, and did even greater damage, carrying portions of the outer casing into the sea.
To meet the assaults of the Tyrian ships upon the work, the Macedonians constructed two movable towers, well protected against torches and weapons by curtains made of raw hides,[14382] and advancing these upon the surface of the mole to the points most threatened, discharged from the engines which the towers contained darts and stones of a large size against the Tyrian sailors. Thus protected, the workmen were able to make sensible progress, and the Tyrians began to fear that, unless they could destroy the towers, the mole would ere long be completed. For the accomplishment of their purpose, they resolved to employ a fire-ship.[14383] Selecting one of the largest of their horse-transports, they stowed the hold with dry brushwood and other combustible materials; and erecting on the prow two masters, each with a projecting arm, attached to either a cauldron, filled with bitumen and sulphur, and with every sort of material apt to kindle and nourish flame. By loading the stern of the transport with stones of a large size, they succeeded in depressing it and correspondingly elevating the prow, which was thus prepared to glide over the smooth surface of the mole and bring itself into contact with the towers. In the fore part of the ship were deposited a quantity of torches, resin, and other combustibles. Watching an opportunity when the wind blew strongly from the seaward straight upon the mole, they towed the vessel at their best speed in the direction of the towers, set it on fire, and then, loosing their hawsers, allowed it to dash itself upon the work. The prow slid over the top a certain distance and then stopped. The arms projecting from the masts broke off at the sudden check,[14384] and scattered the contents of the cauldrons around. The towers caught fire and were at once in a blaze. The Macedonians found it impossible to extinguish the flames, since the Tyrian triremes, drawing close to the mole, prevented approach by flights of arrows and other missiles. “At the same time, the full naval force of the city, both ships and little boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole. So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were burnt—the outer woodwork which kept the mole together was torn up in many places—and a large part of the structure came to pieces."[14385] A heavy sea, moreover, accompanied the gale of wind which had favoured the conflagration, and penetrating the loosened work, carried the whole into deep waters.[14386]