Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 1

by George S. Boutwell

This condition of public opinion and of party division was reached as early as the twenty-ninth day of April, when Kossuth said: "Many a man has told me that if I had not fallen into the hands of the Abolitionists and Free-soilers, he would have supported me; and had I landed somewhere in the South, instead of New York, I would have met quite different things from that quarter; but being supported by the Free-soilers, of course I must be opposed by the South." All this was error. If Kossuth had been spurned by the Abolitionists and Free- soilers, he would not have been accepted by the South; for there was not a quadrennium from 1832 to 1860 when that section would have contributed to the election of Thomas Jefferson to the Presidency with the weight of the Declaration of Independence upon his shoulders, as it came from his pen, had he been in existence and eligible to the office.

Support of Kossuth, by aggressive action of by official declarations against Austria and Russia, was an impossibility for the country; and an open avowal of sympathy with his opinions and principles was an impossibility for the South or for the Democratic Party.

Henceforward Kossuth's hopes were limited to pecuniary aid for himself and his family and friends, and to expressions of sympathy for his downtrodden country by individuals, by voluntary associations, and by municipalities. All his speeches after his visit to Washington were laden with one thought, viz., the duty of all free countries to resist the spread of absolutism. Pre-eminently this duty was upon America. "Republican America," said he, "and all-overwhelming Russian absolutism cannot much longer subsist together on earth. Russia active,—America passive,—there is an immense danger in the fact; it is like the avalanche in the Alps, which the noise of a bird's wing may move and thrust down with irresistible force, growing every moment."

He quoted the declaration which the elder Cato made whenever he spoke, whether in private or in public: "However, my opinion is that Carthage must be destroyed." Imitating the language and spirit of Cato, Kossuth said: "However, the law of nations should be maintained, and absolutism not permitted to become permanent."

That he exaggerated the scope of what is called the law of nations there can be no doubt. Beyond a few points, such as the recognized rule in regard to piracy, the law of nations is very indefinite, and most certainly it has but little relation, if indeed it can be said justly to have any relation, to what he called "absolutism." Moreover, it is very doubtful whether any interference by one nation in the affairs of another nation, in whatever considerate way such interference might by presented, could produce aught but evil, in arousing the passions of jealously and hostility. Had England and the United States tendered any advice even in the affairs of Austria, Hungary and Russia, such advice would have been rejected by the nations, and indignities would have been heaped upon the officious parties. All that part of Kossuth's mission to England and the United States was hopeless from the beginning, and it seems to be an impeachment of his wisdom to assume that he ever entertained the thought that either country could or would make the cause of Hungary its own, whatever might be the general or official opinion as to the justice of the contest that Hungary had carried on.

His speeches and his private conversations justify the inference that he had a hope that in some way the influence of England and the United States might be exerted effectually in behalf of Hungary, and that through that influence the activity of Russia might be arrested. Although he looked to France for aid to the cause of Hungary, he regarded the coup d'etat of Napoleon as an adverse event,—as a step and an important step in the direction of "absolutism." On one occasion he said: "Look how French Napoleonish papers frown indignantly at the idea that the Congress of the United States dared to honor my humble self, declaring those honors to be not only offensive to Austria, but to all the European powers."

Mr. Webster delivered a speech in Boston in the month of November, 1849, when it was apprehended that Russia might assume the task of demanding of Turkey the surrender of Kossuth and others, and of executing them for crimes against Austria. On that occasion Mr. Webster claimed that the Emperor of Russia was "bound by the law of nations"; and to that declaration Kossuth often referred. The full text of Mr. Webster's speech leaves upon the mind the impression that what he then called "the law of nations" was only that general judgment of the civilized nations before which the Czar of Russia "would stand as a criminal and malefactor in the view of the public law of the world." Having this declaration in mind, Kossuth said: "It was a beautiful word of a distinguished son of Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), which I like to repeat, that every nation has precisely the same interest in international law that a private individual has in the laws of his country." Mr. Webster's speech did not justify the inference which Kossuth drew from it; but the speech itself was much less reserved than that which Mr. Webster delivered in 1852, when he held the office of Secretary of State, and spoke for the administration, at a banquet given in the city of Washington in Kossuth's honor.

When Kossuth had abandoned the hope, which his intense interest in the fate of his country had inspired, that the United States might act in behalf of Hungary, he yet returned again and again to the subject. On one occasion he said; "I take it for an axiom that there exist interests common to every nation comprised within the boundaries of the same civilization. I take it equally for certain that among these common interest none is of higher importance than the principles of international law." Nor did he hesitate to say that our indifference to the spread of "absolutism" would be attended with serious and grievous consequences: "To look indifferently at these encroachments is as much as a spontaneous abdication of the position of a power on earth. And that position abandoned, is independence abandoned." He declared that neutrality did "not involve the principles of indifferentism to the violation of the law of nations"; and he attempted to stimulate the national pride by the declaration that neutrality was the necessity of weak states, like Belgium and Switzer- land, whose neutrality was due the rivalry of other powers, and not to their own will.

These appeals were in vain, although they were made in language most attractive, and although the sympathies of the people were sincere and active in behalf of Hungary. His mission was a failure, inasmuch as neither by argument, by eloquence, nor by sympathy was he able to secure an official declaration or promise of a purpose in the national authorities to interfere in the affairs of Continental Europe. Kossuth's personal wants and the necessities of his family and friends were met by the sale of Hungarian bonds and by voluntary contributions; but no substantial aid was given to Hungary in its contest with Austria and Russia.

In his many speeches Kossuth set forth his views upon national and international topics with freedom, and often with great wisdom. Said he on one occasion: "I take political economy for a science not exactly like mathematics. It is quite a practical thing, depending upon circumstances; but in certain proceedings a negative principle exists. In political economy it is not good for the people that a prohibitory system be adopted. Protection may sometimes be of service to a nation, but prohibition never." Thus did he qualify the claim of authors and students, who assert that political economy deserves rank among the sciences, whether exact or speculative, and thus did he recognize the protective theory as adapted to the condition of states while in the transition period in the development of the higher industries.