Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 1

by George S. Boutwell

He did not assume the probability of war. Before we left he asked me whether I had seen a certain number of the Richmond Enquirer. I said that I had not. He sent for it, and gave it to me with the request that I should return it after reading the leading editorial. The editorial was upon Mr. Seward, and it was written upon the theory that he was engaged in a scheme for delaying definite action in Virginia and the other States of the South, until the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, when he would use both whip and spur. From the conversation and the editorial I inferred that he intended to have me understand that such was his purpose. It is possible he may have thought that war could be averted by dilatory proceedings.

When the report of the Committee of Thirteen was made, the border State men had high hopes that the country, both North and South, would accept its recommendations. In truth, there was no ground for believing that the Secessionists or the anti-slavery Republicans, would accept the propositions. The recommendations were more offensive to the North than the original constitution, with all the compromise legislation, considered together.

I think that there were five speeches made in support of the resolutions before a speech was made in opposition, and it fell to me to make that speech. One morning there was a conference between the Massachusetts delegation, which was composed of radical men only, and the radical members of the New York delegation, at which it was agreed that a speech should be made in opposition, and that Massachusetts should lead. The duty was put upon me, accompanied with the suggestion that I should speak that day. I had not made any preparation, but during the time that I had occupied a seat in the convention, my conviction had been strengthened that it was impossible to adopt a plan that would be acceptable to the contending parties, and consequently that any scheme of compromise that could be framed would result in a renewal of the controversy, under circumstances less favorable to the North. At that moment the government was in the hands of men who were incapable of decisive action. While we could not count upon active measures against secession on the part of Mr. Buchanan, on the other hand, the country had ample assurance that he would do nothing in aid of the unlawful proceeding. That he had declared in his message of December, 1860. Beyond that, we had a right to assume that Mr. Lincoln would maintain the Union by force. Hence, I resolved to say that no scheme would be accepted by us which did not contain an abandonment of the doctrine of secession, an acknowledgment of the legality of Mr. Lincoln's election, and a declaration that it was the duty of the whole body of citizens to render obedience to the Government. I very well knew that these terms would be rejected with scorn, as I well knew that any other terms would be rejected. Conspirators are never disposed to make terms with the party or person against whom their conspiracy is aimed, until the conspiracy has failed. Hence it was that those who humbled themselves in the dust were treated with contumely, even more offensive than the invectives which the conspirators showered upon the heads of those who neither proffered nor accepted terms of compromise.

Mr. Chittenden's report is accurate in respect to the views that I presented, but it is incomplete, as I spoke about an hour. When I began to speak, I advanced slowly up the aisle until I could look into the faces of the Virginia delegation, who occupied the settee next to the president's desk. Mr. William C. Rives was one of the Virginia delegation, a Union man, who sympathized with the border State men, and hoped by some concession to avert war. When I said that if the South persisted in secession, "the South would march its armies to the Great Lakes, or we should march ours to the Gulf of Mexico," the tears came into his eyes. My remark that the North abhorred the institution of slavery, wounded the Southern men sorely. They were not indignant, but grieved rather. At any rate, such was their aspect, and for many days the remark was repeated or referred to with the hope, apparently, of inducing me to retract or qualify it. I allowed it to stand as a truth which they might well accept.

When the day came for the final vote upon the first resolution relating to slavery as reported by the Committee of Thirteen, a meeting of the New York delegation was called in consequence of the engagement of David Dudley Field to argue a case in the Supreme Court. Mr. Field was one of the six Republican members, and associated with them were five Democrats and Conservatives.

As each State had one vote, his absence would set New York out of the contest unless the Democrats would agree that Mr. Field's vote should be counted in his absence. This proposition the Democrats refused to accept, and they gave notice that the vote of New York would be lost unless Mr. Field remained and voted. Mr. Field left, and the vote of the State was lost. There were twenty-one States represented, including Kansas, which was in a territorial condition when the convention assembled, and the Territorial Governor had sent a Conservative, Mr. Thomas Ewing, Jr. His father was a member from Ohio. When the State government of Kansas was organized, the Governor delegated a Republican. Both were allowed seats, although manifestly, Mr. Ewing should have retired.

When the vote was declared, it appeared that eight States had voted in the affirmative, and eleven States in the negative. The border State men were sorely disappointed, and some of them wept like children. The result they must have anticipated, but they had been wrought to a high condition of nervous excitement, due in part to the circumstance that they were unable to discuss the business of the convention in public. The disagreeable silence which followed the announcement of the vote, was broken by Mr. Francis Granger, who counseled calmness and deliberation, and finally, he appealed to the States of the majority to move a reconsideration. This was done by the State of Illinois, through Mr. Turner, who made the motion. The next day the resolution was adopted by a vote of nine to eight. Upon this question the Missouri delegation refused to vote, under the lead, it was said, of General Doniphan, who denounced the resolutions as not satisfactory to either side. Doniphan was a large, muscular man, who acquired some fame in the Mexican war as the leader of a cavalry expedition to California, of which nothing was heard for about six months.

The reconsideration was attributed to the interference of Mr. Lincoln or of his recognized friends.

When the convention was about to adjourn, President Tyler made a speech in which he thrice invoked the blessing of Heaven upon the doings of the convention, and from that act he went to Richmond, and in less than three days he was an avowed and recognized leader in secession. Indeed, it was understood in the convention that Mr. Seddon was his representative on the floor. The doings of the Congress were endorsed by Maryland, but in the National Congress, and in the States North and South they were neglected utterly. The result which Mr. Seward anticipated was not realized by the country.

After the arrival of Mr. Lincoln the Massachusetts delegation called upon him to recommend the selection of Mr. Chase for the Treasury Department in preference to General Cameron, and to say that the capitalists of the East would have more confidence in the former than in the latter. Mr. Lincoln did not say what his purposes were, but he made this remark: