Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

by George S. Boutwell

In a message to the Senate of the 31st of May, 1870, he urged the annexation of Santo Domingo. He said, "I feel an unusual anxiety for the ratification of this treaty, because I believe it will redound greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization, and to the extirpation of the institution of slavery." He claimed for the scheme great commercial advantages, that it was in harmony with the Monroe doctrine, and that the consummation of the measure would be notice to the states of Europe that no acquisitions of territory on this continent would be permitted. In his second inaugural address General Grant referred to the subject in these words: "In the first year of the past administration the proposition came up for the admission of Santo Domingo as a Territory of the Union. . . . I believe now, as I did then, that it was for the best interests of this country, for the people of Santo Domingo, and all concerned, that the proposition should be received favorably. It was, however, rejected constitutionally, and therefore the subject was never brought up again by me." General Grant considered the failure of the treaty as a national misfortune, but he never criticised the action of its opponents.

General Grant's firmness was shown in his veto of the Senate currency bill of 1874. It is known that unusual effort was made to convince him that the measure was wise in a financial view, and highly expedient upon political grounds. The President wrote a message in explanation of his act of approval, but upon its completion he was so much dissatisfied with his own argument that he resolved to veto the bill. Hence the veto message of April 22, 1874.

In foreign policy, the principal measure of General Grant's administration was the treaty with Great Britain of May, 1871. The specific and leading purpose of the negotiations was the adjustment of the claim made by the United States that Great Britain was liable in damages for the destruction of American vessels, and the consequent loss of commercial power and prestige, by the depredations of Confederate cruisers that were fitted out or had obtained supplies in British ports. Neither the treaty of peace of 1783, nor the subsequent treaties with Great Britain, made a full and final settlement of the fishery question or of our northern boundary-line at its junction with the Pacific Ocean. These outlying questions were considered in the negotiations, and they were adjusted by the terms of the treaty. The jurisdiction of the island of San Juan on the Pacific coast, then in controversy, was referred to the Emperor of Germany as arbitrator, with full and final power in the premises. By his award the claim of the United States was sustained.

The fishery question was referred to arbitrators, but it was a misfortune that the award was not satisfactory to the United States, and the dispute is reopened with capacity to vex the two governments for an indefinite period of time.

The claims against Great Britain growing out of the operations of the Confederate cruisers, known as the Alabama claims, were referred to arbitrators, by whose award the Government of the United States received the sum of $15,500,000. But the value of the treaty of 1871 was not in the award made. The people of the United States were embittered against the Government of Great Britain, and had General Grant chosen to seek redress by arms he would have been sustained throughout the North with substantial unanimity. But General Grant was destitute of the war spirit, and he chose to exhaust all the powers of negotiation before he would advise a resort to force. A passage in his inaugural address may have had an influence upon the policy of the British Government: "In regard to foreign policy, I would deal with nations as equitable law requires individuals to deal with each other. . . . I would respect the rights of all nations, demanding equal respect for our own. If others depart from this rule in their dealings with us, we may be compelled to follow their precedent."

The reference of the question at issue to the tribunal at Geneva was a conspicuous instance of the adjustment of a grave international dispute by peaceful methods.

By the sixth article of the treaty of 1871, three new rules were made for the government of neutral nations. These rules are binding upon the United States and Great Britain, and the contracting parties agreed to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite such powers to accede to the rules.

In those rules it is stipulated that a neutral nation should not permit a belligerent to fit out, arm, or equip in its ports any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which it is at peace. It was further agreed, as between the parties to the treaty, that neither would suffer a belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as a base of operations against the other. Finally, the parties agreed to use due diligence to prevent any infraction of the rules so established.

Mr. Fish was then Secretary of State, and to him was General Grant and the country largely indebted for the settlement of the Alabama controversy; but the settlement was in harmony with General Grant's inaugural address.

Before the final adjustment of the controversy, by the decision of the tribunal at Geneva, General Grant had occasion to consider whether the allegation against Great Britain, growing out of her recognition, in May, 1861, of the belligerent character of the Confederacy, could be maintained upon the principles of public law. Upon his own judgment he reached the conclusion that the act was an act of sovereignty within the discretion of the ruler, for which a claim in money could not be made. This opinion was accepted, finally, by his advisers, by the negotiators, and by the country.