Les honoraires dus par les parties aux avocats chargés du soin de leur défense, ne doivent pas être restraints à la taxe établie par le tarif. Cette taxe a pour objet seulement de fixer la somme due par la partie qui succombe, et non d'apprecier les soins de l'avocat, appreciation qui doit être faite selon l'importance et la difficulté du travail. Ibid. 699.

[48] Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns. Ch. Rep. 48.

[49] Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts, 338, 339.

[50] Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts. & Serg. 315; Marshall v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 16 Howard (S. C.) Rep. 336. That champerty is an offence at common law, and that contracts of that character, between client and counsel, are void on that ground, and as against public policy, will be found to have been maintained in Rust v. Larue, 4 Litt. 411; Caldwell's Administrators v. Shepherd's Heirs, 6 Monroe, 391; Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415; Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns. Ch. Rep. 48; Bleakley's case, 5 Paige, 311; Wallis v. Loubert, 2 Denio, 607; Backus v. Byron, 4 Michigan, 535; Elliott v. McClelland, 17 Alabama, 206. The cases on the other side, are, Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cowen, 643; Ramsay's Devisees v. Trent, 10 B. Monroe, 336; Bayard v. McLane, 3 Harrington, 216; Lytle v. State, 17 Arkansas, 608; Newkirk v. Cone, 18 Illinois, 449; Major v. Gibson, 1 Patton Jr. & Heath (Va.), 48; Wright v. Meek, 3 Iowa, 472. In New York, by the Revised Statutes, it was made an offence, punishable by fine or imprisonment, and removal from the Bar, for any attorney, counsellor, or solicitor, directly or indirectly to buy, or be in any manner interested in buying, or to advance or procure money to be advanced upon anything in action, with the intent, or for the purpose of bringing any suit thereon. 2 Revised Stat. 386. The Code of Procedure appears to have changed the law in this respect, and to enable parties to make such bargains as they please with their attorneys. Code of Procedure, s. 258; Satterlee v. Frazer, 2 Sandf. S. C. Rep. 142; Benedict v. Stuart, 23 Barb. 420; Ogden v. Des Arts, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 275; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 4 Kernan, 289. In Kentucky there appears to be a statute, which provides that any one not a party, receiving as compensation for services in prosecuting or defending a suit the whole or part of the subject-matter in suit, is guilty of champerty, and it has been held that this statute extends to attorneys. Davis v. Sharron, 15 B. Monroe, 64. In England, contingent fees are held to be clearly within the statutes of champerty and maintenance. Penrice v. Parker, Rep. Temp. Finch, 75.

[51] 2 Wallace, Jr. Rep. 452.

[52] 10 Casey, 299.

[53] Paciscendi quidem ille piraticus mos; et imponentium periculis pretia, procul abominanda negotiatio, etiam a mediocriter improbis aberit: cum præsertim bonos homines bonasque causas tuenti non sit metuendus ingratus, qui si futurus, malo tamen ille peccet. Quinct. Lib. xii, c. 7.

[54] Evans v. Ellis, 5 Denio, 640; Newman v. Payne, 2 Ves. 199; Walmsley v. Booth, 3 Atk. 25; Montesquieu v. Sandys, 18 Ves. 313. The doctrine has been fully followed in this country; Stockton v. Ford, 11 How. U. S. 247; Starr v. Vanderheyden, 9 Johns. 253; Howell v. Ransom, 11 Paige, 538; De Rose v. Fay, 4 Edw. Ch. 40; Lewis v. J. A., Ibid. 599; Berrien v. McLane, 1 Hoffman, Ch. Rep. 424; Miles v. Ervin, 1 McCord, Ch. Rep. 524; Rose v. Mynell, 7 Yerger, 30; Bibb v. Smith, 1 Dana, 482; Smith v. Thompson's Heirs, 7 B. Monroe, 308; Jennings v. McConnel, 17 Illinois, 148.

An agreement made by a client with his counsel, after the latter had been employed in a particular business, by which the original contract is varied, and greater compensation is secured to the counsel than may have been agreed upon when first retained, is invalid and cannot be enforced. Lecatt v. Sallee, 3 Porter, 115.

[55] In Foss's Grandeur of the Law, eighty-two existing peerages are stated to have sprung from the law. That was in 1843.