A British Rifle Man / The Journals and Correspondence of Major George Simmons, Rifle Brigade, During the Peninsular War and the Campaign of Waterloo

by George Simmons

It was, however, in the affairs of outposts and advanced guards, and on occasions when individual action was both permissible and practicable, that the value of the rifle became most apparent. Thus at the action of Tarbes on March 14, 1814, the three Battalions of the 95th attacked and ousted from an exceptionally strong position a French Division. George Simmons was severely wounded in this fight. An eye-witness belonging to another corps thus describes the attack, and in words which convey a good idea of the methods of Riflemen under such circumstances: "Our Rifles were immediately sent to dislodge the French from the hills on our left, and our Battalion was ordered to support them. Nothing could exceed the manner in which the 95th set about this business. Certainly I never saw such skirmishers as the 95th, now the Rifle Brigade. They could do the work much better and with infinitely less loss than any other of our best Light troops. They possessed an individual boldness, a mutual understanding, and a quickness of eye in taking advantage of the ground, which, taken altogether, I never saw equalled. They were, in fact, as much superior to the French Voltigeurs as the latter were to our skirmishers in general. As our regiment was often employed in supporting them, I think I am fairly qualified to speak of their merits."[2]

Unquestionably the most pressing military problem of the present day is how to conduct an attack on troops armed (as all infantry are now) with magazine rifles, which, owing to their flat trajectory and extraordinary rapidity and precision of fire, are overwhelming in their effects against favourable targets up to 2000 yards.

The object-lesson most recently before us is that of the fight at Khartoum, where the absolute impossibility of masses of men advancing under modern artillery and rifle fire, although known to students of war, was practically demonstrated again to the whole world. The unusually heavy losses experienced by our troops in the fighting on the Indian Frontier in 1897 were mostly due to the able manner in which the Afridis and other tribesmen took advantage of the ground and worked in unison (as did the Riflemen at Tarbes and on many another battlefield) to assist and support one another, and thus develop their fire so as to obtain the maximum value from it with the minimum exposure and loss to themselves. The accounts by officers who served in that campaign bear a striking resemblance to some of the instances narrated by George Simmons of the methods of fighting of the Riflemen during the Peninsular War. Thus the French captain's description in Chapter V. of the attack of the British Riflemen at Vimeiro, and the heavy losses he sustained, especially in officers, is almost an exact repetition of some of the accounts of the fights in the Tirah Campaign of 1897.

Sir John Kincaid, who served throughout the Peninsular War, and was adjutant of the 1st Battalion 95th Rifles at Waterloo, says truly that his corps, as "the Light regiment of the Light Division, fired the first and last shot in almost every battle, siege, or skirmish, in which the army was engaged during the war." But he hastens to add that he considered the 43rd and 52nd Light Infantry as a part of the Rifles, "for they bore a share in everything, and although the nature of our arm generally gave us more employment in the way of skirmishing, yet, whenever it came to a pinch, independent of a suitable mixture of them among us, we had only to look behind to see a line in which we might place a degree of confidence almost equal to our hopes in heaven; nor were we ever disappointed. There never was a corps of Riflemen in the hands of such supporters."

It is notoriously dangerous to prophesy, but I am presumptuous enough to believe that the difficult problem of the conduct of attacks in the future will in all probability be solved by adopting some system based on the methods originated and carried out so successfully by the first regiment of Riflemen in the British service during the Peninsular War, of which the account of their attack on the French position at Tarbes, given by the author of Twelve Years' Military Adventure, is a good example. It is, of course, an integral part of the system that the firing line should be intelligently and effectively supported, so as to give those committed to the forefront of the battle that superb confidence, both in themselves and in their comrades behind, so admirably described by Kincaid.

Such confidence can only come from careful training and fellowship in peace time, followed by experience on active service under fire, and this is precisely what the celebrated Light Division was fortunate enough to obtain. For it was largely due to the marvellous training of the Light Brigade, consisting of these same three regiments, under Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe during the years 1803 to 1805 that the gallant Craufurd was able to achieve the splendid results he did, first with the "Light Brigade," and later with his famous "Light Division."

But there was another element which should on no account be ignored, and which unquestionably had much to do with the successful training under Moore. On the Rifle Corps being first raised in 1800, the Colonel, Coote Manningham, set to work to train the officers and men thoroughly in the duties of Riflemen in the field. In that year he issued a small book entitled Regulations for the Rifle Corps. The most noticeable point in this is the great importance he attached to what is known as the "Company system." Starting with the axiom that "In a regiment of Riflemen, each company must be formed upon the principle of being separate from, and totally independent of, another," the whole of the book is permeated with the same ideas. Thus it is laid down that transfers of officers or men from one company to another are not to be made unless absolutely necessary, since "Riflemen, being liable to act very independently of each other, and in numerous small detachments in the field, will feel the comfort and utility of their own officer, non-commissioned officers, and comrades with them, and the service will be benefited by the tie of friendship."

Captains were held responsible for the whole training of their men, and were directed "to offer premiums" for those who became good rifle shots. These were to be styled "marksmen" and to wear "a green cockade!"

The Regulations are of especial interest nowadays, since they show that as early as the first year of this century there were soldiers, such as Coote Manningham and his second-in-command, Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. William Stewart (to whom no small share of their compilation is most justly ascribed), who realised the importance of educating the soldier of that day and also in treating him with consideration.

Thus a regimental school was founded and a library provided, periodical examinations were held of the scholars, and lectures on military subjects were given to officers and men. An excellent series of lectures given by Coote Manningham to the 95th Rifles at Shorncliffe in 1803 is still extant.[3]