Now this Absolute, the element of existence which accompanies all other elements in consciousness, is the only one with which the argument has at all concerned itself, and yet this is evidently not the Absolute in which the author is chiefly interested. There can be no good reason for calling this Absolute either Unknowable, Incomprehensible, or Inscrutable. It is not a "Power" for it is simply the element of existence, nor is it a "Reality," for the "abstract of all thoughts, ideas, or conceptions" must be common to the unreal or imaginary as well as to the real. It is (mental) existence pure and simple. If the argument be good, this element is known completely and just as it is; indefinitely, it is true, but then it is indefinite, and if known definitely would not be known as it is. There is nothing farther about it to know. It is in no sense Unknowable. If the objection be to the use of the word "know" where the knowledge is indefinite, we should invent some word to apply to an indefinite consciousness; but such consciousness, if denied to be knowledge, should not be classed with ignorance. Moreover, as knowledge is of all degrees of definiteness, we should need a series of words to express the gradations. The series would be a long one.
But the Absolute which interests Mr. Spencer, and which throws that halo of the mysterious about his philosophy, is a something distinct from the Absolute in consciousness, and not known as it is. It is by no means that which is common to "impressions" made upon us, but the something assumed to make these impressions. It is "under," "apart from," and "behind" appearances and modes—which an Absolute, which is simply that which is common to appearances and modes, cannot be. Phenomena (the things immediately known) are only "a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon,"[62] and this Absolute cannot take its place among phenomena, as the former must. The two Absolutes are, indeed, quite distinct things: one of them, the one in consciousness, has been shown to exist; no argument is forthcoming to prove the existence of the other. Manifestly it is not immediately known, for then it would be a phenomenon, however indefinite. Upon what ground is it inferred? It is the old problem of Descartes and Locke.
This problem Mr. Spencer solves in the same way as they, by assuming the "external" object to be given immediately; but there is this important difference, that whereas Descartes and Locke fall into the error from inadvertence, the author of the "First Principles" and the "Principles of Psychology" embraces it deliberately. The two earlier writers were sometimes able to recognize as two things a something in consciousness and an assumed something without. They confused them only now and then. Mr. Spencer has been unable to distinguish them with clearness at any time, and he elevates the confusion into a principle.
"The postulate with which metaphysical reasoning sets out, is that we are primarily conscious only of our sensations—that we certainly know we have these, and that if there be anything beyond these serving as cause for them, it can be known only by inference from them.
"I shall give much surprise to the metaphysical reader if I call in question this postulate; and the surprise will rise into astonishment if I distinctly deny it. Yet I must do this. Limiting the proposition to those epi-peripheral feelings produced in us by external objects (for these are alone in question) I see no alternative but to affirm that the thing primarily known, is not that a sensation has been experienced, but that there exists an outer object."[63]
"The question here is—What does consciousness directly testify? And the direct testimony of consciousness is, that Time and Space are not within but without the mind; and so absolutely independent of it that they cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the mind to become non-existent."[64]
The moral of the first bit quoted would seem to be, unless we make the word "primarily" refer only to order in time, that one knows immediately what is beyond consciousness and mediately what is in it—a use of words satisfactory, I should think, to no one but Mr. Spencer. If, by "primarily" be meant "previously," and the two classes of being are known in just the same way, why distinguish between the classes? Moreover, in this case a thing would not be known "through" appearances, but before them. Upon the other supposition, to be sure, appearances would be known "through" it—a mode of speaking not in harmony with the language of the "First Principles." It seems a choice between Scylla and Charybdis.
The second extract makes consciousness "directly testify" not only to what is beyond its pale, but, putting on the spirit of prophecy, even to what does not belong to the present, but to a possible future. When we speak of consciousness as testifying to a sensation, we mean simply that the sensation is in consciousness. The word cannot be used in this sense in speaking of what is beyond consciousness. In what sense is it used? It would seem to mean, if it mean anything, that consciousness gives one the right to infer a something beyond—a right which thoughtful men believe should be established by proof. This proof, one cannot, of course, expect from a man who makes the thing beyond consciousness the thing "primarily" known. It would be more consistent in him to attempt a proof that there is something in consciousness.
This complete confusion in Mr. Spencer's mind of things in consciousness and things without, will explain why he keeps talking of his two Absolutes as if there were only one, as if this one were the one of which we are conscious, and yet as if this one were beyond consciousness. His pages swarm with illustrations which I might give. I shall give only the following: "Thus the consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena, has been growing ever clearer; and must eventually be freed from its imperfections."[65] If Mr. Spencer ever comes to a consciousness that sameness in sense seventh is not sameness in sense first, he will find work before him in remodeling his doctrine.
The second confusion upon which I wish to comment comes to the surface in a sentence occurring near the end of the lengthy extract quoted at the outset: "And since the only possible measure of relative validity among our beliefs, is the degree of their persistence in opposition to the efforts made to change them, it follows that this which persists at all times, under all circumstances, and cannot cease until consciousness ceases, has the highest validity of any."