CONTENTS.
PART I.
THE KINDS OF SAMENESS.
| PAGE. | ||
| Sec. 1. | Object of the Monograph, | [5] |
| " 2. | Sameness in Sense First, or Strict Identity, | [6] |
| " 3. | Sameness in Sense Second, | [6] |
| " 4. | Sameness in Sense Third, | [6] |
| " 5. | Sameness in Sense Fourth, | [11] |
| " 6. | Sameness in Sense Fifth, | [12] |
| " 7. | Sameness in Sense Sixth, | [14] |
| " 8. | Sameness in Sense Seventh, | [16] |
| " 9. | The Samenesses of "External" Things, | [31] |
| " 10. | Ambiguity of the Word "Self," | [34] |
| " 11. | The Samenesses of the Self, | [35] |
| " 12. | Samenesses of the Self as Noumenon or Substance, | [35] |
| " 13. | Samenesses of the "Real" Self out of Consciousness, | [37] |
| " 14. | Samenesses of the Self in Consciousness, | [38] |
| " 15. | Samenesses of the Self in Consciousness (continued), | [42] |
| " 16. | Samenesses of the Self in Consciousness (continued), | [43] |
| " 17. | The Self as "Form," and its Samenesses, | [43] |
| " 18. | Summary of Results of the Foregoing Analysis, | [48] |
| " 19. | The Element Common to the Kinds of Sameness, | [54] |
| " 20. | Use of the Word Identity, | [64] |
PART II.
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.
| Sec. 21. | The Error of Heraclitus, | [67] |
| " 22. | The Climax of Cratylus, | [68] |
| " 23. | The Parmenidean Argument for the Eternity of "Being," | [68] |
| " 24. | Gorgias and Samenesses Fifth and Sixth, | [69] |
| " 25. | Plato and the Eleatic "One," | [70] |
| " 26. | Aristotle's Treatment of Samenesses, | [82] |
| " 27. | The Confusions of Pyrrho, and Their Results | [84] |
| " 28. | Sameness and the Dispute concerning Universals, | [88] |
| " 29. | Descartes' Confusion of Samenesses, | [98] |
| " 30. | Spinoza's Argument to Prove every Substance Infinite, | [108] |
| " 31. | Locke's Confusion of Sense First and Sense Seventh, | [111] |
| " 32. | Berkeley's Error concerning Sense Sixth, | [120] |
| " 33. | John Stuart Mill on the Kinds of Sameness, | [122] |
| " 34. | The Spencerian "Unknowable," and Samenesses Seventh and Second, | [124] |
| " 35. | The Confusions at the Basis of Dr. McCosh's "Realism," | [134] |
| " 36. | Sameness and the Infinite Divisibility of Space, | [143] |
| " 37. | Conclusion, | [152] |
[1] Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. 2, Chap. 27, § 3.
[2] Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bk. 2, Chap. 2, § I, and Bk. 2, Chap. 23, § 1. et seq.
[3] Kritik der reinen Vernunft.—"Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung aller Gegenstände überhaupt in Phænomena und Noumena." Kant's Sämmtliche Werke, herausgegeben von Hartenstein. Leipzig, 1867, 3er Band, s. 209, et seq. See also, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft; Vorrede; and the discussion: "Wie eine Erweiterung der reinen Vernunft in praktischer Absicht, ohne damit ihr Erkenntniss als speculativ, zugleich zu erweitern, zu denken möglich sei?" I Th. II B. II Hptst.; same edition, 5er Bd., s. 5, 140. I am not concerned here with the inner contradiction of the Kantian system. The notion of noumena predominantly in Kant's mind, was, I think, about as I have stated. He would not, of course, have denied "reality" to phenomena, but his misconception of Berkeley, and the satisfaction with which he settles down to the noumenal in the Critique of the Practical Reason, show that he felt toward the "blos Erscheinung" very much as Locke felt toward mere ideas. Cf. "Essay," Bk. 4, Chap. 11, § 7.
[4] There is, of course, no reason why he may not add as many more classes as he pleases, and justify the additions as he justifies this. Men do not do this, as a matter of fact, but that is no reason.
[5] Ueberweg. See Krauth's Ed. of Berkeley's "Principles," Phila., 1874, p. 343.