[46] See my "Conception of the Infinite," Ch. VI (J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia). It is but fair to state that my criticism of Realism in this volume is directed against the "ante rem" Realism. I did not have the Moderate Realism in mind, and what I said will not apply to it.
[47] Hauréau. Philos. Scholastique. Paris, 1872. I, p. 281.
[48] Historia Calamitatum, quoted by Hauréau. I, p. 324.
[49] Species est tota substantia individuorum, totaque species eademque in singulis reperitur individuis: itaque species una est substantia, ejus vero individua multæ personæ, et hæ multæ personæ sunt illa una substantia. (Sentent., p. I, c. III.)—Quoted by Hauréau, I, p. 328.
[50] Hauréau, I, 380-381. The argument is taken from the De Intellectibus.
[51] Méditation Deuxième.—Ed. Simon, Paris, 1860, pp. 76-78.
In this extract the author attempts to distinguish between what is thought and what is perceived by the senses or imagined. Had he remained within the sphere of the immediately known, one could not have objected to such a distinction. Sameness in sense third is something highly complex, implying that elaboration of mental elements which we call thought. It is quite just to distinguish the notion "a bit of wax" from any single sense experience or picture of the imagination. In doing this Descartes was searching for sameness in sense third. But when he leaves the sphere of consciousness, and assumes that what remains the same in the bit of wax is something distinct from the sum total of experiences, as men are distinct from their garments, he falls into error. It is against this that the criticism in the text is directed.
[52] Méditation Troisième, pp. 83-85.
[53] "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision." Sec. 44. Works: ed. Fraser. Oxford 1871. Vol. I, p. 53.
[54] Ibid., § 45.