The result was that, though I was greatly cheered by his action, there was not one word that I could use, or that could be used, to help us in our struggle in Canada. I always felt, however, that it was only a question of time when he would be heartily with us.
Lord Salisbury about this time invited me to an evening reception at 20 Arlington Street. When there I mentioned to him shortly what I had come over for, and told him I wished to have a long talk with him if he could spare the time. He said, “Certainly, we must have a talk,” and he fixed the following Wednesday, the 14th May.
At this time there was an acute difficulty between the United States Government and the British Government over the seizures of Canadian vessels engaged in the Behring’s Sea seal fisheries. A number of Canadian vessels had been seized by United States cruisers, their crews imprisoned, and their property confiscated. The Canadian Government had complained bitterly, and, after much discussion, two Canadian Ministers, Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper and Sir John Thompson, were in Washington engaged, with the assistance of the British Ambassador, in negotiations with the Hon. James Blaine, United States Secretary of State, endeavouring to settle the Behring’s Sea question, as well as several other matters which were in dispute.
Having watched matters very closely in the United States, I had come to the conclusion that the Washington authorities had no serious intention to settle anything finally. We had made a treaty with them before in 1888, which had arranged the matters in dispute upon a fair basis, and when everything was agreed upon and settled, waiting only for the ratification by the United States Senate, that body threw it out promptly and left everything as it was. This action was at once followed by the retaliation message delivered by President Cleveland, which was a most unfriendly and insulting menace to Canada. I felt confident that they were determined to keep the disputes open for some future occasion, when Great Britain might be in difficulties, and a casus belli might be convenient.
The New York Daily Commercial Bulletin openly declared in November, 1888, that the questions of the fisheries, etc., “in all human probability will be purposely left open in order to force the greater issue (viz., political union) which, as it seems to us, none but a blind man can fail to see is already looming up with unmistakable distinctness in the future.”
At this reception at Lord Salisbury’s I was discussing the negotiations at Washington with Lord George Hamilton, then First Lord of the Admiralty, expressing my fears that they would come to nothing, and pointing out the dangers before us. He seemed somewhat impressed, and said, “I wish you would talk it over with Sir Philip Currie,” then permanent Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and he took me across the room and introduced me to Sir Philip, to whom I expressed my opinion that the negotiations at Washington would fail and that the United States Government would not agree to anything. While I was talking to him I was watching him closely, and I came to the conclusion, from his expression, that he was positively certain that the matter was either settled or on the very point of being settled, and I stopped suddenly and said, “I believe, Sir Philip, you think this is settled. You know all about it, and I know nothing, but I tell you now, that although you may believe it is all agreed upon, I say that it is not, and that either the Senate or the House of Representatives, or the President, or all of them put together, will at the last moment upset everything.” I do not think he liked my persistence, or felt that the conversation was becoming difficult, but he laughed good-naturedly and said, “Nobody will make me believe that the Americans are not the most friendly people possible, but I must just go and speak to Lord ——” whose name I did not catch, and he left me.
The next week I had my interview with Lord Salisbury and put my arguments from an Imperial point of view as powerfully as I could, told him of the dangers of the Commercial Union movement, of the desperate struggle I could see coming in the general election that was approaching in Canada, told him of our dread of a free expenditure of United States money in our elections, and pointed out to him that the real way to prevent any difficulty was to have a preferential tariff or commercial union arrangement with Great Britain, which would satisfy our people, and entirely checkmate the movement in favour of reciprocity with the States.
Lord Salisbury listened attentively and at last he said, “I am fast coming to the opinion that the real way to consolidate the empire would be by means of a Zollverein and a Kriegsverein.” I was delighted, “That,” I said, “gives me all my case,” and I urged him to say something publicly in that direction that we could use in Canada to inspire our loyal people, and put that hope and confidence in them which would carry our elections. He did not say whether he would or not, but I knew then that at heart he was with us.
As a matter of fact, he did speak in a friendly tone at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet at the Guildhall on the 9th November following, and afterwards followed it up with a much more direct speech at Hastings on the 18th May, 1892.
I then said that nothing could be done until the German-Belgian Treaties of 1862 were denounced. He asked me why, and I told him the effect of the treaties was to bar any such arrangement. He did not know of the particular clauses and could hardly believe they existed. When told he would find I was right, he said, “That is most unfortunate, and they will have to be denounced.” I thanked him for taking that view and felt that I had a strong ally on both points. From subsequent conversations and from many letters received from him during the following ten or twelve years, I always relied upon him as a true friend who would help us at the first possible opportunity.