The Struggle for Imperial Unity: Recollections & Experiences

by George T. Denison

I met Lord Roberts shortly after and I pressed the matter upon him. He had not known of the Government report, and consequently listened to my arguments attentively and seemed impressed, for I may say that 1897 was the worst year in all our history as to the manner in which the supply of food was distributed among the nations.

Mr. Spencer Wilkinson seemed to be much interested in my talks with him, and one day he said, “I wish you could have a conversation with some great authority on the other side of the question, who would understand the matter and be able to answer you.” I replied, “That is what I should like very much. Tell me the best man you have and I will tackle him. If he throws me over in the gutter in our discussion it will be a good thing, for then I shall learn something.” Mr. Wilkinson laughed at my way of putting it, and said, “If that is what you want, Sir Robert Giffen is the man for you to see.” I said I would try and get a letter of introduction to him. Mr. Wilkinson said he would give me one, and did so.

I called to see Sir Robert Giffen. He received me very kindly, and we had an interesting interview of about an hour. The moment I broached the subject of the food supply he said at once, “That question came up some two or three years ago, and I was called upon to inquire into the whole matter and report upon it, and my report in a few words was, that we must have the command of the sea, and that once that was secured, then, by paying the somewhat enhanced war prices, we could get all the grain required.” My reply was, “Then, as you have fully inquired into the question, you can tell me what you could do under certain conditions. In case of a war between Great Britain and Russia combined with the United States, followed by an embargo on food products, where and how would you get your supplies?” Sir Robert said, “We do not expect to go to war with the United States and Russia at the same time.” I said, “You were within an ace of war with the United States only a year ago over the Venezuelan difficulty, and Great Britain and Russia have been snarling at each other over the Indian Frontier for years, and if you go to war with either, you must count on having the other on your hands.”

Sir Robert then said, “But I said we must have the command of the sea.” I replied, “I will give you the complete, undoubted, absolute command of the sea, everywhere all the time, although you are not likely to have it; and then in case of an embargo on wheat and foodstuffs where are you to get your supplies?” He said, “We would get some from Canada and other countries.” I pointed out that all they sent was only a fraction. Sir Robert then said, “They could not put on an embargo, for it would ruin their trade.” I told him that I was talking about war and not about peace and trade, and said that no desire for trade induced the Germans to sell wheat to Paris during the siege of 1870. His idea had been that, in case of war with Russia or the United States, or both, holding the command of the sea, Great Britain would allow foodstuffs to be exported to neutral countries such as Belgium or Holland, and then England would import from those countries. My answer to that was, that if England had the command of the sea, the United States or Russia would have only one weapon, an embargo, and they would certainly use it. He seemed cornered in the argument, and said, “Well, if we cannot get bread we can eat meat. I eat very little bread.” I said, “The British people use about 360 lbs. per head of wheat per annum, and about 90 lbs. of meat, and a great deal of meat would be stopped too”; and I said on leaving, “I wish you would investigate this thoroughly again, and let the Government know, for I know they are depending upon your report at the War Office”; and then I left him.

When at Liverpool shortly after on my way back to Canada, I asked the manager of the Bank of Liverpool, to whom I had a letter of introduction, if he would introduce me to the highest authority on the corn trade in Liverpool. He introduced me to the late Mr. Paul, ex-President of the Corn Exchange, and I had a long conversation with him on the question of the food supply. As soon as I mentioned the subject he told me that the corn trade people in Liverpool had been asked from London to make a report on the possibility of supplying grain in case of war. Mr. Paul told me that they had considered the matter (I suppose he meant the leading corn merchants), and that their report was practically that they must have the command of the sea, that was essential; but that secured, and the enhanced war prices paid, they could supply all the corn required in any contingency. I questioned him as I had Sir Robert Giffen and found the same underlying belief. The law of supply and demand would settle the question. The corn would be allowed to go in neutral ships to neutral ports, and then be transhipped to England. An embargo had not been considered or treated seriously as a possibility, and when I cornered him so that he could not answer my arguments, he said, “Well, if we could not get wheat we could live on potatoes.” I told him potatoes could not be kept over a year, that a large quantity was imported which would be stopped. I said he had better make another report. The whole thing was very disheartening to me, for I saw how the Government were depending upon peaceful traders for information how to guard against war dangers.

In 1902 when Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed a small tax on wheat and flour, I was pleased to see that Sir Robert Giffen was the first prominent man to write to the Press endorsing and approving of the bread tax, as it was called. It showed me that Sir Robert had carefully considered the question, and was manly enough to advocate what was not altogether a popular idea.

After my return to Canada I prepared an article for the Nineteenth Century on the “Situation in England,” and it appeared in the December number, 1897. In this I pointed out the danger of the condition of the food supply, and the article attracted a considerable amount of attention in the British Press, in comments, notices, letters, etc. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in a speech at Bristol, in January, 1898, referred to the question, and in a way contradicted the points I had brought out in the Nineteenth Century article. My conversations the summer before with Lord Wolseley, Sir Robert Giffen, and Mr. Paul had so alarmed me at the false security in which the Government were resting, that when I saw Sir Michael Hicks-Beach relying on the same official reports, I determined, although I had never met him, to write him direct, and on the 20th January, 1898, I wrote, drawing his attention to a remark which he was reported to have made that “in any war England would have many friends ready to supply corn,” and I said, “Our League sent a deputation to England last summer to draw attention to the danger of the food supply. I was chairman of it. Since my return I published an article in the Nineteenth Century giving our views. I enclose a reprint which I wish you could read. If you have not time please give me one minute to examine the enclosed diagram (cut out of the Chicago Tribune) showing the corn export of the world. This shows that Russia and the United States control, not including the Danubian ports, nearly 95 per cent. of the world’s needs, and if they were to put an embargo on the export of food of all kinds, where would be the ‘many friends ready to supply England with corn?’”

Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, now Lord St. Aldwyn, with great courtesy wrote me a personal letter, in which he thanked me for my letter, and went on to say:

I do not think that the sentence you quote “that in any war England would have many friends ready to supply corn” quite accurately represents what I said on that subject. The report was necessarily much condensed. But it would be true if (say) we were at war with the United States alone: or if we were at war with one or more of the European Powers and the United States were neutral. In either of such cases the interests of the neutral Powers in access to our market would be so strong, that our enemy would not venture to close it to them, in the only possible way, viz.: by declaring corn contraband of war. And I think that if the United States were the neutral party, self-interest would weigh more with them than their ill feeling towards us, whatever the amount of that feeling may be.