The Struggle for Imperial Unity: Recollections & Experiences

by George T. Denison

And what are we in Canada doing? We are following the example of the Chinese, and trusting to the forbearance and sense of honesty of other nations, instead of relying upon our own strength and the strength of the empire, to which we could better appeal if we did our own share properly.

Thirty-eight thousand militia, drilled spasmodically, without the necessary equipment and departments, without reserves, or even rifles to arm them, is no contribution to the strength of the empire. This should be changed at once. We should establish depots for training our fishermen and sailors to supplement the royal naval reserve, and the guns with which to train them, the barracks in which to house them, and the permanent instructional staff necessary to drill them, if judiciously placed in batteries in front of St. John, N.B., Charlottetown, Quebec, and other seaports, would be aiding the British navy, which protects our mercantile marine, while matters could be arranged to make them a defence for those seaports, which at present would be at the mercy of any swift cruiser that, evading pursuit, might approach their wharves. (Hear, hear.)

Our militia should be largely increased, and supplies of all kinds provided, and in agreeing to do our share in developing and strengthening the military resources of the empire, in our own borders, we could fairly ask the mother country to remedy a danger which at present menaces the safety of our race.

I spoke very plainly on this point of the food supply last year, but the intervening months have produced such strong evidence in support of my arguments that I wish to draw attention to the subject again. I said last year that an embargo on foodstuffs in Russia and the United States, rigidly carried out, would force the surrender of the mother country in a very few months. I have been told by trade theorists in England that the demand would create the supply, and that England could purchase food through neutral countries. I argued that an embargo by the two countries mentioned would necessarily be followed by an embargo in all important countries at once, and in all other countries as soon as their surplus was exported. This last year has seen this view triumphantly vindicated. Mr. Leiter effected a corner in wheat in Chicago, purchasers became alarmed, prices increased, and wheat began to be picked up in other countries. What was the result? Spain, a country which about feeds itself, put on an embargo. I believe Italy did the same, or was on the point of doing so, while an embargo was being discussed in France and Germany. If this could be the result of the cornering operations of one dealer in one town in one exporting country, what would have happened if those two countries which control nearly nine-tenths of the wheat exports of the world were to withhold that amount?

I have been told that no country could put on an embargo, that the people would rebel against being prevented from selling their produce, but I have one example which conclusively proves my argument. The southern States had the bulk of the cotton supply of the world when the Civil war broke out in 1860. Their main industry was growing cotton, their capital, labour, and business were mainly involved in the production and sale of it. To force Great Britain to recognise and assist them, in other words, to bring pressure to bear upon a neutral power, the southern Government placed an embargo on the export of cotton. At Great Britain’s request the northern Government agreed to give permits to let it go to England. So that it was not the blockade alone which prevented its export. The southern Government maintained a strict embargo. When their troops were forced back the stores of cotton were seized and paid for by the Confederate Government by receipts and Government bonds, and the cotton was burned. Mrs. Jefferson Davis, in her memoirs, says that her husband grudged every pound that got out. Now let us see what was the result of this embargo, and how far it was possible to enforce it. In 1860, England imported from the United States 1,115,890,608 pounds; in 1861, England imported from the United States, 819,500,528 pounds; in 1862, England imported from the United States 13,524,224 pounds; in 1863, England imported from the United States 6,394,080 pounds; in 1864, England imported from the United States 14,198,688 pounds. The drop from 1,115,890,608 to 6,394,080 pounds, about one-half of one per cent, shows how complete this embargo was. The cotton famine has not been forgotten. The loss to the English people has been computed at £65,000,000, and yet this only affected one industry in one section of one kingdom. (Hear, hear.)

Nine-tenths of the population were able to help; the tenth affected, and there was abundance of food for all. But extend that pressure, and let it be in food, which no one can do without, and let it extend over the whole ten-tenths (as would be the case in the event of a stoppage of food) and try to imagine the misery that would follow. Food would have to be rationed to rich and poor alike, for the starving masses would not allow all there was to be monopolised by the wealthy. Under such conditions, what heart could the Government be expected to display in the conduct of the struggle? Russia and the United States could control the export of 40,000,000 quarters out of 45,375,000 quarters exported by all nations in 1897. The late war between the United States and Spain is said to have cost the States nearly $500,000,000. If the Government of Russia and the United States bought the full surplus from their people of 320,000,000 bushels at the present market price, it would only cost them about $225,000,000, while even at $1 a bushel it would only be $320,000,000—the cheapest and most effective war measure that could be adopted. And this could be done by these countries without their having one war vessel. I repeat, therefore, that this is the weak point of our empire; our food should be grown under our own flag, or there should be large stores in England, and a preference which would increase the growth of wheat to the extent of 10,000,000 quarters additional in the British Isles would be the best spent money for defence that could be expended, and a preference to the colonies would soon produce the balance within the Empire. (Hear, hear.)

We should urge this upon the mother country, not because it would help us enormously, though that is no reason why we should not urge it, but because danger to the mother country is danger to us all.

These are the two points for us to look forward to, a thorough organisation of our own forces in Canada, with a liberal assistance from us toward the royal naval reserve and other defences of the empire, and a provision, for the food supply of the empire being made safe. These should go together, for there is not much use in our sending our sailors, well trained, to man war vessels, to defend our empire, unless it is understood that a ship without food is as useless as one without guns, or powder or coal or men. A number of requisites are absolutely necessary to make an effective navy, or an effective defence, and the want of one makes all the others useless, and food is one of these indispensable requisites. We cannot press this too earnestly upon the mother country, but we cannot talk to them about their duties or necessities until we first attend to ours, and show our willingness to take up our share of the common burden. The answer to my argument from the English point of view is that my suggestion to secure a safe supply of food might be a great material advantage to Canada. This should not be considered. A preference to the British farmer would increase the growth of wheat to sixteen or seventeen million quarters in the United Kingdom. This would do us no good financially, but would be a great service to us, because it would make our empire more secure.

If large stores of grain were accumulated in England, it would be no advantage to us pecuniarily, but it would strengthen the whole empire, and I for one would be delighted to see either plan adopted, for at present none of us are safe. No nation or power can be independent that is not self-dependent. The lesson taught us by the course of events is to consolidate and unite our empire, both for trade and defence. (Applause.)

Another movement which has spread over the Empire was started this year to help Imperial sentiment. Mrs. Clementine Fessenden of Hamilton wrote to the Hon. G. W. Ross suggesting the establishment of an Empire Day to be celebrated in the schools by patriotic exercises, readings, and addresses. Mr. Ross was favourably impressed with the idea and inaugurated the movement at a large meeting held in the Theatre of the Normal School, Toronto, on the 23rd May 1899, which was attended by most of the school teachers of the City and many others. I was asked by Mr. Ross to address the meeting, which I did. Mr. Ross himself, Mr. N. F. Rowell and Mr. Sanford Evans were the other speakers. This idea has been taken up by Lord Meath in England, and has spread throughout the empire, but that meeting in the Normal School was the beginning of the movement.