This interview proves that Sir Wilfrid Laurier at that time had no intention of sending a contingent.
On the 7th October Sir Wilfrid Laurier left for Chicago, and returned to Ottawa on the 12th. The Boer ultimatum had been given on the 9th October, was refused by Lord Milner on the 10th, and war opened on the 11th. This turned Sir Wilfrid back. He travelled on the train from Chicago with Mr. J. S. Willison, editor of the Globe, who urged him strongly to send a contingent at once. I called to see Sir Wilfrid on his way through Toronto in order to press the matter upon him. He had evidently made up his mind, for he told me he would send a contingent no matter whether it broke up his Government or not, that it was the right thing to do and he would do it. He was anxious, however, about how his own people would take it, and told me that Mr. Bourassa would resign as a protest, and he seemed very sorry that it should be so. I was very much pleased at the decision and firmness he evinced, and have always been very grateful to him for his action in this matter, as in many other things in the interest of the Empire.
On the next day, the 13th October, the Order in Council was passed. It provided that a certain number of volunteers in units of 125 men each with a few officers, would be accepted to serve in the British army operating in South Africa, the moment they reached the coast, provided the expense of their equipment and transportation to South Africa was defrayed, either by themselves or by the Canadian Government, and the Government undertook to provide the equipment and transportation for 1,000 men.
I knew that it was the intention to send these eight units of 125 men each, as distinct units to be attached to eight different British regular infantry regiments, and that no officer of higher rank than a captain was to be sent. I felt that our men would be swallowed up and lost, and could gain no credit under such conditions. I therefore published in the Globe of the 14th October the following letter:
The Globe on Wednesday morning published in its Ottawa correspondence a proposed scheme for a Canadian contingent for the war in South Africa.
If the Imperial Government proposes, as the report indicates, to enlist a number of units of one hundred and twenty-five men each, to be attached to the British Infantry Regiments, and to be paid and maintained at imperial expense, there can be no objection raised to their doing it, in any way they like, and under any conditions that may be agreed upon between the imperial authorities and the Canadians who enlist in what will practically be British regiments. Of course, these units will not be a Canadian contingent, any more than were the 40,000 Canadians who fought in the northern army during the civil war, or the large numbers who fought in the ranks of the United States army and navy in the late Spanish war. A thousand Canadians may go and fight for the Empire in the British army, but it will not be a Canadian contingent, nor will it represent Canadian sentiment, or a Canadian desire to aid the Empire. For what part will the six millions who stay at home contribute to that contingent?
If Canada sends a contingent as her share in helping the common cause, she should send a force commanded by our own officers, and paid and maintained by our own people. They should feel that they represent our country, and that the honour of all who stay at home is in their keeping. Men would go in such a corps for such a purpose who would never dream of enlisting as the ordinary Tommy Atkins, in regiments they did not know, among comrades unfamiliar, and under strange officers. A Canadian contingent sent to represent our militia and country in an imperial quarrel would attract the very best of our young men, but every officer should be a Canadian.
The slurs that have been thrown out in some quarters, that our officers are not qualified, are not based upon fact, and are grossly insulting to our people. We have had over 35,000 militia for over thirty years, we have had a Military College of the highest class for over twenty years, a permanent corps for over fifteen years, a number of our officers have been sent for long courses of instruction at Aldershot, and not long since 6,000 of our militia were engaged in a campaign of some four months’ duration. If Canada with all that experience has not produced one man fit to command a battalion of infantry, we are too inferior a type of fellaheen to offer assistance to anyone. I repudiate, however, any such idea of inferiority. It does not exist, and even if it did, our own Government should not admit it until it has been clearly proven.
It has been said that our men have not had war service, and that a lieutenant-colonel in command of a battalion in war must have war experience. I examined the list of imperial battalions published in this evening’s Telegram, as being in South Africa, or told off to be sent there, and I find, after consulting Hart’s army list, that out of these thirty-four battalions seventeen are commanded by lieutenant-colonels who have had war service, and the same number by lieutenant-colonels who have never had experience of any kind in active operations. An examination of our militia list of the 1st April last shows that in the seniority lists of lieutenant-colonels there are no less than seventy-six who have the crossed swords before their names, indicating that they have had active service. It seems strange that out of the seventy-six one could not be found sufficiently qualified. Let us send a Canadian contingent entirely our own, and at our own cost. Let us send the best we have, and then let us stand or fall with what they can do on our behalf. I think we can await the result with confidence.