The Attorney-General.—“That is the case, my Lord, on the part of the Crown.”

THE DEFENCE.

Mr. Curwood now rose to address the Jury on the part of the prisoner. He commenced by stating, “That if it were consistent with a sense of moral and professional duty, he would not have stood there to address them. It was one of the characteristics of the profession to which he had the honour to belong, however, and one which perhaps reflected upon it the greatest credit, that they were not at liberty to refuse their assistance to persons in the situation of the unfortunate man at the bar. No man could feel more impressed than himself with the sense of the great and weighty duty he had to perform. He felt that the unhappy prisoner had a right to call upon him to do his duty boldly and fearlessly, and without any consideration for the Government who were the prosecutors on this occasion; he felt also that he had a duty to perform to his country, by assisting in the administration of the law, and not by any power which he possessed, if he did possess such power, to endeavour to pervert that law. He owed something too, to his own fair fame, which was all, his only inheritance.

“With these feelings pressing upon him, he might truly say, he was placed in a trying and critical situation. It was fit on an occasion of this sort, that they should know something of the man by whom they were addressed. It could not be denied that the unfortunate transactions, to which their attention had been so painfully directed, had arisen out of that state of the country which they must all alike lament and deplore. It was clear also, that while they had attachments to certain parties, prejudices would arise which it was out of their power to control in favour of the sentiments of those parties. With respect to himself, although like every other Englishman, he had his feelings upon certain points, yet he never belonged to any particular party, nor was he in the habit of attending political meetings. With respect to Government, he never had received any place or appointment from them, nor was it likely that he should. In the present instance, therefore, he had no motive to influence him in doing his duty, or at least in endeavouring to do it fairly and honestly.

“It was due to his Learned Friends and to himself to state, that in consequence of the lateness of the moment in which they were called upon to undertake this arduous task, not having received their instructions till a late hour on Thursday, that the difficulties with which they had to cope were of no ordinary kind; and these difficulties became the more formidable, when it was recollected that they had arrayed against them the most distinguished talents which it was in the power of the Crown to procure—talents not a little aided by the advantage of study, and of a mature consideration of all the facts of the case which they were called upon to discuss. No doubt, in the notice which they (the Jury) had given to the Attorney-General, when he opened this case, they had not failed to observe, and he had observed it with unfeigned surprise, that he had not stated to them precisely what were the points which they were called upon to try. He had indeed stated that it was a prosecution for high treason, but he had only defined what was the quality of the treason which he meant to impute.

“Unfortunately, there was mixed up with this transaction a great deal for which the prisoner might hereafter be answerable, and which was calculated to make a deep impression on the minds of the Jury; but whatever was their opinion upon the moral guilt of the prisoner, if, upon a review of the evidence, they should not be of opinion that he had committed the precise offence charged in the indictment, it was their duty to pronounce a verdict of Not Guilty. It therefore devolved upon him to state precisely what they had to try; it was not merely a question of high treason, but a question of a particular species of high treason.

“The indictment was very long, and contained many things which, in the language of the law, were called overt acts. They were not, however, because a great body of evidence had been given to them, to jump at the conclusion, that the substantive treason alleged had been committed. The sorts of treason charged were four in number: the first was founded upon the late statute of the 36th of the King, for conspiring to depose his majesty from his imperial style and dignity. It was now nearly 400 years since that statute, to which Englishmen had been wont to look with veneration as a protection for the dearest rights of man—he meant the statute of Edw. III.—had been passed. There, among other treasons set forth, was the conspiring to take away, or the compassing and imagining, or intending to compass or imagine the King’s death—but there had subsequent treasons started up. There was now another Act of Parliament in existence, which embraced not merely the compassing and imagining the King’s death; but the conspiring to depose him from his imperial style and dignity. It was also treason to conspire to levy war against his majesty. This was the question then which they had to try.

“First, had the prisoners at the bar conspired or imagined the death of the King; secondly, had they conspired to depose his Majesty from his imperial style and dignity; thirdly, had they conspired to levy war against the King; and lastly, had they actually levied war against the King? He apprehended that they must be satisfied that one or other of these charges was proved, before they could find a verdict of guilty.

“Before he came to these topics, they would look to the probability of the evidence which had been laid before them. The great mass which had been adduced certainly led them to conclude that a conspiracy of some kind had existed; but it did not follow that the substantive treason charged in the indictment had therefore been committed. It did not follow, as a matter of course, that the removal of the administration of the King must be succeeded by the deposition of the Monarch himself. Let them go by steps. There was continually in Parliament one party endeavouring to remove another; that was to say, endeavouring to remove the existing administration. He would admit, probably with the best intentions.