“A charge so grave and serious required therefore, at the hands of an English Jury (and would, he was sure, from what he had seen, receive) the most mature and patient consideration. The charge, as it stood in the indictment, consisted of several counts. First, conspiring and imagining to depose the King; 2d, conspiring and imagining to put the King to death; 3d, conspiring and imagining to levy war against the King, in order to compel him to change his councils; and 4th, actually levying war against the King.

“Two of these offences, conspiring the deposition of the Monarch, and levying war against him, were declared to be treason, by a statute passed so long ago as the reign of Edward the Third. In the construction of that statute, it had been held, not only in many cases decided in this country, but also in the opinion delivered to us by various learned writers on this law, that all conspiracies and attempts to depose his Majesty, and all conspiracies to levy war against him, were treasonable, and must be considered as overt acts, proving an intention to take away his life; because, as historical experience showed, the death of a sovereign generally followed the loss of his kingly authority.

“But, in order to remove any mistake that persons might fall into on this subject, a statute was passed in the reign of his late Majesty, similar in substance, and nearly so in language, to statutes that had been enacted in former years, but which had expired. By that statute, the conspiring or compassing to depose the King, or to levy war against him, were declared to be substantive treasons. Some of the persons called before them on this occasion were represented, and truly represented, to have been accomplices in this traitorous design. This character did not, however, apply to all the witnesses who had been brought forward.

“Much observation had been made on the degree of credit that ought to be given to persons, who admitted that they had joined in the design. On this point he should only say, that, according to the law of this country, and, he believed, of every other country, accomplices were considered competent witnesses; but the credit that should be given to them was matter of consideration. The evidence of an accomplice was to be weighed, with reference to the probability of the story he told, the confirmation of it, so far as it was capable of confirmation, and the absence of that contradiction which might be adduced, if the story were false.

“There was, however, no rule of law which said, that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be credited; neither was there any rule of law which declared that it must be rejected. To declare the latter would be to open the door, and give the greatest latitude and impunity to crime. For, as had been said by the learned counsel for the prosecution, if such a doctrine were acted on, bad men would feel that they might proceed in their base designs with perfect security, and they would trust each other without reserve; whereas bad men now distrusted each other. They were afraid of detection; and that distrust prevented the commission of many offences which could not be perpetrated without the assistance of several persons.

“Having made these general observations, to direct their attention to the evidence, he would now, some hours having elapsed since the witnesses were heard, read to the Jury such parts of the testimony as were necessary for their consideration in coming to a decision. [Here his Lordship proceeded to recapitulate the evidence, briefly commenting on it as he went on.]

“The first witness was R. Adams, who undoubtedly stood in the situation of an accomplice. But, if the story he told were false, there were several persons mentioned by him, and they could have been brought forward to disprove his statement, and to discharge themselves of the crime imputed to them, if they were innocent, but whom the Crown could not compel to appear. This witness said, that the officers, when they entered the room in Cato-street, cried out, ‘Here’s a pretty nest of you; we have a warrant to take you all;’ and the officers swore they only called out, ‘We are officers—surrender.’ This difference was not material. The two expressions were nearly the same in import; and, in the scene of confusion which undoubtedly occurred on the entrance of the officers, it was very possible that a mistake might arise as to the exact expression used.

“That part of the evidence, in which Adams described his irresolution, gave, his Lordship observed, the exact picture of a man of weak mind, not knowing whether he should go on or recede—balancing whether he should remain true to his associates, or make a discovery—and who, when taken into custody, did come to the resolution to disclose all he knew. If his testimony were true in substance and general effect, it proved not only a determination to assassinate his Majesty’s Ministers, but shewed to them that that was only a part of a more extended and general plan, which embraced the seizure of arms, the taking possession of the Mansion-house, and the forming of a Provisional Government; a plan formed on some vain expectation, that, if the blow were ever struck, there were a great number of people in the metropolis who would readily join in the scheme, and levy war against his Majesty. Such an expectation was vain then, and he hoped would ever be found so when such treasonable attempts were made.

“This witness mentioned a man, named Edwards. Why he was not examined his Lordship could not say. Perhaps the prosecutors did not wish to call him for very good reasons. How far the Jury would disbelieve Adams on that account, it was for them to say. What he had remarked on the evidence of this witness, he was sorry to say, was considerably against the prisoner. As to the character of Adams, before this transaction, they knew nothing. No person had said any thing about it. Hyden was a witness of a very different description; for he, it appeared, disclosed all he knew, early enough to prevent the mischief that was meditated.