Creation or Evolution? A Philosophical Inquiry

by George Ticknor Curtis

[68] "Biology," i, pp. 344, 355.

[69] "Biology," i, pp. 346-348 et seq.

[70] Concerning the nebular hypothesis, and what astronomers now consider, see post.

[71] "Biology," i.

[72] "Biology," i, pp. 349, 350.

[73] "Biology," i, p. 351. I am not quite sure that I understand what Mr. Spencer means by "direct" proof. In the passage immediately following the sentence last quoted, he speaks of "the kind and quantity of direct evidence that all organic beings have gradually arisen," etc., whereas, in a previous passage, he had admitted that the facts at present assignable in direct proof of this hypothesis are insufficient. I presume he meant insufficient in number. (Compare "Biology," i, pp. 351 and 352). Now, I should say that direct proof of the hypothesis that all animal organisms have arisen successively out of one another would require more or less positive evidence of such occurrences; and that the proof which is afforded by what has taken place within the limits of a single species in the course of successive generations would be indirect evidence of what may have taken place in the evolution of different species, because it requires the aid of analogy to connect the two. I am not aware that there is supposed to be any proof of the evolution of species out of species, excepting that which is derived from what has taken place in single races in the development of the ovum into the infant, the development of the infant into the mature animal, and the limited varieties of structure appearing among individuals of the same race. As I go on through the examination of Mr. Spencer's argument, it will appear whether there are grounds for regarding this kind of reasoning as satisfactory or the reverse.

[74] I have stated here, in reference to the pedigree of an individual, a far more liberal rule of evidence than would probably be allowed in courts of justice, where anything of value was depending upon the establishment of a descent from a certain ancestor. But I have purposely suggested the broadest rule that can be applied to family or race resemblances as a means of aiding a pedigree in popular determination or in a judicium rusticum. For example, suppose that there were persons now living in this country who trace their descent from the English husband of Pocahontas, the daughter of an Indian chief, and from her. They bear, we will suppose, the family name of the Englishman whom she is known to have married, and perhaps one of them bears very strong resemblance to the Indian race in features, complexion, and hair. In a judicial trial of this person's supposed pedigree I do not suppose that these resemblances, if they constituted his sole evidence, together with the name of Rolfe which he bears, and which a certain number of his ancestors may have borne before him, would be received as evidence of his descent from the Indian girl whose name was Pocahontas, and who married an Englishman of the name of Rolfe more than two centuries ago. It would be necessary to make some proof of the whole pedigree by the kind of evidence which the law admits in such cases, and then the resemblances of the individual to the Indian race might possibly be received as confirmatory proof, in aid of the proof derived from the family name of Pocahontas's English husband, from reputation, written or oral declarations of deceased witnesses, family documents, ancient gravestones, and the like. In popular judgment most persons would be apt to accept the family name of Rolfe and the apparent trace of Indian blood as sufficient proof of the descent of the individual from the Indian girl who married John Rolfe. But in a court of justice these facts would go for nothing without some independent proof of the pedigree.

[75] See the table of the Darwinian pedigree of man, ante. Any other mode of arranging the order of evolution that will admit of the application of the steps of supposed development to what is known of the animal kingdom, will equally serve to illustrate the theory.

[76] Darwin's "Descent of Man," Prof. Huxley's note, p. 199 et seq.

[77] Mr. Spencer observes that the hypothesis of special creations is one "which formulates absolute ignorance into a semblance of positive knowledge...." Thus, however regarded, the hypothesis of special creations turns out to be worthless—worthless by its derivation; worthless in its intrinsic incoherence; worthless as absolutely without evidence; worthless as not satisfying a moral want. "We must therefore consider it as counting for nothing, in opposition to any other hypothesis respecting the origin of organic beings." There is a great deal more in the same tone. (See "Biology," i, pp. 344, 345, and passim throughout Chapters II and III of Part III of that work.) Mr. Darwin, who is sufficiently positive, is much more moderate, and in my opinion a much better reasoner, although I can not subscribe to his reasoning or his conclusions. A rather irreverent naval officer of my acquaintance once extolled a doctrinal sermon, which he had just heard preached by a Unitarian clergyman, in this fashion: "I tell you what, sir, the preacher did not leave the Trinity a leg to stand upon." Probably some of Mr. Spencer's readers think that he has equally demolished the doctrine of special creations.