The difficulty in the way of its adoption was its supposed tendency to absorb, and perhaps to annihilate, the sovereignties of the States. The advocates of the Virginia plan were called upon to show how the general sovereignty and jurisdiction which they proposed to give to their system could consist with a considerable, though subordinate, jurisdiction in the States. One of its moderate and candid opponents[71] declared that, if this could be shown, the objections to it ought to be surrendered; but if not, he thought that those objections must have their full force. But, from the very nature of the case, that which had not been demonstrated by experience could rest only upon opinion; and while the Virginia system made no other provision for State defence against encroachments of the general government than such as might be found in the election by the State legislatures of the national Senate, the apprehensions of the smaller States could not be satisfied, however admirable the theory, and however able might be the reasoning by which it was supported.

Let the reader, then, as he pursues the history of this conflict between the opposing interests of the two classes of States, and observes how strenuously the different theories were maintained, until victory became impossible on either side, note the danger of adhering too firmly to mere theoretical principles, in matters of government. He will see the impressive spectacle of States assembled for the formation of some system capable of answering the exigencies of their situation; he will see how rapidly a difference of local interests developed the most opposite theories, and how profoundly those theories were discussed; and he will see this conflict carried on for days, and even for weeks, with all the sincerity that interest lends to conviction, and all the tenacity that conviction can produce, until at last the whole discussion leads to the probable failure of the purpose for which the assembly had been instituted. He will then see an amalgamation of the two systems, which in their integrity were irreconcilable, and will witness the first introduction of that mode of adjusting opposite interests and conflicting theories of government which lies at the basis of the Constitution of the United States, and which alone can furnish a safe foundation on which to unite the destinies and wants of separate communities possessed of distinct political organizations and rights.

The Convention had received the report of the committee of the whole on the 19th of June. From that day until the 5th of July the struggle was continued, commencing with the proposition which affirmed the division of the legislative department of the government into two branches. Although such an arrangement did not necessarily involve the principle of national and popular representation, it was opposed as unnecessary by those who desired to retain the system of representation by States, and who therefore intended to preserve the existing organization of the Congress. Still, the needful harmony and completeness of the scheme, according to the genius of the Anglo-American liberty, required this division of the legislature.

Doubtless a single council or chamber can promulgate decrees and enact laws; but it had never been the habit of the people of America, as it never had been the habit of their ancestors for at least a period of somewhat more than five centuries, to regard a single chamber as favorable to liberty, or to wise legislation.[72] The separation into two chambers of the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons, in the English constitution, does not seem to have originated in a difference of personal rank, so much as in their position as separate estates of the realm. All the orders might have voted promiscuously in one house, and just as effectually signified the assent or dissent of Parliament to any measure proposed.[73] But the practice of making the assent of Parliament to consist in the concurrent and separate action of the two estates, though difficult to be traced to its origin in any distinct purpose or cause, became confirmed by the growing importance of the commons, by their jealousy and vigilance, and by the controlling position which they finally assumed. As Parliament gradually proceeded to its present constitution, and the separate rights and privileges of the two houses became established, it was found that the practice of discussing a measure in two assemblies, composed of different persons, holding their seats by a different tenure and representing different orders of the state, was in the highest degree conducive to the security of the subject, and to sound legislation.[74]

So fully was the conviction of the practical convenience and utility of two chambers established in the Anglican mind, that, when representative government came to be established in the British North American Colonies, although the original reason for the division ceased to be applicable, it was retained for its incidental advantages. In none of these Colonies was there any difference of social condition, or of political privilege or power, recognized in the system of representation; and as there were, therefore, no separate estates or orders among the people, requiring to be protected against each other's encroachments, or holding different relations to the crown, we cannot attribute the adherence to the system of two chambers, on the part of those who solicited and received the privilege of establishing these colonial governments, to anything but their belief in its practical advantages for the purposes of legislation. Still less can we suppose, that after the Revolution, and when there no longer existed any such motive as might have influenced the crown in modelling the colonial after the imperial institutions, to a certain extent, the people of these States should have perpetuated in their constitutions the principle of a division of the legislature into two chambers, for any other purpose than to secure the practical benefits which they and their ancestors had always found to flow from it.

Only three exceptions to this practice existed in America, at the time of the formation of the Constitution. They were the legislatures of the States of Pennsylvania and Georgia, and the Congress of the Confederation.

But the Congress being in fact only an assembly of deputies from confederated States, the means scarcely existed for the application of the principle so familiar in the legislatures of most of the States themselves. As a new government was now to be formed, whose theoretical and actual powers were to be essentially different, an opportunity was afforded for the ancient and favorite construction of the legislative department. The proposal was resisted, not because it was doubted that, in a government of direct legislative authority, in which the people are themselves to be represented, the system of two chambers is practically the best, but because those who opposed its introduction denied the propriety of attempting to establish a government of that kind. The States of New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, therefore, recorded their votes against such a division of the legislature, and the vote of Maryland was divided upon the question.[75]

The reader will observe, however, that, in its present aspect, there was a chasm in the Virginia plan, which to some extent justifies the opposition of the minority to the system of two legislative chambers. According to that plan, the people of the States were to be represented in both chambers in proportion to their numbers. But as there were no distinct orders among the people to furnish a different basis for the two houses, the system must either be a mere duplicate representation of the whole people, as it is in the State constitutions generally, or some artificial basis must be provided for one house, to distinguish it from the other, and to furnish a check as between the two. In a republican government, and in a state of society where property is not entailed and distinctions of personal rank cannot exist, such a basis is not easily found; and if found, is not likely to be stable and effectual. The happy expedient of selecting the States as the basis of representation in the Senate, which had not yet been agreed upon, and which was resorted to as an adjustment of a serious conflict between two opposite principles of government, has furnished a really different foundation for the two branches, as distinct as the separate representation of the different orders in the British constitution. It has thus secured the incidental advantages of two chambers, without resorting to those fluctuating or arbitrary distinctions among the people, which can alone afford, in such a country as ours, even an ostensible difference of origin for legislative bodies.

The same struggle which had been maintained upon this question was continued through all the votes taken upon the mode of electing the members of the two branches, and upon their tenure of office. It is not necessary here to rehearse the details of these proceedings; the result was, that the members of the first branch of the legislature were to be chosen by the people of the States for a period of two years, and to be twenty-five years of age, while the members of the second or senatorial branch were to be chosen by the State legislatures for a period of six years, and to be thirty years of age. The States of Pennsylvania and Virginia voted against the election of senators by the legislatures of the States, because it was still uncertain whether an equality or a ratio of representation would finally prevail in that branch, and the election by the legislatures was considered to have a tendency to the adoption of an equality.[76]

At length, the sixth resolution, which defined the powers of Congress, and the seventh and eighth, which involved the fundamental point of the suffrage in the two branches, were reached.[77] The subject of the powers of Congress was postponed, and the question was stated on the rule of suffrage for the first branch, which the resolution declared ought to be according to an equitable ratio. In the great debate which ensued, Madison, Hamilton, Gorham, Reed, and Williamson combated the objections of the smaller States, while Luther Martin, with his accustomed warmth, resisted the introduction of the new principle. The discussion involved on both sides a repetition of the arguments previously employed; but some of the views presented are of great importance, especially those taken by Madison and Hamilton, of the situation in which the smaller States must be placed, if a constitution should not be formed and adopted containing a just distribution of political power among the whole people of the country, creating thereby a government of sufficient energy to protect each and all of the States against foreign powers, against the influence of the larger members of the confederacy, and against the dangers to be apprehended from their own governments.