I dined to-day with Count Pozzo di Borgo. Before dinner he took Mr. Harris and myself into a room apart from the rest of the company, and told me he wished to communicate to me, so that I might inform the President, on my return, what was the true condition of Europe at the present moment. He said there did not exist at the present any immediate apprehension of war; though from the state of things there was no telling at what time war might take place.
Everything was unsettled in France; they were a turbulent and restless people, and busily employed with their propaganda. They were wholly unfit for liberal institutions; and, in fact, these were not what they wanted. They wished again for the glory of the times of Bonaparte. He could himself, in a month, raise an insurrection in France; but what the allied powers wanted was peace, and peace they would maintain so long as they could consistently with propriety. That this they did not wish from fear of the result. Far from it. They, to wit, Russia, Prussia and Austria, were indissolubly united, and war with one would be war with all.
Those three powers, with the German Confederation, could, in three months, bring an army of 600,000 men into the field, 500,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry, and have an army of reserve of the same number. The French journals were continually attacking them without cause, for interfering with foreign states, but I understood him to say that Austria would interfere in Piedmont, and if the French should attempt to prevent it, the allies would make common cause against them. They disliked and distrusted France very much; England not so much. If the latter would act a prudent and proper part, she might have great influence on the affairs of Europe; but the English ministry were fools. They were encouraging France, and yet it was almost certain they would not fire a gun in defence of the latter. England depended upon her commerce, and she could not afford to lose that of the whole continent of Europe, which she would do in the event of war. She had acted very foolishly in giving Belgium to France.
What he wished me especially to tell the President was that he hoped the United States in the event of a war would cause their neutrality to be respected, and would not suffer the existence of illegal blockades. That in the event of war, England would have every interest to cripple American commerce; for, in that event, the commerce of the world would fall into the hands of Americans. That the English must even use their vessels to carry articles essentially necessary to them from the north of Europe.
I promised I would communicate all he had said to the President, and observed that when we were comparatively feeble, we had gone to war for the purpose of maintaining our neutral rights upon the ocean; and that at this time of day, when we were much more powerful, neither the President nor people of the United States would suffer them to be violated with impunity. Our policy was peaceful; we never interfered with the political concerns of other nations. The strictest neutrality we should observe both from principle and from policy. This had been the course of our Government ever since the celebrated proclamation of neutrality of General Washington, which I explained to him. I was not now afraid that England would, as she had done before, attempt to violate the neutral rights of a nation which in six months could put to sea fifty ships of the line and heavy frigates. He expressed some admiration and astonishment at this statement, which was confirmed by Mr. Harris, and observed he could not believe that they would.
The conversation then turned upon the French treaty. He said he had been speaking several times to Broglie, as he called him, upon the subject. He had done what he could for us. Broglie was well disposed, and he thought with the assistance of Lafayette and his friends, it would be ratified very early in the next session. I told him I had understood that Mr. Dupin, the President of the Chamber, was rather opposed to us. He said that Dupin was an unprincipled man, I think he said a rascal, very selfish, and fond of money. He was now receiving a pension of 200 or 300 pounds. I did not understand exactly from whom.
After we went to table, we had much conversation in nearly the same strain. He told me he wished I could be present at two or three sittings of the Chamber. They were like cats, all in a passion, and all making a noise, and afterwards laughing; wholly unfit for liberty. They wanted such a man as Bonaparte and glory again, not liberty.
Before we went to table I asked him what he thought of Louis Philippe, and whether the allied sovereigns had confidence in his character. He answered equivocally. Said Louis Philippe might be well disposed; but he might be controlled by the factions, and made to do what he did not approve. His government wanted strength.
At table, in speaking of the emperor [Nicholas], I said I had taken occasion, since my arrival in France, to speak of the personal character of the emperor to some persons, as I thought it deserved. He replied as if I had mentioned the name of Lafayette, which I did not, and asked what Lafayette had thought of that. I said that General Lafayette was aware of the good personal character of the emperor, and that of the empress, and the happy influence of their example on the Russian nobility, and had freely admitted it. He said that the general had lost his influence with Louis Philippe, and in a great degree in France. I observed that whatever opinion others might express concerning him, I considered it the duty of every American to speak with gratitude of him. Mr. Harris here shook his head at me, but I continued to talk about him, and the donation we had made him. The count said it was all spent, and I replied I was very sorry for it. Various subjects were talked over, and the count took leave of me in the kindest and most affectionate manner. He was glad to have an opportunity of communicating this information to a gentleman of my character, who had been sent on a special mission to Russia, and acquitted himself in such a manner as I had done. General Jackson might probably have never heard of him; but he had often [heard] of the general, and respected his character very highly. I told him his name was known throughout the political world. General Jackson would be proud of his good opinion, which I should not fail to communicate.
I forgot to mention that, at the proper place, I introduced the subject of the treaty concerning maritime rights, and said one object of my mission was to make a treaty which should assert these rights as between the two nations. He replied that he presumed it had been explained to me that the reason why Russia did not accede to this treaty at the present moment was the delicate relations between them and England. Such a treaty at this time would set England in a flame. Russia was but a second-rate naval power. She agreed, however, entirely with the principles concerning maritime rights maintained by us, and at the proper time would assert them in the same manner as if she had entered into the treaty. In the course of the conversation, he observed that the influence of Russia was firmly established in Constantinople. Yes, I observed, she had been acting whilst the other powers were talking. I asked the true character of the sultan, and he spoke of him as rather a wavering and weak man, etc.