It has been asked what the American Congress would do placed in similar circumstances. Would they appropriate money with a menace impending over their heads? I answer, no, never. But I should never consider it a menace, if, after refusing to vote an appropriation to carry a treaty into effect, a foreign government in the spirit of candor, in language mild and courteous, such as that used by the President, were to inform us they could not abandon their rights, and, however painful it may be, they should be compelled, by a sense of duty, to assert them by force.
After some further discussion, the resolution was so modified as to declare that it was at that time inexpedient to adopt any legislative measure in regard to the state of affairs between the United States and France. In this form the resolution was unanimously adopted.
The President’s message was received in Paris in the early part of January (1835). It was resented as a threat. The French minister at Washington was recalled, and on the 13th of January, the day before the vote in the Senate, Mr. Livingston, the minister of the United States at Paris, was informed that his passports were at his service. But a bill was introduced by the ministry in the Chambers, to make the necessary appropriation. It was passed in the latter part of April, but with an amendment making the payment conditional upon an apology from President Jackson for the language of his message of the previous December. There was little likelihood that any such apology would be made for language addressed by the President to the people of the United States through their representatives in Congress. On the contrary, in the early part of the next session (January, 1836) the world was somewhat startled by a recommendation made to Congress by the President, of partial non-intercourse with France.[[52]] On the 18th of January, on a motion by Mr. Clay to refer this recommendation to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Buchanan said that he had been so much gratified with the message which had just been read, that he could not, and he thought he ought not, at this the very first moment, to refrain from expressing his entire approbation of its general tone and spirit. He had watched with intense anxiety the progress of our unfortunate controversy with France. He had hoped, sincerely hoped, that the explanations which had been made by Mr. Livingston, and officially approved by the President of the United States, would have proved satisfactory to the French government. In this he had found his hopes to be vain. After this effort had failed, he felt a degree of confidence, almost amounting to moral assurance, that the last message to Congress would have been hailed by France, as it was by the American people, as the olive branch which would have restored amity and good understanding between us and our ancient ally. Even in this, he feared, he was again doomed to be disappointed. The government of France, unless they change their determination, will not consider this message as sufficient. We have the terms clearly prescribed by the Duke de Broglie, upon which, and upon which alone, the French government will consent to comply with the treaty, and to pay the five millions of dollars to our injured fellow-citizens. Speculation is now at an end. The clouds and darkness which have hung over this question have vanished. It is now made clear as a sunbeam. The money will not be paid, says the organ of the French government, unless the Government of the United States shall address its claim officially in writing to France, accompanied by what appeared to him, and he believed would appear to the whole American people, without distinction of party, to be a degrading apology. The striking peculiarity of the case, the one which he would undertake to say distinguished it from any other case which had arisen in modern times, in the intercourse between independent nations, was, that the very terms of this apology were dictated to the American Government by the French Secretary of Foreign Affairs. One of these terms was, that it had never entered into the intention (pensée), the thought of this Government, to call in question the good faith of the government of France.
But the French Government proceed still further. Upon the refusal to make this apology, which they ought to have known would never be made—could never be made—they are not content to leave question where it then was. They have given us notice in advance that they will consider our refusal to make this degrading apology an evidence that the misunderstanding did not proceed on our part from mere error and mistake.
In addition to all this, the last note of the Duke de Broglie to Mr. Barton declares that the Government of the United States knows that henceforward the execution of the treaty must depend upon itself. They thus leave us to decide whether we shall make the apology in the prescribed terms, or abandon our claim to the fulfillment of the treaty.
He would not allow himself to express the feelings which were excited in his mind upon hearing these letters of the Duke de Broglie read. Most sincerely, most ardently, did he hope that the French government, when this message reached them, if not before, might reconsider their determination, and that all our difficulties might yet pass away. But their language is now clear, specific, incapable of ambiguity or doubt. It would, then, become our duty calmly, but firmly, to take such a stand as the interests and the honor of the country may require.
Mr. B. had already said much more than he intended when he rose. He would, however, make another remark before he took his seat. He felt a proper degree of confidence, he might add a great degree of confidence, in the President of the United States. He knew him to be honest and firm, and faithful to his country; prompt to resent its injuries and avenge its wrongs. He confessed he had anticipated a message of a stronger character. He had supposed that a general non-intercourse with France would, at least, have been recommended. But the recommendation was confined to the mere refusal to admit French ships or French productions to enter our ports. It left France free to receive her supplies of cotton from the United States, without which the manufacturers of that country could not exist. This was wise, it was prudent; it left to France to judge for herself if this unnatural contest must still continue, whether she would close her ports against our vessels and our productions.
In the spring of 1832 (Mr. B. did not recollect precisely the time) Congress passed an act to carry into effect our part of the treaty. Under this treaty, the wines of France had ever since been admitted into the United States upon the favorable terms therein stipulated. Her silks were imported free of duty, in contradistinction to those which came from beyond the Cape of Good Hope. She had for years been enjoying these privileges. Nothing milder, then, could possibly be recommended than to withdraw these advantages from her, and to exclude her vessels and her productions from our ports.
Mr. Buchanan said that when he made the observations which had called forth the remarks of the Senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun) he had believed the message to be the harbinger of peace, and not of war. This was still his opinion. In this respect he differed entirely from the gentleman. Under this impression, he had then risen merely to remark that, considering the provocation which we had received, the tone, the spirit, and the recommendations themselves, of the message, were mild and prudent, and were well calculated to make an impression upon France, and to render her sensible of her injustice.