Did Mr. Livingston intend to say France would be terrified into this measure? By no means. But, in the intercourse between independent States, there is a point at which diplomacy must end, and when a nation must either abandon her rights, or determine to assert them by the sword, or by such strong and decided measures as may eventually lead to hostilities. When this point is reached, it becomes a serious and alarming crisis for those to whom, on earth, the destiny of nations is entrusted. When the one alternative is war, either immediate or prospective, with all the miseries which follow in its train, and the other the payment of a just debt to an ancient ally and firm friend, who could doubt what must be the decision? Such was the position in which France stood toward the United States. Not only justice, but policy required the payment of the debt. In the event of war, or, of a non-intercourse between the two nations, her wine-growers, her producers and manufacturers of silk, and all her other manufacturing interests, especially those of her southern provinces, would be vitally injured. The payment of five millions of dollars would be but a drop in the ocean, compared with the extent of their sufferings. In France, they then believed that the time for diplomacy—the time for procrastination had ended. The President’s message had opened their eyes to the importance of the subject. It was under this impression that Mr. Livingston predicted that the bill would pass the Chambers. That it would have done so without any condition, had Congress responded to the President’s message, I do not say, by authorizing reprisals, but by manifesting a decided resolution to insist upon the execution of the treaty, will, I think, appear abundantly evident hereafter.

The French ministry having manifested their sensibility to the supposed insult, by recalling Mr. Serrurier, proceeded immediately to present the bill for the execution of the treaty to the Chambers. In presenting it on the 15th January, Mr. Humann, the minister of finance, addressed the Chamber. His speech contains the views then entertained by the French cabinet. I shall read an extract from it. He says:

“General Jackson has been in error respecting the extent of the faculties conferred upon us, by the constitution of the State; but if he has been mistaken as to the laws of our country, we will not fall into the same error with regard to the institutions of the United States. Now, the spirit and letter of those institutions authorize us to regard the document above named [the message], as the expression of an opinion merely personal, so long as that opinion has not received the sanction of the other two branches of the American Government. The message is a Government act, which is still incomplete, and should not lead to any of these determinations, which France is in the habit of taking in reply to a threat or insult.”

The French ministry, at that time, considered the President’s message, merely his personal act, until it should receive the sanction of Congress. They, then, had not dreamt of requiring an explanation of it, as the only condition on which they would pay the money. This was an after thought. The bill presented by Mr. Humann merely prescribed that the payment should not be made, “until it shall have been ascertained that the Government of the United States has done nothing to injure the interests of France.” This bill was immediately referred to a committee, of which Mr. Dumon was the chairman. On the 28th of March, he reported it to the Chamber, with a provision, that the money should not be paid, if the Government of the United States shall have done anything “contrary to the dignities and the interests of France.” Still we hear nothing of an explanation of the message being made a condition of the payment of the money. The clauses in the bill to which I have adverted were evidently inserted to meet the contingency of reprisals having been sanctioned by Congress.

The debate upon the bill in the Chamber of Deputies commenced on the 9th of April and terminated on the 18th. On that day General Valazé proposed his amendment declaring that “the payments in execution of the present law cannot be made until the French government shall have received satisfactory explanations with regard to the message of the President of the United States, dated the 2d December, 1834.”

The Duke de Broglie, the minister of foreign affairs, accepted this amendment. I shall read his remarks on this occasion. He says: “The intention of the government has always been conformable with the desire expressed by the author of the amendment which is now before the Chambers (great agitation), the government has always meant that diplomatic relations should not be renewed with the Government of the United States until it had received satisfactory explanations. The government, therefore, does not repulse the amendment itself.” After this, on the same day, the bill passed the Chamber by a vote of 289 to 137.

Well might the Chamber be agitated at such an annunciation from the minister of foreign affairs. Why this sudden change in the policy of the French government? The answer is plain. Congress had adjourned on the 4th of March, without manifesting by their actions any disposition to make the fulfilment of the treaty a serious question. Whilst our Treasury was overflowing, they had refused to make any provision for the defence of the country. They had left the whole coast of the United States from Maine to Georgia in a defenceless condition. The effect upon the French Chamber and the French people was such as might have been anticipated. To prove this, I shall read an extract from a speech delivered by Mr. Bignon, one of the Deputies, on the 10th April. I select this from many others, because it contains nothing which can be offensive to any Senator. It will be recollected that Mr. Bignon is the gentleman who had been more instrumental in defeating the bill at the previous session than any other member.

“President Jackson’s message has astonished them (the Americans) as well as us; they have seen themselves thrown by it into a very hazardous situation. What have they done? They are too circumspect and clear-headed to express, by an official determination, their disapproval of an act which, in reality, has not received their assent. Some of them, for instance Mr. Adams, in the House of Representatives, may indeed, from a politic patriotism, have even eulogized the President’s energy, and obtained from the Chamber the expression that the treaty of 1831 must be complied with; but at a preceding sitting the same member took pains to declare that he was not the defender of a system of war; he proclaimed aloud that the resolution adopted by the Senate was an expedient suggested by prudence, and he thought the House of Representatives should pursue the same course. Gentlemen, the American legislature had to resort to expedients to get out of the embarrassing dilemma in which the President’s message had placed them; and they acted wisely.”

From the conduct of Congress, the French Chambers were under the impression that the people of the United States would not adopt any energetic measures to compel the fulfilment of the treaty. They had no idea that the nation would sustain the President in his efforts. They had reason to believe that he was almost left alone. They appear ever since to have acted under this delusion. According to the impression of Mr. Bignon, the nation was astounded at President Jackson’s message. This is the true reason why the ministry accepted the amendment requiring President Jackson to make an explanation.

The best mode of obtaining justice from the powerful as well as from the weak—the best mode of elevating this nation to the lofty position she is destined to occupy among the nations of the earth—the best mode of preventing war and preserving peace, is to stand up firmly for our rights. The assertion of these rights, not by threats, but boldly, manfully, and frankly, is the surest method of obtaining justice and respect from other nations.