Again, sir, we possess the power of originating amendments to the Constitution. Although, therefore, we may not be able to grant the petitioners relief, such a petition may induce us to exercise this power, and to ask for a new grant of authority from the States.
The gentleman’s third proposition was, that we are not bound to receive this petition, because it is no grievance to the citizens of any of the States, that slavery exists in this District. But who are to be the judges, in the first instance, whether the people are aggrieved or not? Is it those who suffer, or fancy they suffer, or the Senate? If we are to decide when they ought to feel aggrieved, and when they ought to be satisfied, if the tribunal to whom their petitions are addressed may refuse to receive them, because, in their opinion, there was no just cause of complaint, the right of petition is destroyed. It would be but a poor answer to their petitions to tell them they ought not to have felt aggrieved, that they are mistaken, and that, therefore, their complaints would not be received by their servants.
I may be asked, is there no case in which I would be willing to refuse to receive a petition? I answer that it must be a very strong one indeed to justify such a refusal. There is one exception, however, which results from the very nature of the right itself. Neither the body addressed nor any of its members must be insulted, under the pretext of exercising this right. It must not be perverted from its purpose, and be made the instrument of degrading the body to which the petition is addressed. Such a petition would be in fraud of the right itself, and the necessary power of self-protection and self-preservation inherent in every legislative body confers upon it the authority of defending itself against direct insults presented in this or any other form. Beyond this exception I would not go; and it is solely for the purpose of self-protection, in my opinion, that the rules of the Senate enable any of its members to raise the question, whether a petition shall be received or not. If the rule has any other object in view, it is a violation of the Constitution.
I would confine this exception within the narrowest limits. The acts of the body addressed may be freely canvassed by the people, and they may be shown to be unjust or unconstitutional. These may be the very reasons why the petition is presented. “To speak his mind is every freeman’s right.” They may and they ought to express themselves with that manly independence which belongs to American citizens. To exclude their petition, it must appear palpable that an insult to the body was intended, and not a redress of grievances.
Extreme cases have been put by the Senator from South Carolina. Ridiculous or extravagant petitions may be presented; though I should think that scarcely a sane man could be found in this country who would ask Congress to abolish slavery in the State of Georgia. In such a case I would receive the petition, and consign it at once to that merited contempt which it would deserve. The Constitution secures the right of being heard by petition to every citizen; and I would not abridge it because he happened to be a fool.
The proposition is almost too plain for argument, that if the people have a constitutional right to petition, a corresponding duty is imposed upon us to receive their petitions. From the very nature of things, rights and duties are reciprocal. The human mind cannot conceive of the one without the other. They are relative terms. If the people have a right to command, it is the duty of their servants to obey. If I have a right to a sum of money, it is the duty of my debtor to pay it to me. If the people have a right to petition their representatives, it is our duty to receive their petition.
This question was solemnly determined by the Senate more than thirty years ago. Neither before nor since that time, so far as I can learn, has the general right of petition ever been called in question, until the motion now under consideration was made by the Senator from South Carolina. Of course I do not speak of cases embraced within the exception which I have just stated. No Senator has ever contended that this is one of them. To prove my position, I shall read an extract from our journals. On Monday, the 21st January, 1805, “Mr. Logan presented a petition signed Thomas Morris, Clerk, in behalf of the meeting of the representatives of the people called Quakers, in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, etc., stating that the petitioners, from a sense of religious duty, had again come forward to plead the cause of their oppressed and degraded fellow-men of the African race; and, on the question, “Shall this petition be received?” it passed in the affirmative; yeas, 19; nays, 9.
“The yeas and nays being required by one-fifth of the Senators present, those who voted in the affirmative are—Messrs. Adams, Mass., Bayard, Del., Brown, Ky., Condict, N. J., Franklin, N. C., Hillhouse, Conn., Howland, R. I., Logan, Penn., Maclay, Penn., Mitchell, N. Y., Alcott, N. H., Pickering, Mass., Plumer, N. H., Smith, Ohio, Smith, Vt., Stone, N. C., Sumpter, S. C., White, Del., Worthington, Ohio.
“And those who voted in the negative are—Anderson, Tenn., Baldwin, Ga., Bradley, Vt., Cocke, Tenn., Jackson, Ga., Moore, Va., Smith, Md., Smith, N. Y., and Wright, Md.
“So the petition was read.”