Sir, in regard to this veto power, as it at present exists, the convention which framed the Constitution, although much divided on other subjects, were unanimous. It is true that in the earlier stages of their proceedings, it was considerably discussed, and presented in different aspects. Some members were in favor of an absolute veto, and others were opposed to any veto, however qualified; but they at length unanimously adopted the happy mean, and framed the article as it now stands in the Constitution. According to Mr. Madison’s report of the debates and proceedings in the convention, we find that on Saturday the 21st July, 1787, “the tenth resolution giving the executive a qualified veto, requiring two-thirds of each branch of the legislature to overrule it, was then agreed to nem. con.” The convention continued in session for nearly two months after this decision; but so far as I can discover, no member ever attempted to disturb this unanimous decision.
A principle thus settled ought never to be rashly assailed under the excitement of disappointed feelings occasioned by the veto of two favorite measures at the extra session, on which Senators had fixed their hearts. There ought to have been time for passion to cool and reason to resume her empire. I know very well that the Senator from Kentucky had announced his opposition to the veto power so far back as June, 1840, in his Hanover speech; but that speech may fairly be considered as a declaration of his own individual opinion on this subject. The great Whig party never adopted it as one of the cardinal articles of their faith, until, smarting under disappointment, they saw their two favorite measures of the extra session fall beneath this power. It was then, and not till then, that the resolution, in effect to abolish it, was adopted by them as a party, in their manifesto. The present amendment proposes to carry this resolution into execution.
I should rather rely upon the judgment of the Senator from Kentucky on any other question, than in regard to the veto power. He has suffered so much from its exercise as to render it almost impossible that he can be an impartial judge. History will record the long and memorable struggle between himself and a distinguished ex-President, now in retirement. This was no common party strife. Their mighty war shook the whole Republic to its centre. The one swayed the majority in both Houses of Congress; whilst the other was sustained by a majority of the people. Under the lead of the one, Congress passed bills to establish a Bank of the United States;—to commence a system of internal improvements;—and to distribute the proceeds of the public lands among the several States; whilst the other, strong in his convictions of duty, and strong in his belief that the voice of the sovereign people would condemn these measures of their representatives, vetoed them every one. And what was the result? Without, upon the present occasion, expressing an opinion on any one of these questions, was it not rendered manifest that the President elected by the mass of the people, and directly responsible to them for his conduct, understood their will and their wishes better than the majority in the Senate and House of Representatives? No wonder then that the Senator from Kentucky should detest the veto power. It ought never to be torn from its foundation in the Constitution by the rash hands of a political party, impelled to the deed under the influence of defeated hopes and disappointed ambition.
I trust now that I shall be able to prove that the Senator from Kentucky has entirely mistaken the character of the veto power; that in its origin and nature it is peculiarly democratic; that in the qualified form in which it exists in our Constitution, it is but a mere appeal by the President of the people’s choice from the decision of Congress to the people themselves; and that whilst the exercise of this power has done much good, it never has been, and never can be, dangerous to the rights and liberties of the people.
This is not “an arbitrary and monarchical power;” it is not “a monarchical prerogative,” as it has been designated by the Senator. If it were, I should go with him, heart and hand, for its abolition. What is a monarchical prerogative? It is a power vested in an emperor or king, neither elected by, nor responsible to, the people, to maintain and preserve the privileges of his throne. The veto power in the hands of such a sovereign has never been exerted, and never will be exerted, except to arrest the progress of popular liberty, or what he may term popular encroachment. It is the character of the public agent on whom this power is conferred, and not the nature of the power itself, which stamps it either as democratic or arbitrary. In its origin we all know that it was purely democratic. It owes its existence to a revolt of the people of Rome against the tyrannical decrees of the Senate. They retired from the city to the Sacred Mount, and demanded the rights of freemen. They thus extorted from the aristocratic Senate a decree authorizing them annually to elect tribunes of the people. On these tribunes was conferred the power of annulling any decree of the Senate, by simply pronouncing the word “veto.” This very power was the only one by means of which the Democracy of Rome exercised any control over the government of the republic. It was their only safeguard against the oppression and encroachments of the aristocracy. It is true that it did not enable the people, through their tribunes, to originate laws; but it saved them from all laws of the Senate which encroached on their rights and liberties.
Now, sir, let me ask the Senator from Kentucky, was this an arbitrary and monarchical power? No, sir; it was strictly democratic. And why? Because it was exercised by tribunes elected by the people, and responsible annually to the people; and I shall now attempt to prove that the veto power, under our Constitution, is of a similar character.
Who is the President of the United States, by whom this power is to be exercised? He is a citizen, elected by his fellow-citizens to the highest official trust in the country, and directly responsible to them for the manner in which he shall discharge his duties. From the manner in which he is elected, he more nearly represents a majority of the whole people of the United States than any other branch of the Government. Sir, one-fourth of the people may elect a decided majority of the Senate. Under the Constitution, we are the representatives of sovereign States, and little Delaware has an equal voice in this body with the Empire State. How is it in regard to the House of Representatives? Without a resort to the gerrymandering process which of late years has become so common, it may often happen, from the arrangement of the Congressional districts, that a minority of the people of a State will elect a majority of representatives to Congress. Not so in regard to the President of the United States. From necessity, he must be elected by the mass of the people in the several States. He is the creature of the people—the mere breath of their nostrils—and on him, as the tribune of the people, have they conferred the veto power.
Is there any serious danger that such a magistrate will ever abuse this power? What earthly inducement can he have to pursue such a course? In the first place, during his first term, he will necessarily feel anxious to obtain the stamp of public approbation on his conduct, by a re-election. For this reason, if no other existed, he will not array himself, by the exercise of the veto power, against a majority in both Houses of Congress, unless in extreme cases, where, from strong convictions of public duty, he may be willing to draw down upon himself their hostile influence.
In the second place, the Constitution leaves him in a state of dependence on Congress. Without their support, no measure recommended by him can become a law, and no system of policy which he may have devised can be carried into execution. Deprived of their aid, he can do nothing. Upon their cordial co-operation the success and glory of his administration must, in a great degree, depend. Is it, then, at all probable that he would make war upon Congress, by refusing to sanction any one of their favorite measures, unless he felt deeply conscious that he was acting in obedience to the will of the people, and could appeal to them for support? Nothing short of such a conviction, unless it be to preserve his oath inviolate to support the Constitution, will ever induce him to exercise a power always odious in the eyes of the majority in Congress, against which it is exerted.
But there is still another powerful influence which will prevent his abuse of the veto power. The man who has been elevated by his fellow-citizens to the highest office of trust and dignity which a great nation can bestow, must necessarily feel a strong desire to have his name recorded in untarnished characters on the page of his country’s history, and to live after death in the hearts of his countrymen. This consideration would forbid the abuse of the veto power. What is posthumous fame in almost every instance? Is it not the voice of posterity re-echoing the opinion of the present generation? And what body on the earth can give so powerful an impulse to public opinion, at least in this country, as the Congress of the United States? Under all these circumstances, we must admit that the opinion expressed by the Federalist is sound, and that “it is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often or too much.” Such must also have been Mr. Jefferson’s opinion. When consulted by General Washington in April, 1792, as to the propriety of vetoing “the act for an apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first enumeration,” what was his first reason in favor of the exercise of this power upon that occasion? “Viewing the bill,” says he, “either as a violation of the Constitution, or as giving an inconvenient exposition to its words, is it a case wherein the President ought to interpose his negative?” “I think it is.” “The non user of his negative power begins already to excite a belief that no President will ever venture to use it; and consequently, has begotten a desire to raise up barriers in the State legislatures against Congress throwing off the control of the Constitution.” I shall not read the other reasons he has assigned, none of them being necessary for my present purpose. Perilous, indeed, I repeat, is the exercise of the veto power, and “no President will ever venture to use it,” unless from the strongest sense of duty, and the strongest conviction that it will receive the public approbation.