Life of James Buchanan, Fifteenth President of the United States. v. 1 (of 2)

by George Ticknor Curtis

I might appeal to many passages in the history of the world to prove that the natural tendency of legislative power has always been to increase itself; and the accumulation of this power has, in many instances, overthrown republican institutions.

Our system of representative Democracy, Heaven’s last and best political gift to man, when perverted from its destined purpose, has become the instrument of the most cruel tyranny which the world has ever witnessed. Thus it is that the best things, when perverted, become the worst. Witness the scenes of anarchy, confusion, and blood, from which humanity and reason equally revolt, which attended the French Revolution, during the period of the Legislative Assembly and National Convention. So dreadful were these scenes, all enacted in the name of the people, and by the people’s own representatives, that they stand out in bold relief, from all the records of time, and are, by the universal consent of mankind, denominated “the reign of terror.” Under the government of the Committee of Public Safety—a committee of the National Convention—more blood was shed and more atrocities committed, than mankind had ever beheld within the same space of time. And yet all this was done in the name of liberty and equality. And what was the result? All this only paved the way for the usurpation of Napoleon Bonaparte; and the people sought protection in the arms of despotism from the tyranny and corruption of their own representatives. This has ever been the course in which republics have degenerated into military despotisms. Let these sacred truths be ever kept in mind: that sovereignty belongs to the people alone, and that all their servants should be watched with the eyes of sleepless jealousy. The Legislative Assembly and the National Convention of France had usurped all the powers of the government. They each, in their turn, constituted the sole representative body of the nation, and no wise checks and barriers were interposed to moderate and restrain their action. The example which they presented has convinced all mankind of the necessity of a senate in a republic; and similar reasons ought to convince them of the necessity of such a qualified veto as exists under our Constitution. The people cannot interpose too many barriers against unwise and wicked legislation, provided they do not thereby impair the necessary powers of the Government. I know full well that such scenes as I have just described cannot occur in America; but still we may learn lessons of wisdom from them to guide our own conduct.

Legislative bodies of any considerable number are more liable to sudden and violent excitements than individuals. This we have all often witnessed; and it results from a well known principle of human nature. In the midst of such excitements, nothing is more natural than hasty, rash, and dangerous legislation. Individual responsibility is, also, diminished, in proportion to the increase of the number. Each person, constituting but a small fractional part of the whole mass, thinks he can escape responsibility in the midst of the crowd. The restraint of the popular will upon his conduct is thus greatly diminished, and as one of a number he is ready to perform acts which he would not attempt upon his own individual responsibility. In order to check such excesses, the Federalist tells us that this veto power, or reference of the subject to the people, was granted.

Again, sir, highly excited political parties may exist in legislative assemblies, so intent upon grasping or retaining power, that in the struggle they will forget the wishes and the interests of the people. I might cite several examples of this kind in the history of our own legislation; but I merely refer to the odious and unconstitutional alien and sedition laws. Led on by ambitious and eloquent men who have become highly excited in the contest, the triumph of party may become paramount to the good of the country, and unconstitutional and dangerous laws may be the consequence. The veto power is necessary to arrest such encroachments on the rights of the States and of the people.

But worst of all is the system of “log-rolling,” so prevalent in Congress and the State legislatures, which the authors of the Federalist do not seem to have foreseen. This is not a name, to be sure, for ears polite; yet, though homely, it is so significant of the thing, that I shall be pardoned for its use. Now, sir, this very system of log-rolling in legislative bodies is that which has involved several of the States in debts for internal improvements, which I fear some of them may never be able to pay. In order to carry improvements which were useful and might have been productive, it was necessary to attach to them works of an opposite character. To obtain money to meet these extravagant expenditures, indulgence was granted to the banks at the expense of the people. Indeed, it has been a fruitful source of that whole system of ruinous and disastrous measures against which the Democracy have been warring for years. It has produced more distress in the country than can be repaired by industry and economy for many days to come. And yet how rarely has any Executive had the courage to apply the remedy which the veto power presents?

Let us, for a moment, examine the workings of this system. It is the more dangerous, because it presents itself to individual members under the garb of devotion to their constituents. One has a measure of mere local advantage to carry, which ought, if at all, to be accomplished by individual enterprise, and which could not pass if it stood alone. He finds that he cannot accomplish his object, if he relies only upon its merits. He finds that other members have other local objects at heart, none of which would receive the support of a majority if separately considered. These members, then, form a combination sufficiently powerful to carry the whole; and thus twenty measures may be adopted, not one of which separately could have obtained a respectable vote. Thanks to the wisdom and energy of General Jackson, this system of local internal improvements which threatened to extend itself into every neighborhood of the nation, and overspread the land, was arrested by the veto power. Had not this been done, the General Government might, at the present day, have been in the same wretched condition with the most indebted States.

But this system of “log-rolling” has not been confined to mere local affairs, as the history of the extra session will testify. It was then adopted in regard to important party objects, and was called the “great system of measures of the Whig party.” It was openly avowed that the majority must take the system in mass, although it is well known that several of the measures, had they stood alone, would have been rejected in detail. We are all perfectly aware that this was the vital principle of the extra session. By means of “log-rolling” the system was adopted. That the passage of the Distribution bill was the price paid for the Bankrupt bill, was openly avowed on this floor. By what mutual compensations the other measures were carried we are left to infer, and therefore I shall not hazard the expression of any opinion in this place on the subject. The ingredient, which one member could not swallow alone, went down easily as a component part of the healing dose. And what has been the consequence? The extravagant appropriations and enormous expenses of the extra session have beggared the Treasury.

It is to check this system, that the veto power can be most usefully and properly applied. The President of the United States stands “solitary and alone,” in his responsibility to the people. In the exercise of this power, he is emphatically the representative of the whole people. He has the same feeling of responsibility towards the people at large, which actuates us towards our immediate constituents. To him the mass of the people must look as their especial agent; and human ingenuity cannot devise a better mode of giving them the necessary control than by enabling him to appeal to themselves in such cases, by means of the veto power, for the purpose of ascertaining whether they will sanction the acts of their representatives. He can bring each of those measures distinctly before the people for their separate consideration, which may have been adopted by log-rolling as parts of a great system.

The veto power has long been in existence in Pennsylvania, and has been often exercised, and yet, to my knowledge, it has never been exerted in any important case, except in obedience to the public will, or in promotion of the interests of the people. Simon Snyder, whose far-seeing sagacity detected the evils of our present banking system, whilst they were yet comparatively in embryo, has rendered himself immortal by his veto of the forty banks. The system, however, was only arrested, not destroyed, and we are now suffering the evils. The present governor has had the wisdom and courage repeatedly to exercise the veto power, and always, I believe, with public approbation. In a late signal instance, his veto was overruled, and the law passed by a majority of two-thirds in both Houses, although I am convinced that at least three-fourths of the people of the State are opposed to the measure.

In the State of Pennsylvania, we regard the veto power with peculiar favor. In the convention of 1837, which was held for the purpose of proposing amendments to our Constitution, the identical proposition now made by the Senator from Kentucky was brought forward, and was repudiated by a vote of 103 to 14. This convention was composed of the ablest and most practical men in the State, and was almost divided between the two great rival parties of the country; and yet, in that body, but fourteen individuals could be found who were willing to change the Constitution in this particular.