Again: the Senator asks, why has not the veto been given to the President on the acts of conventions held for the purpose of amending our Constitutions? If it be necessary to restrain Congress, it is equally necessary, says he, to restrain conventions. The answer to this argument is equally easy. It would be absurd to grant an appeal, through the intervention of a veto, to the people themselves, against their own acts. They create conventions by virtue of their own undelegated and inalienable sovereignty; and when they speak, their servants, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, must be silent. Besides, when they proceed to exercise their sovereign power in changing the forms of their Government, they are peculiarly careful in the selection of their delegates—they watch over the proceedings with vigilant care, and the Constitution proposed, by such a convention, is never adopted until after it has been submitted to the vote of the people. It is a mere proposition to the people themselves, and leaves no room for the action of the veto power.

[Here Mr. Clay observed, that Constitutions, thus formed, were not afterwards submitted to the people.]

Mr. Buchanan. For many years past, I believe that this has always been done, as it always ought to be done, in the States: and the Federal Constitution was not adopted until after it had been submitted to a convention of the people of every State in the Union.

So much in regard to the States. The Senator’s argument has no application whatever to the Federal Constitution, which has provided the mode of its own amendment. It requires two-thirds of both Houses, the very majority required to overrule a Presidential veto, even to propose any amendment; and before such an amendment can be adopted, it must be ratified by the legislatures, or by conventions, in three-fourths of the several States. To state this proposition, is to manifest the absurdity, nay, the impossibility of applying the veto power of the President to amendments, which have thus been previously ratified by such an overwhelming expression of the public will. This Constitution of ours, with all its checks and balances, is a wonderful invention of human wisdom. Founded upon the most just philosophical principles, and the deepest knowledge of the nature of man, it produces harmony, happiness, and order, from elements which, to the superficial observer, might appear to be discordant.

On the whole, I trust not only that this veto power may not be destroyed, but that the vote on the Senator’s amendment may be of such a character as to settle the question, at least during the present generation. Sir, of all the executive powers, it is the one least to be dreaded. It cannot create; it can originate no measure; it can change no existing law; it can destroy no existing institution. It is a mere power to arrest hasty and inconsiderate changes, until the voice of the people, who are alike the masters of Senators, Representatives and President, shall be heard. When it speaks, we must all bow with deference to the decree. Public opinion is irresistible in this country. It will accomplish its purpose by the removal of Senators, Representatives, or President, who may stand in its way. The President might as well attempt to stay the tides of the ocean by erecting mounds of sand, as to think of controlling the will of the people by the veto power. The mounting waves of popular opinion would soon prostrate such a feeble barrier. The veto power is everything when sustained by public opinion; but nothing without it.

What is this Constitution under which we live, and what are we? Are we not the most prosperous, the most free, and amongst the most powerful nations on the face of the earth? Have we not attained this pre-eminence, in a period brief beyond any example recorded in history, under the benign influence of this Constitution, and the laws which have been passed under its authority? Why, then, should we, with rude hands, tear away one of the cords from this wisely balanced instrument, and thus incur the danger of impairing or destroying the harmony and vigorous action of the whole? The Senator from Kentucky has not, in my opinion, furnished us with any sufficient reasons.

And after all, what harm can this veto power ever do? It can never delay the passage of a great public measure, demanded by the people, more than two, or at the most, four years. Is it not better, then, to submit to this possible inconvenience, (for it has never yet occurred,) than to destroy the power altogether? It is not probable that it ever will occur; because if the President should disregard the will of the people on any important constitutional measure which they desired, he would sign his own political death warrant. No President will ever knowingly attempt to do it; and his means of knowledge, from the ordeal through which he must have passed previous to his election, are superior to those of any other individual. He will never, unless in cases scarcely to be imagined, resist the public will when fairly expressed. It is beyond the nature of things to believe otherwise. The veto power is that feature of our Constitution which is most conservative of the rights of the States and the rights of the people. May it be perpetual!

It was during the summer of 1842 that the treaty negotiated at Washington, between Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton, settled various long standing and somewhat perilous controversies between the United States and England, for which Mr. Webster had remained in office under President Tyler. Mr. Buchanan was one of those who opposed the ratification of this treaty when it came before the Senate, in August, 1842. His speech in the secret session was very elaborate in its criticisms upon the whole negotiation, but it does not need to be reproduced now.

The debates on the treaty were not published until the following session of Congress, which began in December, 1842. In February, 1843, Mr. Buchanan received the following letter from Mr. Jared Sparks, the distinguished historian:[[72]]

[JARED SPARKS TO MR. BUCHANAN.]