I replied that the whole field was open to him, as it had been in the beginning; that it was as free to him as it had been to him at first, or was to me afterwards, to make any proposition he thought proper; that all I could say was that any proposition he might make would be respectfully considered by the President; but I said no more.
He then observed that as I was not willing to go further (as I understood him), he would, under his instructions, present me the offer of the British government to arbitrate the question. He said it was drawn up chiefly in the very language of Lord Aberdeen.
I then received the communication from him, and read it over carefully. As soon as I had completed its perusal, he urged its acceptance strongly; expressed his great desire for the preservation of peace between the two countries, and said that it was impossible that war should grow out of such a question between two great nations. He said he was not worth much in the world; but would give half what he was worth to see the question honorably and amicably adjusted between the two nations.
I stated the strong desire, both on the part of the President and myself, that the question might be amicably and honorably adjusted. That we had every disposition that this result might be attained. I observed, however, that if ever this was accomplished, I thought it must be by negotiation, and not by arbitration; and especially such an arbitration as he proposed. That both the President and myself were firmly convinced of the validity of our title up to 54° 40´; and yet his proposition to arbitrate assumed the right to a portion of the territory on the part of Great Britain, and left it to the arbitrator alone to decide in what manner the territory should be divided between the parties. That this alone, I thought, would be a sufficient reason for the rejection of his proposition, even if others did not exist, of which he must be aware from our previous conversations on the subject; but I would consult the President, and give him an answer with as little delay as possible. He intimated rather than expressed a wish that his answer might be communicated to him in time for the packet (Monday). I told him that a proper respect for the British government required that the answer should be well considered; that the cabinet would not meet again before Tuesday, and I could not encourage him to expect the answer before Saturday next. He said he had no doubt my answer would be well considered. He hoped that in it I would not assert a claim to the whole territory, and Saturday next would be in time.
He then branched off, and said that the proposition was to refer the question to a state as well as a sovereign; he said that this had been done on purpose to get clear of the objection to crowned heads. I asked him to whom he thought it might be referred if not to a sovereign. He suggested the Republic of Switzerland, or the government of Hamburg or Bremen. I told him that whilst my own inclinations were strongly against arbitration; if I were compelled to select an arbitrator, it would be the Pope. That both nations were heretics, and the Pope would be impartial. This he appeared at first to take seriously,—he said the Pope was a temporal sovereign; but I thought he was disinclined to select him as an arbitrator. He perceived, however, that I was not in earnest, and suggested that the reference might be made to commissioners from both countries. I told him I thought it was vain to think of arbitration; because, even if the President were agreed to it, which I felt pretty certain he was not, no such treaty could pass the Senate. That the pursuit of arbitration would only involve the question in new difficulties. He then suggested the mediation of a third power in the adjustment of the question. I told him that was an idea which he had never suggested before, and on which I could say nothing. He observed that this, together with his suggestion of commissioners, came from himself and had not been embraced in his instructions. He said that a mediator who would interfere might share the fate of the man who interfered between two other men who were fighting, when both fell upon him and gave him a sound drubbing.
He remarked that the affair might remain just where it was, and the British government would not disturb it. He did not entertain serious apprehensions of war.
He then told me that he had met Judge Douglas at Mr. Cox’s party the other evening, and had a good deal of conversation with him about his bill.
He objected to a promise of a grant of lands to actual settlers in Oregon, and to the erection of forts by the Government within it, as violations of the treaty. I told him I had formed no decided opinion as to the promise of grants of land; but as to the forts, it was very clear, in my opinion, that we had a right to erect them. We did not purpose to erect fortifications capable of enduring a siege in civilized warfare; but merely stockade forts to protect our emigrants from the savages. That the Hudson’s Bay Company had erected many such forts, and we surely had the right under the treaty to do what they had done. He observed that the settlers might do this themselves as the Company had done. I replied that they were too poor; that this Company had the entire government in its hands; and surely we might do what they had done. I observed that this was ever the way with Great Britain, she was always fettered by monopolies; and if it were not for the Company they would at once give us our rights to the whole country up to 54° 40′. He said that the Hudson’s Bay Company had rights in Oregon which must be protected; but I understood him to admit that they did interpose an obstacle in the way of the settlement of the question. He said the British government would be glad to get clear of the question on almost any terms; that they did not care if the arbitrator should award the whole territory to us. They would yield it without a murmur. I said I had no doubt of this. They never played the part of the fox: but always of the lion. They would preserve their faith inviolate. He said they wished for peace; but intimated that this was not our wish. I asked him why we should desire war. Would not their superiority at sea give them command of the coasts of Oregon. Yes, he said, that was true, but the war would not be confined to that region. That he would willingly make a bargain to fight it out with us there, if we would agree to that.
On the 26th of February (1846), Mr. Buchanan addressed an elaborate official despatch to Mr. McLane, explaining fully the reasons which had led the President to decline to make the boundary of Oregon a subject of arbitration, and suggesting what it would be practicable for the President to agree upon, if proposed by the British government. Mr. McLane was authorized to make known to Lord Aberdeen the contents of this despatch; and between its date and the 1st of June, Sir Robert Peel’s government determined to send to Washington the project of a convention which is described in a despatch addressed to Mr. J. Randolph Clay on the 13th of June, and which is given below. The despatch of February 26th, to Mr. McLane, was accompanied by a private letter of the same date. On the 6th of June, another private letter to Mr. McLane informed him of the President’s purpose to submit Lord Aberdeen’s project to the Senate, and the despatch of June 13th to Mr. Clay gives the result.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. LOUIS McLANE.]