Your friendly letter gave me both pleasure and pain. Pleasure, in the renewed assurance of your friendship; and pain, to perceive that the course of the President towards you has not been entirely characterized by that delicacy and confidence which is certainly due to your position, and to the important services you have rendered to him and the country. Let me entreat you, however, to act with great deliberation and prudence. Do not suffer yourself to be operated upon by professing, or even by real friends, to act hastily. I am not of the opinion that any slight was intended by the President. He no doubt gave the true reason for having nominated Judge —— without consulting you, as he knew you were opposed to his selection.[[92]] It is not, I think, of sufficient importance to produce a quarrel; and the President must be too well aware of the strength you give to his administration to desire your withdrawal. Your doing so at this most important juncture would be to give the staff into the hands of your enemies; who would desire nothing better to prostrate you with. Your able correspondence with Pakenham has justly turned the eyes of the country towards you as a talented and safe helmsman to guide the ship of State. This your enemies know and feel. Do not, I again entreat you, by your own act, aid them to defeat your future prospects. Probably I have dwelt more on this matter than it merits; if so, I feel assured you will attribute it to the true motive, my anxiety to see you elevated to a station you are so well qualified to fill, with honor to yourself and advantage to the country....
[KING TO BUCHANAN.]
Paris, February 28, 1846.
My Dear Friend:—
I read your kind letter attentively, and then committed it to the flames, as you requested. The refusal of the President to place you on the Bench of the Supreme Court, after you had manifested a willingness to accept of the situation, surprises me greatly. I had supposed, independent of a desire to gratify you, to whom he owes so much, he would have seized with avidity on the opportunity thus afforded him to get freed from the importunities of persons of doubtful qualification, none of whom could venture to complain of your being preferred to him. I have turned it over and over in my mind, to see if I could discover any motive for his refusal other than that assigned by himself, viz., that you were too important to his administration in the post you now occupy to enable him to dispense with your services. If this was in truth his sole reason, he should have frankly and unreservedly placed before you the difficulties and embarrassments your abandonment of the State Department would involve him in; how necessary you were to enable him to carry on the Government successfully, and at the same time have expressed his willingness to meet your wishes if persisted in. If such had been his course, I know you too well to doubt for a moment but that you would have relinquished the judgeship, and continued your invaluable services as a member of the administration. This, however, you must still do; you owe it to the country; you owe it to yourself. You can form no idea of the reputation you have acquired, even in Europe, by the able and masterly manner in which you have presented our claim to Oregon, never before perfectly understood, either in Europe or America. You certainly occupy at this moment, in public estimation, a more enviable position than any other distinguished man of our country, and your prospects for the future are brighter than those of any one I know. Do not, I beg you, mar those prospects by abandoning your place at this critical period of our foreign relations. Finish the work you have so ably begun. Settle the Oregon question by an equitable compromise, and whatever a few hot heads or selfish aspirants may say, your reputation will rest upon a foundation broad and strong, the approval of a virtuous and intelligent people at home, and the wise and good of every land. You know I am no flatterer. I speak in all sincerity, and say nothing but what is strictly true.
[KING TO BUCHANAN.]
Paris, March 28th, 1846.
Dear Buchanan:—
The last steamer brought me your very acceptable letter of the 26th February. The publication of my correspondence with M. Guizot has been well received by all parties in Paris, and has put at rest forever all speculation as to the correctness of my despatch. Even M. Guizot himself manifests a greater degree of cordiality than formerly, and made it a point to attend a ball I gave on the 22d February, although he is not in the habit of going to parties. I knew the course I pursued would, so far from committing me with any one here, produce a salutary result; and it was not taken in passion, or because I am “thin skinned.” My position was never better than at this time with all in power here, from the king down to the lowest official. Present me kindly to my friend, Mr. Trist, and tender him my thanks for the interest he has manifested for me. The postponement of the election of Senator for Alabama will, as you say, enable me to enter the field with a fair prospect of success, and I am free to declare that I should be truly gratified to be reinstated in the Senate. It is possible, however, that the Governor may be operated upon by those on the spot, who aspire to the situation, and dread my return, to call the legislature together this spring, and before I can possibly be present. This my friends Bagby and others should prevent. A called session would involve unnecessary expense, without an adequate advantage, or, in fact, any advantage whatever, so far as the public is concerned. My arrangements are such that I cannot, with convenience, return to the United States before the last of July. I am anxious, however, to conform to the wishes of the President in the appointment of my successor, and will either hasten or retard my surrender of my place, as to him may seem best. Should he prefer to delay the appointment of my successor until after the adjournment of Congress, I could return on leave of absence, as he once kindly permitted me to do, and leave my Secretary, Mr. Martin, as chargé des affaires. He is, as you know, well qualified to discharge the duties, and on his account I should be pleased to give to him the advantages of the position. You will confer with the President and let me know what course will be most acceptable to him, and I will then make my request accordingly. If a vacancy occurs at Turin by the resignation of Wickliff, could you not lend a helping hand to Dr. Martin? The place will not, I presume, be sought for by any of the prominent politicians, and Martin’s information and experience peculiarly fits him to be useful. He is, withal, very poor; and even if my successor consented to retain him here, his condition would be greatly altered for the worse, as with me he lives without expense. Serve him if you can; at any rate, save us from that miserable toady ——.
I altogether approve of the President’s refusal to submit the Oregon question to arbitration, as proposed by the British government. The objections enumerated by you are all sufficient, but, in addition, it could not escape your observation that, by the terms of submission, whether referred to a crowned head or to private individuals, the result would, in all probability, have been to deprive us of all the country north of the Columbia, simply upon the ground that actual possession should not be disturbed. Information on which I can rely convinces me that Lord Aberdeen, when he directed the offer to be made, did not expect it to be accepted. His object was, first, to induce the European governments to believe that they were anxious to settle the question upon just terms, and, secondly, to gain time, as they calculated on Sir Robert Peel’s measure inducing the American people to force their Government to give way on the Oregon question that they may receive the advantages it holds out to them.[[93]] I know the calculation is altogether erroneous, and that, as you say, the people are ahead of the Government on the question. Still, such is the impression made in England by Pakenham’s despatches, the speeches of some of our prominent men, and the tone of our opposition press generally. I have my doubts whether Pakenham is as yet instructed to make a proposition for a compromise, but it will be made; and will, I think, be such as we should not hesitate to accept, unless the perpetual navigation of the Columbia is insisted upon. This I would not grant without an equivalent in the navigation of the St. Lawrence; but there seems to be a propriety in allowing the use of the river for a term of years, not to exceed ten, to enable the Northwest Fur Company gradually to withdraw an interest which has grown up under the treaty of joint occupancy. The President will certainly act with prudence by submitting the proposition, whatever it may be (unless altogether inadmissible), to the Senate, for the advice in advance of that body. Cass, Allen and Company will find that no political capital can be made by arraying themselves against an arrangement which makes the 49th parallel the boundary, but yielding the whole of Vancouver’s Island, and the use for a few years of the Columbia River. The good sense of the whole country will approve of such a settlement. I am not at all surprised to hear that Calhoun is anxious to free himself from the odium of voting against the notice, regardless of the dilemma in which he has involved his devoted adherents in the House. If the Senate amends the House resolutions, my life upon it, they will receive Calhoun’s vote; and all chivalry will exclaim: Behold the great statesman, whose wise and prudent course has alone saved the nation from the horrors of war. The speech of Colonel Benton was excellent, and proves him to be a statesman indeed. Still, I do not, I am sorry to say, approve of his opposition to an increase of our navy. If we hope to command the respect of the powers of Europe, we must put ourselves in a position not only to repel all aggression, but, if needs be, to act on the offensive. They are all jealous of our rapid growth and prosperity, and would, if they dared, unite to retard or destroy it. We should hasten to repair our forts, build some new ones, and add to our little navy ten or twelve war steamers.