The objections urged against this measure, when the resolutions for accomplishing it were finally adopted, three days before Mr. Polk became President, were the great extent of territory which it would add to our dominions, the increase of slavery and slave representation, and its tendency to produce a war with Mexico. It could not be said, however, that under the circumstances Mexico would have a clearly just cause for war if the annexation should be accomplished, whatever she might have had at an earlier period. Texas was now actually independent of Mexico. The United States had not only recognized her independence, but had made treaties and carried on commerce with her, in entire disregard of the claim of Mexico to the sovereignty of this revolted province. And Mexico had during all this period made no attempt at reconquest. She had practically acquiesced in the recognition of Texan independence by the United States and other powers; and therefore it could not be said, after such a lapse of time, that a new and just cause for war would arise if Texas should be annexed to the American Union.[[98]] There was undoubtedly much danger that Mexico would not regard the annexation in this light; and, therefore, what the new Secretary of State had to do was to conduct the whole matter, under the resolutions of Congress, so as to preserve peace, if possible.
His first official duty was to answer a protest addressed to the Government of the United States by General Almonte, the Mexican minister at Washington. Mr. Buchanan’s answer was regarded by Mr. Webster as “mild and conciliatory.” It was, in substance, that Mexico had no right to complain of such a transaction between independent states; that the Government of the United States would respect all the just rights of Mexico, and hoped to bring all pending questions with her to a fair and friendly settlement; but that the annexation of Texas must now be considered as a thing done. Still, a period of sixty or seventy days must elapse before it could be known how the government of Texas had taken the passage of the joint resolutions. At that time, there were instalments of money due from Mexico to the United States, under an existing treaty, to meet claims of citizens of the United States to a large amount. These Mexico might choose to withhold; perhaps she might decree non-intercourse with the United States; but that she would go to war was not regarded as probable by the best informed persons at Washington. In the meantime, Mr. Buchanan had not only to manage the relations between the United States and Mexico, under circumstances of great delicacy, with firmness, as well as conciliation, but also to keep a watchful eye upon the course of England and France in reference to this measure. It must be remembered that Mr. Buchanan had succeeded, as Secretary of State, to the management of the Oregon question with England, as well as to the completion of the arrangements for annexing Texas to the United States. He was informed, both privately and officially, by the ministers of the United States at London and Paris, of the danger of an intervention by England and France in the affairs of Mexico; and soon after he became Secretary of State, he had some reason to apprehend that the settlement of the Oregon difficulty might be delayed for the purpose of keeping open the unsettled questions in regard to the final disposal of Texas. Mexico was at this time about to undergo one of its many revolutions, and it might become difficult to find an executive government with which to establish diplomatic relations. In this posture of affairs, an interference by either France or England, or both, might render it impracticable to carry out the annexation of Texas to the United States, and might lead to very serious complications. Writing from London on the 3d of March, at the moment when the resolutions providing for the annexation of Texas had just passed, but before they could have become known in London, Mr. McLane said, in a private letter to Mr. Buchanan:
“Allow me to add a word in regard to Mexico. I stated in an early despatch that the policy here would be to keep open our difficulties there, to await the issue of the Oregon question; and of that I have very little doubt. But why not disappoint such calculation? Even if our affairs with Great Britain are to end in a rupture, that result, with proper precaution, may be postponed until the expiration of the year’s notice. Then why not act promptly and decisively in regard to Mexico? ...... Every day is leading to machinations in Europe to interfere with the settlement of the Mexican government.”
On the 25th of March (1845,) Mr. Buchanan sent the following official despatch to Mr. King, the Minister of the United States at Paris:
[BUCHANAN TO KING.]
Department of State,
Washington, March 25, 1845.
}
Sir:—
Your Despatch, No. 11, under date of the 27th ultimo, has been received and submitted to the President. In commencing his administration, he had confidently hoped, that the government of France was animated by the same kind spirit towards the United States which inspires the Government and people of this country in all their conduct towards their ancient Revolutionary ally. This agreeable impression was made upon his mind by the emphatic declaration of his Majesty to yourself on the 4th July last, when speaking on the subject of the annexation of Texas to our Union, “that in any event no steps would be taken by his government, in the slightest degree hostile or which would give to the United States just cause of complaint.” The President was also gratified with the subsequent assurance of M. Guizot, given to yourself, that France had not acted and would not act in concert with Great Britain for the purpose of preventing annexation, but that in any course she might pursue she would proceed independently of that power. You may then judge of the surprise and regret of the President, when he discovered from your last despatch, that the governments of France and Great Britain were now acting in concert and endeavoring by a joint effort to dissuade the government and people of Texas from giving their consent to annexation. Nay, more, that so intimate has been their alliance to accomplish this purpose, that even “the instructions of the French government to its representative in Texas had been communicated to Lord Aberdeen.”
The people of Texas are sovereign and independent. Under Providence they hold their destiny in their own hands. Justice to them requires that they should have been left free to decide the question of annexation for themselves without foreign interference and without being biassed by foreign influence. Not a doubt exists but that the people of the two Republics are anxious to form a re-union. Indeed, the enthusiastic unanimity which has been displayed by the citizens of Texas in favor of annexation is unexampled in the history of nations. Little reason then had we to anticipate that whilst the two Republics were proceeding to adjust the terms for accomplishing this re-union that France in concert with Great Britain, and under the lead of that power, should interpose her efforts and influence to paralyze and obstruct the free action of the people of Texas, and thus place herself in an unfriendly attitude towards the United States.