There are but two modes of carrying it on—to march upon the capital with such a force as will ensure success, or to hold the northeastern provinces and California, with the ports of Vera Cruz and Tampico, keeping up a rigid blockade of both coasts, and requiring the enemy to supply all the provisions we may require. For this purpose we should not require more than fifteen thousand effective men. If we do not march upon Mexico, it is every way essential to take San Juan de Ulloa. The navy should have an opportunity to distinguish itself, and the people must have something to huzza about.
There is a Doctor Mesa here, just arrived from Victoria, the capital of Tamaulipas. He brings letters, stating him to be a man of character and influence, and that he is authorized to speak the sentiments of the leading men of Tamaulipas. He says that the people of that department are willing to separate from Mexico, if they can have assurances of protection from us, and that they would be joined in the movement by the neighboring departments. I of course did not pretend to say what would be done by the administration, but suggested that at present it would be indiscreet to guarantee a northern confederation, but that we would be under the strongest obligations of honor, in making a treaty of peace, to stipulate for full protection in person and property to all those who might take part in the movement. He will proceed to Washington, and I have taken the liberty of giving him a letter of introduction to you. I shall patiently await the expiration of the month of December; if by that time Mexico has not signified her wish to treat, I shall no longer continue to look forward to a renewal of my mission. I have written to the President, and I have felt it my duty to say what I have heard from almost every quarter, that General —— (of whose qualifications I personally have no knowledge whatever), does not command the confidence of the army. Do you know General Pillow? Has not the President exaggerated views of his military talents?
Believe me, my dear sir, very faithfully and respectfully,
Your friend, etc.,
John Slidell.
[MR. SLIDELL TO PRESIDENT POLK.]
New Orleans, January 6, 1847.
My Dear Sir:—
The tenor of all the advices from Mexico is such as to satisfy me that [the Mexican] Congress will not authorize the opening of negotiations, and that we are not to have a peace until its terms are dictated by a victorious army before the walls of the capital. The public interest may, and probably will, require that you should make, under such circumstances, other arrangements for future negotiations than those which you had heretofore proposed, and my object in now addressing you is to state, as I do with the most entire frankness, and without the slightest reservation, that I do not expect or desire that my previous mission, or any understanding that has existed in regard to its resumption, should interfere in the remotest degree with any new selection that you may consider it expedient to make. While I shall ever entertain the warmest sense of the distinguished and unsolicited mark of your good opinion in charging me with one of the most important trusts which has ever been confided to a citizen of the United States, I feel that I should be unworthy of its continuance if I permitted any claims of mine, real or supposed, to embarrass you for a single moment.
General Scott, when he passed through this place, considered himself, in consequence of my relation to Mexican affairs, at liberty to communicate in confidence to me, as he did fully, his plan of the campaign, and I was highly gratified to learn that Vera Cruz was to be attacked by a force that will insure the possession of that most important position. I am not so well satisfied, however, that the shortest road to Mexico is the best, and while I take it for granted that the topography, resources and climate of Mexico have been maturely studied, and due weight given to all the considerations which should decide the choice of routes, yet I can not but feel some misgiving as to the result. At all events, the most abundant resources of men and materials should be placed at his disposition. There is one subject connected with this, of which I have long been thinking of writing to you, but have been restrained by feelings which you can understand and appreciate. I fear that the commander of our squadron has not the qualities of energy and decision which are imperatively required for an emergency like the present. Commodore Conner is a brave man, an accomplished officer, and a good seaman, but his health is, and has been for some time past, so much impaired as, in a great degree, to neutralize these qualities; the sound mind, in military matters especially, is not sufficient without the strong body; and frequent violent attacks of a most painful nervous affliction, the tic-douloureux, cannot fail to affect the clearness of his perception and the vigor of his action. To my mind this has been abundantly demonstrated by his two abortive attempts at Alvarado. On this point there is little difference of opinion among the officers under his command. Alvarado might have been taken without difficulty on either occasion. He does not command the confidence of those who serve under him, and confidence is the vital principle of success. I make these remarks with great diffidence and still greater reluctance, for I have the highest regard for Commodore Conner, as an officer and a gentleman, and were it not for his bodily ailments, there are few men in the navy whom I consider better fitted for so important a command. I trust that you will pardon me for suggestions which may perhaps be considered misplaced, but I am sure that you will do justice to the feeling that has dictated them. Your own fame, the success of your administration, the great interests of the country are staked upon a brilliant termination of the war, and the feelings of an individual are but dust in the balance of such momentous issues. This is the scale in which I wish my own to be weighed, and be assured, my dear sir, that so far as I am concerned, I shall most cheerfully and cordially acquiesce in any decision which you may think proper to make.