It is not my purpose, upon the present occasion, again to agitate the questions which have so often been discussed in this House, as to the powers of Congress in regard to internal improvements. For my own part, I cheerfully accord to the Federal Government the power of subscribing stock, in companies incorporated by the State, for the purpose of making roads and canals; and I entertain no doubt whatever but that we can, under the Constitution, appropriate the money of our constituents directly to the construction of internal improvements, with the consent of the States through which they may pass. These powers I shall ever be willing to exercise, upon all proper occasions. But I shall never be driven to support any road, or any canal, which my judgment disapproves, by a fear of the senseless clamor which is always attempted to be raised against members upon this floor, as enemies to internal improvement, who dare to vote against any measure which the Committee on Roads and Canals think proper to bring before this House. It was my intention to discuss the power of Congress to pass the bill, and its policy, separately. Upon reflection I find these subjects are so intimately blended, they cannot be separated. I shall therefore consider them together.
“Before, however, I enter upon the subject, it will be necessary to present a short historical sketch of the Cumberland Road. It owes its origin to a compact between the State of Ohio and the United States. In 1802, Congress proposed to the convention which formed the constitution of Ohio, that they would grant to that State one section of land to each township, for the use of schools; that they would also grant to it several tracts of land on which there were salt springs; and that five per cent. of the net proceeds of the future sale of public lands within its territory should be applied to the purpose of making public roads, ‘leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic to the Ohio, to the said State, and through the same.’ The act, however, distinctly declares that such roads shall be laid out under the authority of Congress, ‘with the consent of the several States through which the road shall pass.’ These terms were offered by Congress, to the State of Ohio, provided she would exempt, by an irrevocable ordinance, all the land which should be sold by the United States within her territory, from every species of taxation, for the space of five years, after the day of sale. This proposition of Congress was accepted by the State of Ohio, and it thus became a compact, the terms of which could not be changed without the consent of both the contracting parties. By the terms of the compact, this five per cent. of the net proceeds of the sales of the public land was applicable to two objects; the first, the construction of roads leading from the Atlantic to the State of Ohio; and the second, the construction of roads within that State. In 1803, Congress, at the request of Ohio, apportioned this fund between these two objects. Three of the five per cent. was appropriated to the construction of roads within the State, leaving only two per cent. applicable to roads leading from the navigable waters of the Atlantic to it.
“In March, 1806, Congress determined to apply this two per cent. fund to the object for which it was destined, and passed ‘an act to regulate the laying out and making of a road from Cumberland, in the State of Maryland, to the State of Ohio.’ Under the provisions of this act, before the President could proceed to cut a single tree upon the route of the road, it was made necessary to obtain the consent of the States through which it passed. The Federal Government asked Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia for permission to make it, and each of them granted this privilege in the same manner that they would have done to a private individual, or to a corporation created by their own laws. Congress, at that day, asserted no other right than a mere power to appropriate the money of their constituents to the construction of this road, after the consent of these States should be obtained. The idea of a sovereign power in this government to make the road, and to exercise jurisdiction over it, for the purpose of keeping it in repair, does not, then, appear to have ever entered the imagination of the warmest advocate for Federal power. The federalism of that day would have shrunk with horror from such a spectre. There is a circumstance worthy of remark in the act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, which was passed in April, 1807, authorizing the President of the United States to open this road. It grants this power upon condition that the road should pass through Uniontown and Washington, if practicable. The grant was accepted upon this condition, and the road was constructed. Its length is one hundred and thirty miles, and its construction and repairs have cost the United States one million seven hundred and sixty-six thousand one hundred and sixty-six dollars and thirty-eight cents; whilst the two per cent. fund which we had bound ourselves to apply to this purpose, amounted, on the 30th of June, 1822, the date of the last official statement within my knowledge, only to the sum of one hundred and eighty-seven thousand seven hundred and eighty-six dollars and thirty-one cents, less than one-ninth of the cost of the road. This road has cost the United States more than thirteen thousand five hundred dollars per mile. This extravagant expenditure shows conclusively that it is much more politic for us to enlist individual interest in the cause of Internal Improvement, by subscribing stock, than to become ourselves sole proprietors. Any government, unless under extraordinary circumstances, will pay one-third more for constructing a road or canal, than would be expended by individuals in accomplishing the same object.
“I shall now proceed to the argument. Upon a review of this brief history, what is the conclusion at which we must arrive? That this road was made by the United States, as a mere proprietor, to carry into effect a contract with the State of Ohio, and not as a sovereign. In its construction, the Federal Government proceeded as any corporation or private individual would have done. We asked the States for permission to make the road through the territories over which their sovereign authority extended. After that permission had been obtained, we appropriated the money and constructed the road. The State of Pennsylvania even annexed a condition to her grant, with which the United States complied. She also conferred upon the agents of the United States the power of taking materials for the construction and repair of this road, without the consent of the owner, making a just compensation therefor. This compensation was to be ascertained under the laws of the State, and not under those of the United States. The mode of proceeding to assess damages in such cases against the United States was precisely the same as it is against corporations, created by her own laws, for the purpose of constructing roads.
“What, then, does this precedent establish? Simply, that the United States may appropriate money for the construction of a road through the territories of a State, with its consent; and I do not entertain the least doubt but that we possess this power. What does the present bill propose? To change the character which the United States has hitherto sustained, in relation to this road, from that of a simple proprietor to a sovereign. To declare to the nation, that, although they had to ask the States of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, for permission to make the road, now, after it is completed, they will exercise jurisdiction over it, and collect tolls upon it, under the authority of their own laws, for the purpose of keeping it in repair. We will not ask the States to erect toll-gates for us. We are determined to exercise that power ourselves. The Federal Government first introduced itself into the States as a friend, by permission; it now wishes to hold possession as a sovereign, by power. This road was made in the manner that one independent sovereign would construct a road through the territories of another. Had Virginia been a party to the compact with Ohio, instead of the United States, she would have asked the permission of Maryland and Pennsylvania to construct the Cumberland Road through their territories, and it would have been granted. But what would have been our astonishment, after this permission, had Virginia attempted to assume jurisdiction over the road in Pennsylvania, to erect toll-gates upon it under the authority of her own laws, and to punish offenders against these laws in her own courts. Yet the two cases are nearly parallel.
The right to demand toll, and to stop and punish passengers for refusing to pay it, is emphatically a sovereign right, and has ever been so considered amongst civilized nations. The power to erect toll-gates necessarily implies, 1st, The stoppage of the passenger until he shall pay the toll; 2d, His trial and punishment, if he should, either by force or by fraud, evade, or attempt to evade, its payment; 3d, A discretionary power as to the amount of toll; 4th, The trial and punishment of persons who may wilfully injure the road, or violate the police established upon it. These powers are necessarily implied. Without the exercise of them, you could not proceed with safety to collect the toll for a single day. Other powers will soon be exercised. If you compel passengers to pay toll, the power of protecting them whilst travelling along your road is almost a necessary incident. The sovereign, who receives the toll, ought naturally to possess the power of protecting him who pays it. To vest the power of demanding toll in one sovereign, and the protection of the traveller’s person in another, would be almost an absurdity. The Federal Government would probably, ere long, exercise the power of trying and punishing murders and robberies, and all other offences committed upon the road. To what jurisdiction would the trial and punishment of these offences necessarily belong? To the courts of the United States, and to them alone. In Ohio, in New York, in Virginia, and in Maryland, it has been determined that State courts, even if Congress should confer it, have no jurisdiction over any penal action, or criminal offence, against the laws of the United States. Even if these decisions were incorrect, still it has never been seriously contended that State courts were bound to take jurisdiction in such cases. It must be admitted, by all, that Congress have not the power to compel an execution of their criminal or penal laws by the courts of the States. This is sufficient for my argument. Even if the power existed, in State courts, they never ought, unless upon extraordinary occasions, to try and to punish offences committed against the United States. The peace and the harmony of the people of this country require that the powers of the two governments should never be blended. The dividing line between their separate jurisdictions should be clearly marked; otherwise dangerous collisions between them must be the inevitable consequence. In two of the States through which this road passes, it has already been determined that their courts cannot take jurisdiction over offences committed against the laws of Congress. What, then, is the inevitable consequence? All the penal enactments of this bill, or of the future bills which it will become necessary to pass to supply its defects, must be carried into execution by the Federal courts. Any citizen of the United States, charged with the most trifling offence against the police of this road, must be dragged for trial to the Federal court of that State within whose jurisdiction it is alleged to have been committed. If committed in Maryland, the trial must take place in Baltimore; if in Pennsylvania, at Clarksburg.
The distance of one hundred or two hundred miles, which he would be compelled to travel to take his trial, and the expenses which he must necessarily incur, would, in themselves, be a severe punishment for a more aggravated offence. Besides, the people of the neighborhood would be harassed in attending as witnesses at such a great distance from their places of abode. These, and many other inconveniences, which I shall not enumerate, would soon compel Congress to authorize the appointment of justices of the peace, or some other inferior tribunals, along the whole extent of the Cumberland Road.
Can any man lay his hand upon his heart and say that, in his conscience, he believes the Federal Constitution ever intended to bestow such powers on Congress? The great divisions of power, distinctly marked in that instrument, are external and internal. The first are conferred upon the General Government—the last, with but few exceptions, and those distinctly defined, remain in possession of the States. It never—never was intended that the vast and mighty machinery of this Government should be introduced into the domestic, the local, the interior concerns of the States, or that it should spend its power in collecting toll at a turnpike gate. I have not been presenting possible cases to the committee. I have confined myself to what must be the necessary effects of the passage of the bill now before us. By what authority is such a tremendous power claimed? That it is not expressly given by the Constitution, is certain. If it exists at all, it must, therefore, be incidental to some express power; and in the language of the Constitution, “be necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution.” From the very nature of incidental power, it cannot transcend the specific power which calls it into existence. The stream cannot flow higher than its fountain. This principle applies, with peculiar force, to the construction of the Constitution. For the purpose of carrying into effect any of its specific powers, it would be absurd to contend that you might exercise another power, greater and more dangerous than that expressly given. The means must be subordinate to the end. Were any other construction to prevail, this Government would no longer be one of limited powers.
The present case affords a striking and forcible illustration of this principle. Let it be granted that you have a right, as proprietor, by the permission of the States, to make a road through their territories, can it ever follow, as an incident to this mere power of appropriating the public money, that you may exercise jurisdiction over this very road, as a sovereign? If you could, the incident is as much greater than the principal, as sovereign is superior to individual power. It does follow that you can keep the road in repair, by appropriations, in the same manner that you have made it; but this is the utmost limit of your power. What, Sir? Exclusive jurisdiction over the road, for its preservation, and for the punishment of all offenders who travel upon it, and that as an incident to the mere power of expending your money upon its construction! The idea is absurd.
Under the power given to Congress “to establish post offices and post roads,” the Federal Government possess the undoubted right of converting any road already constructed, within any State of this Union, into a post road.