Mr. Tyler called and delivered me his credentials, and we had a conference. I foreshadowed to him the principal points of my message as [it was] delivered. He preferred that I should enter into the arrangement myself. We discussed this question for some time, and I was decided that I had no power. He then expressed an apprehension that my message might precipitate action in Congress. I told him I thought not. I sent for Governor Bigler that he might consult him on this point, but Governor Bigler had gone to the Senate.

Friday morning, 25th.

Mr. Tyler called again, and Mr. Bigler came. I read to him the principal points of the message. He was anxious it should be sent that day, and I immediately proceeded to put it in form. I told him it should be sent in that day, or at latest on Saturday morning. But the Senate adjourned over till Monday at an early hour, and my purpose was thus defeated.

Mr. Buchanan has said that while he had no constitutional power to enter into the agreement proposed, it was due to its intrinsic importance and to the State of Virginia, which had manifested so strong a desire to restore and preserve the Union, that the proposal should be submitted to Congress.[[138]]

The President, accordingly, in his message of the 28th January, submitting the Virginia resolutions to Congress, observed in regard to this one, that “however strong may be my desire to enter into such an agreement, I am convinced that I do not possess the power. Congress, and Congress alone, under the war-making power, can exercise the discretion of agreeing to abstain ‘from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms’ between this and any other Government. It would, therefore, be a usurpation for the Executive to attempt to restrain their hands by an agreement in regard to matters over which he has no constitutional control. If he were thus to act, they might pass laws which he would be bound to obey, though in conflict with his agreement. Under existing circumstances, my present actual power is confined within narrow limits. It is my duty at all times to defend and protect the public property within the seceding States, so far as this may be practicable, and especially to employ all constitutional means to protect the property of the United States, and to preserve the public peace at this the seat of the Federal Government. If the seceding States abstain ‘from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms,’ then the danger so much to be deprecated will no longer exist. Defence, and not aggression[aggression], has been the policy of the administration from the beginning. But whilst I can enter into no engagement such as that proposed, I cordially commend to Congress, with much confidence that it will meet their approbation, to abstain from passing any law calculated to produce a collision of arms pending the proceedings contemplated by the action of the General Assembly of Virginia. I am one of those who will never despair of the Republic. I yet cherish the belief that the American people will perpetuate the union of the States on some terms just and honorable for all sections of the country. I trust that the mediation of Virginia may be the destined means, under Providence, of accomplishing this inestimable benefit. Glorious as are the memories of her past history, such an achievement, both in relation to her own fame and the welfare of the whole country, would surpass them all.”

This noble and patriotic effort of Virginia met no favor from Congress. Neither House referred these resolutions of her General Assembly to a committee, or even treated them with the common courtesy of ordering them to be printed. In the Senate no motion was made to refer them, and the question to print them with the accompanying message was debated from time to time until the 21st February,[[139]] when the Peace Convention had nearly completed its labors, and after this no further notice seems to have been taken of the subject. In the House the motion to refer and print the Virginia resolutions, made by Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, on the day they were received, was never afterwards noticed.[[140]] This mortifying neglect on the part of the Representatives of the States and of the people, made a deep and unfortunate impression on the citizens of Virginia.[[141]]

The President having laid this whole matter before Congress, with whom it appropriately belonged, the question now recurs whether he omitted any thing that it was in his power to do, during the session of the Peace Convention. It was manifestly his duty to be prepared, to the extent of all the means at his command, when Anderson’s truce had terminated, to send him reinforcements, should Anderson request them, or should it be known from any other quarter that Fort Sumter was in danger of attack. Congress might not, as it did not, assume any part of its just responsibility; and it was not known until some days after the termination of Major Anderson’s truce, on the 6th of February, that the Governor of South Carolina had determined to respect the wishes of the Virginia Legislature, and refrain from attacking the fort while the Peace Convention was sitting.[[142]]

Without waiting to know how Congress might treat this proposal of the Virginia General Assembly, the President, on the 30th of January, addressed the following note to the Secretary of War, Mr. Holt:

Washington, January 30th, 1861.

My Dear Sir:—