On the day that my last letter was written, I had an interview with Secretary Smith, in relation to Mr. Weaver, and explained to him the nature of the service you had rendered to Mr. Lincoln, and also the engagement that Mr. Doolittle had made after that service had been rendered, and as an expression of his sense of the obligation. Mr. Doolittle had also placed a letter on file, as he promised to do, but not making any explanation. I am gratified to learn this morning that Mr. Weaver has been restored to his clerkship, and also that he has received an appointment as first lieutenant in the army, for which I applied on his behalf. You will no doubt be pleased that the administration has properly appreciated the favor you rendered.
Hoping that your health is still improving, I remain,
Yours truly,
Edwin M. Stanton.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. HALLOCK.]
(Private.)
Wheatland, near Lancaster, June 29, 1861.
My Dear Sir:—
My nephew, J. Buchanan Henry, informed me of the very satisfactory conversation with you some time since. I should have written to you some time ago but for my long illness. Since I have been able to write, I have been making memoranda so as to present in one connected view the acts of my administration since the troubles commenced in South Carolina. When presented (but the proper time has not, I think, arrived), they will, unless I am greatly mistaken, prove to be a triumphant vindication in every particular.
In the mean time, it is asked why I did not nip this great revolution in its bud, by garrisoning the forts in the Southern States and sending reinforcements to Forts Moultrie, Sumter and Castle Pinckney, in the harbor of Charleston. I shall let General Scott answer this question. I send you a copy of his “Views,” addressed to the War Department, and finally published at length, doubtless under his own authority, in the National Intelligencer of January 18th, 1861. They are dated on the 29th and 30th October, 1860, more than a week before the Presidential election. After reading them, you will admit that they constitute an extraordinary document. Indeed, they tend to prove what has been often said of the gallant General, that when he abandons the sword for the pen he makes sad work of it. They were extensively published and commented upon in the South, but attracted but little attention in the North. My present purpose, however, is only to prove from them the utter impossibility of garrisoning these forts.