The so-called “Ostend Conference,” which at the time it occurred made a great deal of noise, and in which Mr. Buchanan was directed by his Government to participate, requires but a brief explanation. It was not a meeting in any sense suggested by him, nor was there anything connected with it which should have given rise to alarm. When in the summer of 1856 he had become the nominee of the Democratic party for the Presidency, as is usual on such occasions, biographical sketches of his public and private character were prepared and circulated. Among them was a small volume in duodecimo form of 118 pages, written with far greater ability and precision than was common in such ephemeral publications intended for electioneering purposes. Its account of the whole matter of the “Ostend Conference” is so exact and lucid that I do not hesitate to quote it as a true history of that proceeding:[[19]]

THE OSTEND CIRCULAR.

It is the rare good fortune of Mr. Buchanan to have sustained a long career of public life with such singular discretion, integrity, and ability, that now, when he is presented by the great national party of the country as their candidate for the highest dignity in the Republic, nothing is seriously urged by political hostility in extenuation of his merit, save the alleged countenance to filibuster enterprise and cupidity, inferred by his enemies from a strained interpretation of the recommendations and views of the Ostend Conference. The political opponents of Mr. Buchanan call upon his supporters to vindicate the claim they assert in behalf of Mr. Buchanan to conservatism, by reconciling that assumption with his participation in the American Diplomatic Conference at Ostend and Aix la Chapelle, and with his adoption and endorsement, jointly with the ministers of the United States to France and Spain, of the views and recommendations addressed by the three ambassadors to the Department of State, on the 18th of October, 1854, in the letter commonly known as the Ostend Manifesto. The circumstance that the opposition meet the nomination of Mr. Buchanan with no other objection impugning his qualifications for the Presidential trust, cannot fail to confirm the popular belief in the justice and wisdom of the judgment that governed the Cincinnati convention in selecting a statesman so unassailable in the record of his political life, and so little obnoxious to personal censure and distrust, as the candidate of the great national party of the Union for the highest dignity in the Republic. For it is demonstrable that an erroneous impression exists as to the purport of the Aix la Chapelle letter; and that the policy therein declared by Mr. Buchanan and his associates, is identical with that which has uniformly been regarded and avowed as the policy of the United States in respect to the Island of Cuba. And a belief endeavored to be inculcated, that the policy of the Ostend conference was adopted in consultation or co-operation with the Red Republicans of Europe, is equally erroneous. This belief has originated in another supposition equally unfounded, that Mr. Soulé was in league with the leaders of the European revolutionary movement. The truth is, that fundamental differences existed between the policy of Mr. Soulé and Mazzini, Ledru Rollin, Kossuth, and Louis Blanc; and besides which fact it is well known that these revolutionary leaders themselves were agreed only upon one point, the necessity of revolution, and that they seldom speak to one another. The policy of the revolutionary party of Europe in reference to Cuba was this. They desired the United States to assist the Democratic party of Spain in creating a revolution at Madrid, which should dethrone the queen, and place the Democratic party in power, by the establishment of a republic, and then leave Cuba at her option to either remain a portion of the Spanish republic, or seek annexation to the United States. This concession to the United States was to be in return for material aid furnished in effecting the Spanish revolution. The revolution thus accomplished was intended to be the initiative of further revolutions on the Continent. The Pyrenees range of mountains which forms the boundary line between France and Spain are populated on either side by the most liberal men in either empire, the great mass of the inhabitants being Republican; and could a republic be established in Spain, the Pyrenees would not only furnish points from which to begin their revolutionary designs against France, but would form a barrier behind which they could defend themselves against any attack which Louis Napoleon might make. The revolution accomplished in France, Kossuth and Mazzini would have but little difficulty in overthrowing the power of Austria in Hungary and Italy. Such were the objects which the revolutionary leaders of Europe had in view in endeavoring to secure the influence of the United States Government in support of their policy.

It is needless to say, that neither the Ostend conference nor the cabinet at Washington gave any countenance to this policy. The Ostend conference looked at the Cuba question solely from an American point of view, and quite disconnected from the conflicts and interests of European politics, or the aspirations of revolutionary leaders. On this account, so far from that policy receiving the favor of the Red Republicans, they were as pointed in their hostility to it as any of the monarchical organs of Europe, and did not hesitate to privately, and sometimes publicly, denounce Mr. Soulé for having signed the Ostend circular, as recreant to the expectations which they had formed in regard to him. Mr. Buchanan from first to last opposed the policy which would lead to the United States becoming involved in the European struggle, and held strictly to the American view of the question, in accordance with which the Ostend letter was framed.

The conference at Ostend had its origin in the recommendation of Governor Marcy, who justly conceived that the mission with which Mr. Soulé was charged at the court of Spain might excite the jealousy of other European powers, and that it was important for the purpose of facilitating the negotiations there to be conducted, that explanations should be made to the governments of England and France, of the objects and purposes of the United States in any movement that events might render necessary, having in view the ultimate purchase or acquisition by this government of the Spanish Island of Cuba. The object of the consultation suggested by Mr. Marcy was, as stated in a letter to Mr. Soulé, “to bring the common wisdom and knowledge of the three ministers to bear simultaneously upon the negotiations at Madrid, London and Paris.” These negotiations had not necessarily in view the transfer of Cuba to this country; though that was one of the modes indicated, and seemingly the most effective, of terminating the constantly recurring grievances upon the commerce of the United States, upon the honor of its flag, and the personal rights of its citizens, which disturbed the cordial relations of the two countries, and infused acrimony into their intercourse connected with the prosecution of commerce. Another expedient which Governor Marcy regarded with favor, was the independence of the Island under the Creole sovereignty. At that time, in the summer of 1854, apprehensions of some important change in the social and political condition and relations of Cuba, were generally felt in this country. Rumors prevailed, founded on the then recent decrees and modifications of law pertaining to the servile condition, that it was in contemplation to establish the domination of the blacks in the Island; that the slaves were to be freed and armed, and that an extensive introduction of native Africans was to be resorted to as a means of re-enforcing the strength of the dominant party.

Such, indeed, was the policy of Great Britain; first, to keep alive the slavery agitation in the United States, not from motives of philanthropy, but, by thus inciting internal discord between the people of different sections of the Union, the United States would be prevented from turning its attention to further schemes of territorial extension; and second, to flood Cuba with negroes under a system of apprenticeship, in order to render it valueless to the United States. The execution of such a scheme was regarded as eminently dangerous to the peace and safety of this country, and was one which the United States could not suffer, as the inevitable effects of such a policy, carried out, would be, sooner or later, to induce a servile insurrection in the Southern States. With a colony containing a million and a half of free negroes, immediately off our shores, an expedition could at any time be organized under European aid, and sent from Cuba to our Southern States to incite a rebellion, with all its attendant horrors, among the slaves. Mr. Soulé was instructed to ascertain whether it was in contemplation, and, if so, to seek to prevent it from being carried out, and to avert its baleful consequences to ourselves, by negotiating, first, for the purchase of Cuba, and if that were impracticable, then for the independence of the Island. It was not the greed of territorial expansion that prompted the instructions which convoked the Ostend conference; nor was that sentiment the controlling one that prompted the adoption by its members of the recommendations embodied in the Aix la Chapelle letter. The document is too long to publish at length, but the material passage which contains the doctrines which the opposition would fain lead the people to believe are dangerous, is subjoined:

“But if Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, what ought to be the course of the American Government under such circumstances? Self-preservation is the first law of nature with states as well as with individuals. All nations have at different periods acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of Poland, and other similar cases which history records, yet the principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized. The United States has never acquired a foot of territory except by fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary application of the people of that independent state, who desired to blend their destinies with our own. Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to the rule, because, although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest, in a just war, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both parties a full and ample equivalent. Our past history forbids that we should acquire the Island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our own conscious rectitude and our own self-respect.

“While pursuing this course, we can afford to disregard the censure of the world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed. After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union? Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power. And this, upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home. Under such circumstances, we ought neither to count the cost nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us.

“We forbear to enter into the question whether the present condition of the Island would justify such a measure. We should, however, be recreant to our duty—be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and to become a second St. Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our neighboring shores, seriously to endanger or actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union. We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending towards such a catastrophe....

“James Buchanan,