In Korea with Marquis Ito

by George Trumbull Ladd

So unmistakable a declaration as this from a friendly, impartial Power would, it might reasonably be thought, have caused China to abandon her shadowy pretensions. It did not have that effect, however. Her agents in Korea committed no overt act which was likely to provoke remonstrance from the Treaty Powers; but they lost no opportunity of preserving in the Korean mind at least the fiction of dependency upon China. Yuan Shi Kai, for example, “Claimed, and to a large extent obtained, the position of Chinese Resident at Seoul. His official title was ‘Director General Resident in Korea of Diplomatic and Consular Relations,’ and his substantive rank in his own country was that of Intendant of Circuit, a rank corresponding, according to the Anglo-Chinese Treaty, to that of a Consul.... Resident Yuan was permitted to proceed to the Audience Hall in his chair and to be seated in the presence of the King, privileges not accorded to the representatives of the other Powers.” (Wilkinson’s The Government of Korea.) The privileges thus claimed by this representative of China were obtained in the course of several years after the conclusion of the Convention of 1885. They were largely ceremonial in character and none of the representatives of the Treaty Powers ever recognized the right of the so-called Resident to interfere in any manner in their business with the Korean Government. Whatever there was peculiar in his relations to that Government was a question of an understanding, practically secret, and never formally enunciated or recognized, between the Korean Court and himself. The conditions then prevailing in Korea were highly conducive to the existence of such anomalies. An amiable but weak King; a corrupt Court and Government, with two powerful factions struggling for supremacy and stopping at nothing to gain it—these were ideal conditions for the exercise of Chinese diplomacy. It accomplished nothing in the end, however, even in the hands of such an astute and able man as Yuan Shi Kai. Japan, of course, never recognized his pretensions, but, biding her time and always dealing with Korea as an independent state, devoted herself to the promotion of the rapidly growing commercial and industrial interests of her people in the peninsula.

Naturally neither the Government nor the people of Japan could view without resentment the attempts on China’s part to maintain rights she had already practically surrendered. But this feeling did not assume a definite form until the assassination of Kim Ok Kiun at Shanghai, in March, 1894, and the arrest of a confederate of the murderer in Japan, who confessed that he was officially commissioned to murder another one of the Korean political refugees. These events aroused a storm of indignation in Japan. What followed added fuel to the flames. The murderer and the body of his victim were conveyed on board a Chinese man-of-war to Korea. The murderer was rewarded and the severed parts of Kim’s body were publicly exhibited in different parts of Seoul. Rightly or wrongly this barbarous act, against which the foreign representatives at the instance of the Japanese Minister unofficially protested, was attributed to the Queen’s party. The excitement it caused had not subsided when, in May, came the “Tong Hak” rebellion. The Tong Haks were religious fanatics, the chief article of whose creed was said to be the massacre of all foreigners. Seoul was rife with rumors, and the utmost alarm and confusion prevailed. According to the report of the American Minister, the rebellion was practically suppressed on the 3d of June by Korean troops; and on the 8th of June the Government officially announced that it was at an end. In the meantime, however, the Chinese Government, without previous notice to Japan or mutual consultation, as stipulated in the Convention of 1885, sent a force of 2,000 troops to Korea, which on June 10th landed at A-San, about forty miles south of Chemulpo, ostensibly to suppress the rebellion. The American Minister, Mr. Sill, in his report on the subject to the Department of State, says that “this was done at Korean request, dictated and insisted on by Yuan, the Chinese Resident.” Learning of the purpose to send troops, the Japanese Government promptly remonstrated with the Government at Peking, and in reply was informed (after the act) that the troops had been sent because urgently needed to suppress disorders in “the vassal state.” There was no explanation and no apology beyond this palpable and contemptuous violation of the terms of the Convention of 1885. There was but one possible response. On the same day that the Chinese troops landed, a force of Japanese marines was sent to the capital, to be replaced a few days later by a larger body of soldiers. The scene of the struggle was then transferred to Seoul. The Korean Government, having brought the trouble on its own head, showed its usual impotence. It begged both Japan and China to leave, and sought aid from the foreign representatives in the effort to persuade them to do so. China was quite willing to accede to these appeals. Possibly her agent on the spot, it may even be the Government at Peking, was startled by the promptitude with which Japan had accepted the challenge. In any event, China had nothing to lose and much to gain by doing as Korea asked. She could leave the scene with flying banners, having shown that Korea was in fact her vassal; that the Convention was waste paper and that Japan could be flouted with impunity. Naturally this programme did not commend itself to Japan. According to her view of the situation there were certain vital questions to be settled before the troops were withdrawn. Foremost among these was the decision of Korea’s actual status; then, subsidiary to this, but none the less important, the adoption of certain reforms which, while improving the public administration and promoting the common weal, would prevent the recurrence of disturbances which were a constant menace to the welfare of Korea and her neighbors. Accordingly, the Japanese Minister presented a memorial on the proposed reforms and demanded a categorical statement as to whether Korea was a vassal of China or not.

Regarding the latter demand the American Minister reports that “This caused great consternation,” since if they (the Korean Government) answered in the negative they would offend China, while an affirmative answer would bring down the wrath of Japan. After many consultations and several reminders to be prompt from the Japanese, an answer was given in this sense: “Korea, being an independent state, enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan (see Treaty of Kang-wha, 1876), and that ‘in both internal administration and foreign intercourse Korea enjoys complete independence’ (see letter of the King to the President of the United States). They supposed that by thus quoting the treaties which China allowed them to make she cannot take offence, while Japan should be content with such an answer.”

The breaking out of hostilities between China and Japan was, of course, the occasion of renewal in acute form of internal strife between the conservative and the progressive forces in Korea. But for the time being the progressive forces, backed by the dominance of the Japanese, were the stronger. On the 5th of August, 1894, the Korean treaty with China was denounced; on the 15th of the same month it was formally abrogated by the Korean Government; and on the 19th notice of an entirely new plan of Government was officially issued. On September 3d Marquis Saionji, special Ambassador from the Emperor of Japan, had an audience with the King and presented him with gifts, in honor of his accession to the position of an independent sovereign. Numerous reforms[20] which had been discussed in the Korean Council on July 31st of this same year and agreed upon as laws to be submitted to His Majesty for his approval, instead of being sincerely, wisely, and perseveringly enacted and enforced, became the causes of increased defection, intrigue, and internal dissensions.

The rebellion (referred to above as the “Tong Hak” rebellion), which had been reported as suppressed the previous June, broke out in a still more dreadful form on the first of October (1894). The Korean rebels became a “disorganized pillaging mob.” Taxes were no longer paid; Korean officials were robbed and mutilated or murdered; small parties of the Japanese were attacked and tortured to death after the traditional manner of the nation. Meantime the Japanese forces were quite uniformly victorious both by land and by sea; and on October 9th the last of the Chinese forces were driven across the Yalu River. A solemn “oath, sworn at the royal temple by His Majesty the King of Korea, while he worshipped, on the 12th day of the twelfth moon of the five hundred and third year of the foundation of Ta Chosen” (January 7, 1895), bound him to “give up all idea of subjection to China and to labor firmly to establish the independence of Korea”; “to decide all political affairs in council with his Cabinet”; “to prevent Her Majesty the Queen, his concubines, and all the royal relations from interfering in affairs of state,” thus securing a separation between their affairs and those of the royal household; and to introduce and foster other reforms of a political and educational character. How poorly His Majesty kept his solemn oath, the subsequent history of his throne and of his nation abundantly shows.

By the Chino-Japan war the dominating and baleful influence of China was for all time removed, and to Korea was secured the opportunity for an independent and progressive national development under the guidance, and by the assistance, of Japan. That the Government of Japan honestly wished for this good to come to Korea, there is no reasonable ground of doubt. That the good did not follow is, however, due to the fault of both nations. As regards the character and conduct of the average political reformer there is a marked similarity between the Japanese and the Koreans. Such a one is apt to be over-confident, and even self-conceited; to have only a scanty acquaintance with the fundamental principles of politics and of statesmanship; to be lacking in a judicial estimate of the difficulties to be overcome; to make use (often with an apparent preference for them) of offensive rather than conciliatory means; and to have no adequate apprehension of the value of time, and of the necessity of securing time, in order to effect important changes in national affairs. Neither has he learned the art of compromise in consistency with the maintenance of important moral principles. That Japan has not hitherto failed in reforming herself as conspicuously as Korea is chiefly due, after making proper allowances for the different environments of the two nations, to the great difference in the character of the two Emperors who have been upon their thrones during the period of trial; to the fact that Japan has had a body of most conspicuously wise leaders—something Korea has completely lacked; and to the difference as respects the essential spirit of loyalty among the people which the feudal system developed in Japan, but which has never been to any extent developed in Korea.

The complete inability of the Korean official to comprehend, or to sympathize with, the motives which led the representatives of Japan—first, Mr. Otori and then Count Inouye—to urge the adoption of administrative reforms may be judged by the fact that the King’s father, the Tai Won Kun, handed to Inouye on his arrival as Minister at Seoul a list of sixty persons whom he wished to have forthwith executed in order to secure himself in control of affairs. Squabbles for power between the party of the Queen and the party of the Tai Won Kun therefore continued and even became increasingly acute. The Korean hot-head progressives were pushing reforms without sufficient regard to the existing conditions. But for a time the presence of a real statesman as the representative of Japan in Korea kept the evil forces in check.

Count Inouye’s appointment to the post of Minister was an eloquent proof of the profound interest which the Japanese Government took in Korea, and of its earnest desire to aid her in the promotion of domestic reform and progress. On the Count’s part, personally, the acceptance of such a task, difficult and in many ways distasteful, was an exhibition of self-sacrificing patriotism, to which the present action of his bosom friend and associate, Marquis Ito, affords a striking parallel. While striving to reconcile the warring Korean factions, he devoted himself to the improvement of administrative conditions and to the promotion of the public welfare. He attained a measure of success in some directions, and would undoubtedly have achieved more lasting success had it been possible for him to remain longer in Korea. His singleness of purpose was recognized by many Koreans, and the sincerity of his endeavors to benefit Korea was acknowledged by foreign observers. But the task was too heavy for the time he could devote to it.

Finally, other more imperative duties called Count Inouye home, and he was succeeded by Viscount Miura, a man of a different stamp. Then followed the murder of the Queen, with all its unhappy train of consequences. Although the crime was undoubtedly concocted by the Queen’s implacable enemy, the Tai Won Kun, the Japanese Government never sought to evade the share of responsibility imposed upon it. The tragedy was a far severer blow to Japanese interests than to those of Korea, for the Queen alive, and even still bitterly hostile to Japan, could never have worked the harm that the manner of her taking-off had caused. And, indeed, while apology for this murder from the moral point of view cannot be justified, in spite of the cruel character of the victim and of the fact that there was then visited upon her only the same treatment which she had herself given to scores and hundreds of others, when considered from the diplomatic point of view the act was even more foolish and reprehensible.

The following account from Hershey[21] gives in brief, but with sufficient detail for our purposes, the events of this period:—