In Korea with Marquis Ito

by George Trumbull Ladd

The narrative of this official throws a curious side-light upon M. Pavloff’s methods and shows in an interesting way his persistence, even at a time when the correspondence between Russia and Japan preceding the war had reached a critical stage, in endeavoring by every means at his command to carry through the very intrigue which formed the gravamen of Japan’s strongest reason for complaining. It is easy, in the light of what has happened, to condemn this action; but even at the time it must have seemed to impartial observers more like the infatuation of a desperate gambler than the well-considered moves of a shrewd diplomatist. It was all done, too, in support of a transparent subterfuge, namely: that Russia had no arrangement with Korea which gave to the proposed use of Yong-am-po any other character than that of an entirely peaceful occupation for legitimate commercial purposes; and that her agents had done absolutely nothing in the way of preparing the place for military occupation. When he was urging upon the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs reasons for not opening Yong-am-po, the latter enquired: “Why have you staked off such a large extent of territory, and why are you building a fort?” M. Pavloff instantly denied in emphatic terms that anything of the kind had been done. “For the past ten days,” quietly replied the Korean official, “I have had two men whom I trust thoroughly on the spot, and my question is the result of telegraphic reports I have received from them.” The interview did not continue, but within forty-eight hours his scouts reported to the Acting Minister that all the stakes had been removed. There had not been time, they said, thoroughly to remove all traces of works upon the fortifications, but that as much of the works as possible had been levelled and the whole covered up with loose earth, tree-trunks and branches. Such effrontery seems incredible; but these are facts, and others like them equally typical of M. Pavloff’s methods could be recited. It is doubtful whether even his own government knew all the circumstances, or was fully aware, until it was too late, what he had done and was continuing to do to arouse Japanese suspicion and resentment.

The negotiations having in view the peaceful adjustment of the conflicting interests of Russia and Japan in the Far East, which were begun by the latter country in the summer of 1903, were further continued. Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, was informed by Baron Komura, who was then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the recent conduct of Russia at Peking, in Manchuria, and in Korea, was the cause of grave concern to the Government at Tokyo. “The unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia would,” said Baron Komura, “create a state of things prejudicial to the security and interests of Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would thereby be annulled, and the territorial integrity of China be impaired. There is, however, a still more serious consideration for the Japanese Government; that is to say, if Russia was established on the flank of Korea it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that empire, or at least would make Russia the dominant power in Korea. But Korea is an important outpost in Japan’s line of defence, and Japan consequently considers its independence absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as the commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other Powers. These interests and this influence Japan, having regard to her own security, cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, another Power.”

In view of these reasons, Mr. Kurino was instructed to present the following note to Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs: “The Japanese Government desires to remove from the relations of the two empires every cause of future misunderstanding, and believes that the Russian Government shares the same desire. The Japanese Government would therefore be glad to enter with the Russian Imperial Government upon an examination of the condition of affairs in the regions of the extreme East, where their interests meet, with a view of defining their respective special interests in those regions. If this suggestion fortunately meets with the approval, in principle, of the Russian Government, the Japanese Government will be prepared to present to the Russian Government their views as to the nature and scope of the proposed understanding.”

The consent of Count Lamsdorff and the Czar having been obtained, on August 12th articles were prepared and submitted by the Japanese Government which it wished to have serve as a basis of understanding between the two countries. The essential agreements to be secured by these articles were: (1) A mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires, and to maintain the “open door” in these countries; and (2) a reciprocal recognition of Japan’s preponderating interests in Korea and of Russia’s special interests in Manchuria. These demands were not altered in any very important way by Japan during all the subsequent negotiations. It was their persistent rejection by Russia, together with her long delays in replying while she was meantime making obvious preparations of a war-like character, which precipitated the tremendous conflict that followed some months later. In her first reply with counter proposals which was made nearly eight weeks later through Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister at Tokyo, Russia not only reduced Japan’s demands regarding Korea, but even proposed new restrictions upon her in that country. But what was equally significant, the counter-proposals took no account of the demand for an agreement as to the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese empire, or as to the policy of the “open door” in Manchuria and Korea. On the contrary, they required Japan expressly to recognize Manchuria as “in all respects outside her sphere of interest.” Meantime Russia was increasing her commercial and military activity in both the territorial spheres where the question of interests and rights was under dispute.

In the second overture of October 30th, several important concessions were made by Japan, to which on December 11th Russia replied with a repetition of the former counter-proposal—omitting, however, the offensive clause regarding Manchuria and inserting the Japanese proposal relating to the connection of the Korean and the Chinese-Eastern railways. Ten days later the Japanese Government presented a third overture in which Baron Komura tried to make it clear to the Russian Government that Japan desired “to bring within the purview of the proposed arrangement all those regions in the Far East where the interests of the two empires meet.” But when the reply of Russia was received in Tokyo on January 6, 1904, it was found that not only was there no mention made of the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria, but that Russia again insisted upon Japan’s regarding the “Manchurian Question” and the littoral of Manchuria as quite outside her sphere of interest. Russia, indeed, agreed “not to impede Japan or the other Powers in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements”; but only on condition that Japan would agree not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes, and also to the establishment of a neutral zone in Northern Korea. In spite of the fact that the two governments were still as far apart as at the beginning in regard to the most vital points of interest, Japan made another and fourth attempt. This overture was presented to Count Lamsdorff on January 13th and, in spite of the urgent request for an early reply, this did not come until February 7, the day following the severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Negotiations were then ended; appeal was now made to the “arbitrament of war,” so-called.

It is not our purpose to discuss in detail the question of rights, as involved in these negotiations, whether from the political or the moral point of view, or to consider whether Japan’s method of initiating hostilities was in accordance with law, or with precedent as established, if such it can be said to be, by the usage of civilized nations. In both regards we believe, however, that the claims of Japan to have the right upon her side are in all important particulars defensible. But having begun the war with Russia it can be seen that to secure free passage for her troops through Korea, and to secure Korea in the rear of her troops as they passed to the front, were necessities imposed upon Japan in a yet more absolute and indisputable fashion than was the undertaking of the war itself. If it was necessary in order to maintain the integrity and free, peaceful development of Japan that, all other means having failed, she should resort to arms in the effort to check the dangerous encroachments of Russia in Manchuria and Korea, it was immediately and essentially necessary for any measure of success in this last resort, that she should gain and hold control over the conduct of the Korean Court and the Korean populace during the war. What were the nature and the habitual modes of behavior of both Court and people has already been made clear; more information on these subjects will be afforded in subsequent chapters. As to danger of treachery we may note in passing that, while friendship was being protested to the face of the Japanese in Korea, a boat was picked up in the Yellow Sea, late in January, 1904—that is, a few days before the outbreak of the war—which bore a Korean messenger with a letter to Port Arthur asking for Russian troops to be sent to Korea. The resort to valuable concessions as a bribe for foreign influence became at once, on the beginning of hostilities, more active even than before. On this latter point we quote the words of Mr. D. W. Stevens:

The outbreak of the war created a veritable storm of terror in the ranks of Korean officialdom. Many of its members who were known as Russian sympathizers fled to the country; a few took refuge in the houses of foreign friends. Palace circles were in particular profoundly agitated. There was a curious manifestation of the trend of the Korean official mind toward the belief that political support can be bought. Those were golden days for the foreigner who, willing to trade upon Korean ignorance and credulity, cared to let it be understood, either openly or tacitly, that his government would appreciate favors shown to himself. One foreign minister was surprised by the offer of a mining concession which before that he had unsuccessfully tried to obtain. Having due regard for his own and his country’s reputation he naturally declined. Others, private individuals, were not so scrupulous; and there are to-day extant exceptionally favorable public grants, both claimed and actually enjoyed, which were thus, as it has been put, “obtained in the shadow of the war.”

At this time the Emperor was dominated by the influence of a courtier named Yi Yong-ik, whose foreign affiliations were wholly Russian. The Palace coterie, even including this man’s bitter political enemies, was almost entirely pro-Russian. But the Emperor was also, of course, much afraid of the Japanese, who were now near at hand, whereas the Russians and their Korean coadjutors had either fled the country or gone into retirement. For the time being, therefore, Japan had control of the Imperial environment. Meantime, one of two courses only seemed open to the Japanese themselves: they could either set aside the Emperor and his untrustworthy officials, and assume complete control of Korean affairs; or they could make some sort of arrangement which would secure an alliance with Korea. If faithful to this alliance, the Emperor would be assured of his personal safety and of his throne; and the country would be placed definitively under Japanese protection. The leaders in Japan knew perfectly well that His Korean Majesty was anti-Japanese and characteristically false and treacherous; but they hoped by moderation to win him over to at least a partial and temporary fulfilment of the obligations under which he would be placed by the adoption of the more friendly course.

There were also military reasons why a sort of protectorate and alliance seemed necessary; and if possible in a way to avoid the troubles of a forcible annexation. For, very special and momently imminent dangers threatened the construction and use of the railway by which the Japanese were transporting their troops and supplies through Korea to the seat of the war. In several instances armed attacks were made upon the workmen and the track was torn up. In another connection it will be shown that the charge of extreme cruelty and wholesale slaughter made by Mr. Hulbert[27] (and illustrated by a picture designed to excite pathos), because the Japanese military authorities executed some of the leaders of these dangerous riots, is quite unwarranted by the facts. The same thing may be said of the charge that the Po-an, or “Society for the Promotion of Peace and Safety,” was illegally and wantonly suppressed by the Japanese in July of 1904. The simple truth is that this society bore about the same relation to the cause of “peace and safety” which has been borne during the past two years by the several associations for intrigue and murder which have masqueraded under titles suggestive of the most noble schemes for promoting the interests of patriotism, education, morals and religion. It must be either a dull or a prejudiced mind, indeed, that can take in the atmosphere of Korean politics for even a few months—not to say, years—of residence in the land, and not understand the threatening significance of these associations. On the other hand, the question of propriety in dealing summarily with those who persist in tearing up the tracks of a military road in time of war may confidently be left to those who are experienced in such matters.

Indeed, with regard to the entire conduct of affairs by the Japanese during this period, we may ask the question, and give the answer, of Mr. Whigham:[28] “What, then, is Japan to do? Is she to sit down and watch the Russian flood descending on her fields without attempting to set up a barrier? The answer is very simple. Japan must take Korea and do it very quickly, too.”