In Korea with Marquis Ito

by George Trumbull Ladd

CHAPTER XV
FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

By the Protocols of February and August, 1904, and still more perfectly by the Convention of November, 1905, Japan became the sole official medium for communication between Korea and all other foreign Powers. Indeed, as the history of the relations between the two countries—already narrated in summary form—abundantly shows, thus much of control over Korean affairs had been demonstrated to be necessary for the welfare of both. But apart from considerations which are fitted to influence the judgment of either Japanese or Koreans, the question arises: How is the Protectorate of Japan likely to affect other foreigners in their relations to Korea? At present the foreign interests concerned in the solution of the general problem are chiefly of two orders: they are the interests of trade and commerce, and the missionary interests. The larger diplomatic controversies, except so far as these may possibly arise in adjusting these two classes of interests, have now, it would seem, been satisfactorily arranged for some time to come. The recent treaties concluded between Japan on the one side, and Great Britain, France, and Russia on the other, all expressly guarantee respect for Japan’s control over the peninsula. In addition to the arrangement for a sort of reciprocal “hands-off” from each other’s possessions and “paramount interests” in the Far East, into which France and Russia have entered, Great Britain has pledged her support in defence of the Protectorate. All these nations have, moreover, solemnly committed themselves to the maintenance of the integrity of the Empire of China and to the policy of the so-called “open door.” How unlikely it is, then, that the Japanese Government should proceed at once to violate treaty obligations which it has itself been at such pains and expense of men and money to secure, and the maintenance of which, to the satisfaction of its foreign allies, so intimately concerns its own future welfare.

These same Conventions which confer certain rights upon the Japanese Government in Korea just as plainly put this Government under certain solemn obligations. The foreign Powers have, strictly speaking, no diplomatic corps at Seoul. Their Ambassadors and Ministers at Tokyo are their representatives for Korea as well as for Japan. All foreign Powers are represented by officials residing in the capital city of Korea who have consular functions only. Since, however, such functions must, in general, be exercised on the spot, and since other business can often be transacted only there, with any tolerable degree of convenience, the Consuls at Seoul are admitted to correspond with the Residency-General and with the various subordinate Residencies. Naming them in the order of their seniority, Belgium, China, Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States are now (in 1907) each represented by a Consul-General, and Italy by a Consul. “Where foreign rights of any kind,” says Mr. Stevens—who in saying this speaks both as Adviser to the Korean Council of State and also as Counsellor to the Resident-General—“are threatened or molested, it is the duty of the Japanese Government to furnish safeguards or to provide a remedy. The Japanese Government has the right to employ for that purpose all the machinery which the laws of Korea place in its hands; and it would seem logically to follow, also, that where such means prove inadequate, it is the right, as well as the duty, of the Japanese Government to insist that the deficiency shall be supplied by appropriate legislation or by such other method as may be reasonable and just under the circumstances.”

It does not follow from this, however, that either the rights of the Japanese Government allow, or their obligations compel, it to go to any length demanded by foreign business men, or concessionaires, or even by foreign missionaries, in promoting their real or fancied interests, or in redressing their fancied as well as their real wrongs. There are plainly limits to be observed in meeting demands and requests of this character. It may be the duty of the Japanese Government, for example, to secure and defend all the mining and other concessions made to foreigners which can prove themselves to have been honestly obtained and administered in substantial accord with the initial contract. Inasmuch as few concessions of any sort among those obtained from the last Emperor can stand the test of honesty, or even of tolerable freedom from corruption, it will doubtless be well for the Japanese Government not to be over-scrupulous or too curiously enquiring in many cases. But it certainly is not its duty to allow the Imperial treasury to be plundered ad libitum by contracts made, and concessions obtained, through combinations of corrupt Korean officials with greedy and unscrupulous foreigners. Again: it may be the duty of the Japanese Government to protect a certain “freedom of the press,” in the case of publications owned and managed by foreigners, even if printed in the vernacular and distributed widely among the more ignorant and excitable of the native population. It is certainly greatly to the credit of the Japanese officials to have borne so quietly the slanderous and abusive attacks upon their government of one such publication in Seoul. But surely there may be a limit here also. Undoubtedly that limit was reached, when the vernacular edition of this publication excited the natives to sedition, revolt, and assassination, especially at so critical a juncture in the national affairs as occurred during the spring and summer of 1907. Possibly, there is also a limit beyond which misrepresentation and falsehood directed against individuals not connected with the government ought not to be allowed to pass.[79]

It must also be remembered that the success of the Residency-General in the economic, educational, and judicial reform of Korea depends largely upon husbanding and developing the resources of Korea. In all this, Mr. Megata, the Financial Adviser, has been the right-hand man of Marquis Ito, the Resident-General. If these resources are squandered, or “conceded” in such a way as to deprive the Korean Government and the Korean people of the natural wealth of their own land, then the plans for every kind of reform will be crippled, if not wholly thwarted. To encourage legitimate business with all nations is for the advantage of both the Japanese and the Korean Governments; such a policy is directly in the line of Marquis Ito’s intentions for the reform and uplifting of the economic condition of the peninsula. No one person would suffer so severely in mind and in reputation as would the Resident-General himself if this policy failed through any fault of his own or of his country’s administration in Korea. But, on the other hand, to check the evil consequences of illegitimate schemes of promotion already accomplished, and to prevent the initiation of such schemes in the future, is an equally necessary part of this policy.

On the whole subject of the attitude of the Japanese Government toward foreign business interests in Korea the following lengthy quotations may be considered as authoritative:

The foreign trade of Korea has been steadily increasing, especially during the past six years. Making due allowance for the increase of imports brought about by the war, the proportion of normal increase gives every sign of healthy growth. Japan’s trade is much the largest. Korean exports go almost exclusively to Japan, except ginseng, which is sent to China. Of the imports from Japan a large proportion are foreign, as Japan is put down in the Customs Returns as the country from which the importation was made, the country of origin not being given. As Japan is the place of transhipment for much of the trade, and as much of it passes through Japanese hands, it would be difficult to differentiate. There are certain important staples, however, concerning which there can be no ambiguity—American kerosene, for example, which practically monopolizes the market. Rails and railway equipment also come from foreign countries, the cars and engines from the United States. As Korea increases in wealth and her purchasing capacity grows correspondingly, there will be a field for other machinery, modern farming implements among the rest, no doubt.

American and European enterprise has not been so conspicuous in the field of ordinary commercial enterprise as in other directions. Concessions of one kind and another have attracted more attention than trade and commerce. The most conspicuous and successful undertaking of this kind is the Oriental Consolidated Mining Company at Unsan in Northern Korea, originally American; now it is generally understood to be largely English in ownership. This was the first mining concession ever granted to foreigners in Korea. His Majesty the Emperor was originally a half owner in the company, but sold out his interest for 300,000 yen and a payment of 25,000 yen per annum. The company’s concession covers a large area, and the capital is $5,000,000, American money. At the outset the enterprise did not look very promising, but by skilful management it grew until it reached its present important proportions.

It would probably be idle to attempt an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages to Korea of enterprises of this kind. Certainly, if there are any advantages, the Unsan concession should be a favorable example. That it has been of great advantage to Korea is at least an open question. On the one side, in its favor, may be set the large amounts annually expended by the company in wages, etc. This is undoubtedly a good thing while it lasts; but gold mines are exhausted sooner or later, and the benefits they confer are only temporary. The abandoned mining sites in America, no matter how prosperous in their day, can hardly be instanced as examples of prosperity for the people of the country in which they are located, who are not owners of successful mines.... Against this, and other like enterprises, may be cited, for one thing, the disadvantage of the wholesale destruction of timber. The country about Unsan has been practically denuded of timber, and in an agricultural country like Korea this is undoubtedly an evil.

This much has been said of the effects of the operations of a successful company, conducted on a conservative basis, merely to show that the advantages of the development of Korean resources about which so much has been said, are not unmixed blessings. The matter is of some importance in the light of all that has been published of late upon the subject.... English and German companies each obtained a mining concession, but neither proved financially successful. Japanese also obtained one concession, in which American capital is at present interested.... The system of granting mining concessions was open to so many objections that foreign representatives frequently importuned the Korean Government to issue mining regulations under which the mineral resources of the country could be systematically developed. Nothing was done, however, until after the establishment of the Residency-General, when a mining law was passed. This law provides for mining under proper safeguards as regards public and private interests. Under the old system, or rather lack of system, the concessionaire could do practically what he pleased within the limits of his concession. Now he must conform to laws and regulations which permit him to carry on his business under conditions which promote the interests and conserve the rights of all concerned.