[37] The Marquis’ reasons for refusing hardly need explanation. Japan had already secured some measure of control over the internal administration of Korea by previous arrangements. The acceptance of the proposed amendment would have been virtually an abrogation of these arrangements, notably of the most important portion of the Protocols of February 23 and August 22. To that, of course, the Marquis could not agree. Besides this, the control of Korea’s foreign relations necessarily required some measure of control and guidance over the administration of her internal affairs. The relations between external and internal affairs, their frequent interdependence, is so intimate, that it would have been a grave mistake to assume the obligations which the one imposed without the power to guard against complications which might follow from maladministration of the other. As the case stands, the insertion of the word “primarily,” while soothing Korean susceptibilities, does not affect the control of the Protectorate in any material respect.
[38] The following facts with regard to the possession of the Imperial seal of Korea and its affixing to this important document, are given on the authority of Mr. D. W. Stevens. They are a complete refutation of the charges which have been made regarding this part of the entire transaction. It was the unavoidable delay in bringing the seal to the Palace which gave rise to these extraordinary stories. “What actually happened,” says Mr. Stevens, “was this. While the treaty was being copied, Mr. Pak went to the telephone and directed the clerk in charge of the seal at the Foreign Office to bring it to the Palace. After some delay he went again to the telephone and repeated the order. At the time the only two persons in the office were the clerk in charge of the seal and Mr. Numano, my Japanese assistant. Both were just then reading in the room where the clerk slept and where the seal was kept. The telephone bell rang, and the clerk who answered it informed Mr. Numano that Mr. Pak had ordered the seal to be brought to the Palace. He was putting on his street clothing preparatory to obeying the order when the Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau of the Foreign Office came into the room and asked the clerk where he was going. The clerk informed him, whereupon he went to the telephone and called up Mr. Pak. He implored the latter not to agree to the Treaty and, finally, receiving Mr. Pak’s peremptory order to cease interfering, threw himself down upon the clerk’s bed in great grief. After this, there was no further interruption from any quarter, and the seal was taken quietly to the Palace.”
It throws light upon the control and use of this seal to observe that, when in the summer of 1907 he was committed to the responsibility for the Commission to The Hague Conference by the fact that the commissioners were ready to prove their Imperial authorization by showing the Imperial seal, His Majesty did not admit this as evidence in proof of their claim. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this use of his seal was also with his knowledge and permission. And, now, in connection with the various details inaugurated under the new Treaty which followed this violation of the Treaty of November, 1905, we are told that henceforth the Imperial seal will be kept in a safe especially prepared for it, and carefully protected from intrusion.
[39] It is a significant fact that this memorial which is here followed very closely—and in the most important places even literally—has received no attention from the hostile critics of Japan. It would seem as though neither Mr. Hulbert nor Mr. Story is aware of the existence of such a memorial. This is the more remarkable in the case of the former, because he was for years resident in Seoul, was familiar with the Korean language, and was gathering material for his written account of the affair while upon the ground.
[40] It will, therefore, clearly appear that no one acquainted with this memorial can honestly place any confidence in His Majesty’s subsequent denials of the significance of these facts. Shall we not also be obliged to add, that no one who is acquainted with the memorial is entitled to the confidence of any one else, if he puts confidence in the denials of the Emperor. Amazement at the audacity of the falsehoods which have been told with regard to this historically important transaction would seem to be the fitting attitude of mind.
[41] This part of the memorial agrees closely with the statements in the first part of the chapter, as to what was then said.
[42] The purpose of this significant Memorial, we repeat, is self-evident. The Ministers, who had agreed to the Treaty by the Emperor’s commands and with his concurrence and approval, were being attacked as traitors. The Emperor himself was secretly favoring the attack and endeavoring to create the impression that he had not agreed to the Treaty, but that it was the work of the recreant Cabinet without his approval. The Memorial forced him to abandon that position once and for all. As before stated, it was officially promulgated with the Imperial sanction, and should have ended all controversy at once. In any country but Korea, and with any but the class of writers whom these incidents have developed, that would have been its result.
[43] An amusing illustration of the ex-Emperor’s way of filling his privy purse is found in the following authentic incident. At one time the large sum of 270,000 yen was wanted in cash to pay a bill for silks and jades which, it was alleged, had been purchased in China for Lady Om. When the request was made to exhibit the precious goods which had cost so enormous a sum, and which were going to make so large an unexpected drain upon insufficient revenues, the show of materials was entirely unsatisfactory. But, if not the goods, at least the bill itself could be produced. A bill was then brought to light, with the items made out in due form, but by a Chinese firm of merchants in Seoul instead of in China. The Chinese Consul-General, on being inquired of, replied that there was indeed such a reputable Chinese firm in the city; and he desired to have the matter further investigated lest the credit and business honor of his countrymen might suffer by connection of this sort with His Majesty’s efforts to obtain ready money. Investigation elicited the fact that a certain Court official had visited this firm and inquired how much such and such things would cost, if purchased in Shanghai. But no goods had been delivered or even actually ordered!
[44] See Hulbert, The History of Korea, II, p. 61 f.
[45] The History of Korea, I, p. 339.