The Conquest of Canada, Vol. 1

by George Warburton

CHAPTER XIV.

An embittered disagreement between the governor general, Comte de Frontenac, and the intendant, M. de Cheneau, M. Talon's successor, rendered it necessary to recall both those officers from the colony. The French court attributed the greater share of blame to the governor, but the haughty and unbending disposition of the intendant was probably a principal cause of those untoward disputes. M. le Févre de la Barre and M. de Meules succeeded them in their respective offices, with special recommendation from the king to cultivate friendly relations with each other, and with M. de Blénac, the governor general of the French American islands.

New France had for many years remained in a state of great confusion, and had made but little progress in prosperity or population, and now the prospects of a disastrous war darkened the future of the colonists. Various causes had united to revive the hostility of the Iroquois, their ancient and powerful foes. Since New York had fallen into English hands, the savages found it more advantageous to carry their trade thither than to barter their furs with the privileged company of France. The falling off of commercial intercourse soon led to further alienation, which the death of an Iroquois chief by the hands of an Illinois, in the territory of the Ottawas, then allies of the white men, soon turned into open hostility. The Comte de Frontenac had failed in his attempts to negotiate with the savages; and on the arrival of his successor, an invasion of the colony was hourly expected. M. de la Barre at once perceived the dangerous state of affairs; he therefore summoned an assembly of all the leading men in the country, ecclesiastical, civil, and military, and demanded counsel from them in the emergency.

The assembly was of opinion that the Iroquois aimed at the monopoly of all the trade of Canada, by the instigation of the English and Dutch of New York, who were also supposed to incite them to enmity against the French, and that, consequently, those nations should be held hostile. It was also believed that the savages had only endeavored to gain time by their negotiations, while they either destroyed the tribes friendly to the colonists, or seduced them from their alliance. With this view they had already assailed the Illinois, and it was therefore the duty of the French to save that nation from this attack, whatever might be the cost or danger of the enterprise. For that purpose the colony could only furnish 1000 men; and to procure even this number, it was necessary that the labors of husbandry should be suspended. Re-enforcements of troops and a supply of laborers were therefore urgently required for the very existence of the settlements; and an earnest appeal for such assistance was forwarded to the king, as the result of the deliberations of the assembly. This application was immediately answered by the dispatch of 200 soldiers to New France, and by a remonstrance addressed to the King of Great Britain, who instructed Colonel Dongan, the English governor of New York, to encourage more friendly relations with his French neighbors.

While M. de la Barre pushed on his preparations for war against the Iroquois, he still kept up the hope of treating with them for peace in such a manner as not to forfeit the dignity of his position. In the mean time, however, he received intimation that a formidable expedition of 1500 warriors had assembled, ostensibly to wage war with the Illinois, but in reality for the destruction of the Miamis and Ottawas, both allies of the French. The governor promptly dispatched an envoy, who arrived at the village where the Iroquois had mustered on the evening of the day appointed for the beginning of their campaign. The envoy was received with dignity and kindness; and he succeeded in obtaining a promise that the expedition should be deferred, and that they would send deputies to Montreal to negotiate with the French chief. But the wily savages had promised only to deceive; and in the month of May following, the governor received intelligence that 700 of these fierce warriors were on their march to attack his Miami and Ottawa allies, while another force was prepared to assail the settlements of the French themselves. He attributed these dangerous hostilities to the instigation of the English.

The governor made urgent representations to the minister at home as to the necessity of crushing two of the Iroquois tribes, the most hostile and the most powerful. For this purpose, he demanded that a re-enforcement of 400 men should be sent to him from France as soon as possible, and that an order should be obtained from the Duke of York, to whom New York then belonged, to prevent the English from interfering with or thwarting the expedition.

The Iroquois found the free trade with the English and Dutch more advantageous than that with the French, which was paralyzed by an injudicious monopoly; but they were still unwilling to come to an open rupture with their powerful neighbors. They therefore sent deputies to Montreal to make great but vague professions of attachment and good will. For many reasons, De la Barre placed but little confidence in these addresses: their object was obviously to gain time, and to throw the French off their guard. He, however, received the deputies with great distinction, and sent them back enriched with presents. But a few months after this, however, a small detachment of Frenchmen was assailed by the Iroquois, and plundered of merchandise which they were bearing to traffic with the Illinois.

After this flagrant outrage, nothing remained for M. de la Barre but war. He had received intelligence that the Iroquois were making great preparations for an onslaught upon the French settlements, and that they had sent embassadors to the Indians of the south for the purpose of insuring peace in that quarter, while they threw all their power into the struggle with the hated pale faces. The governor promptly determined to adopt the bolder but safer course of striking the first blow, and making the cantons of his savage enemies the field of battle. As yet, few and small were the aids he had received from France, and a considerable time must elapse ere the further supplies he anticipated could arrive: he was, therefore, unwillingly compelled to avail himself of the assistance of his Indian allies. The native tribes dwelling around the shores of Lake Michigan entertained a deep and ancient jealousy of the powerful confederacy of the Iroquois or Five Nations, who aspired to universal dominion over the Northern Continent; they, therefore, held themselves equally interested with the French in the destruction of those formidable warriors. M. de la Durantaye, who commanded the fort on the far-distant shores of Lake Michigan, announced to his Indian neighbors that his countrymen were about to march against the Iroquois, and requested that all the native warriors friendly to the white men should meet them in the middle of August at Niagara. He was not, however, very successful in making levies, and with difficulty led 500 warriors to the place of meeting, where, to his dismay, he found that the French had not arrived: his followers were not easily reconciled to this disappointment.

In the mean time, M. de la Barre had, on the 9th of July, 1683, marched from Quebec to Montreal, where he appointed the troops to assemble for the expedition. No precautions to insure success were neglected. He dispatched a message to the English governor of New York to invite him to join in the attack, or, at least, to secure his neutrality. He also sent belts and presents to three of the Iroquois tribes, to induce them to refrain from joining in the quarrel of those among their confederates who alone had injured him and his nation. He arrived at Montreal on the 21st, with 700 Canadians, 130 soldiers, and 200 Indians: his force was organized in three divisions. After a brief stay he continued his march westward.

The governor had not proceeded far when he received intelligence that the other Iroquois tribes had obliged the Tsonnonthouans, his especial enemies, to accept of their mediation with the French, and that they demanded the Sieur le Moyne, in whom they placed much confidence, to conduct the negotiation. At the same time, he learned that the tribe he proposed to assail had put all their provisions into a place of security, and were prepared for a protracted and harassing resistance. His appeals both to the remaining Iroquois tribes and to the English had also failed, for the former would assuredly make common cause against him in case of his refusing their mediation, and the latter had actually offered to aid his enemies with 400 horse, and a like force of infantry. Influenced by these untoward circumstances, he dispatched M. le Moyne to treat, and agreed to await the Iroquois deputies on the shores of Lake Ontario. In the mean time, M. de la Barre and his army underwent great privations from the scarcity and bad quality of their provisions; they could with difficulty hold their ground till the arrival of the savages, and such was their extremity that the name of the Bay of Famine was given to the scene of their sufferings.