In this state of affairs there was need of statesmen at the head of the Republican minority in Congress. There were orators; but the demand was for men of judgment, energy, executive ability,—men in whom the Democrats had confidence, who could put a stop to filibustering, and secure a peaceful solution of a unique and dangerous problem.
These were forthcoming; the late President Garfield and Gov. Foster, then a member of Congress, with Kasson, Hale, and other members of Congress, were among those most active and effective in securing a peaceful result.
When the electoral fight was on, and the end seemed uncertain, these gentlemen stepped to the front and fairly won the reputation of statesmen. They saw that if the filibustering of the Democrats were brought to a close, it would have to be accomplished by the leaders in that party and on that side of the House. Accordingly they secured Fernando Wood, of New York, as the leader in opposition to filibustering, and John Young Brown, of Kentucky, as his lieutenant. The Republican policy was to allow the Democrats to lead and do the talking, while they should fall into line and vote when the proper time came. But Fernando Wood at the head of the Republicans as a leader, was a spectacle as strange and startling as Satan leading a prayer-meeting. It was too much for an orthodox, close-communion, hard-shell Republican like Martin I. Townsend!
On Thursday afternoon, the last day of the alarming scenes in Congress, nearly everybody had lost hope. There was no telling at what moment the government would be in anarchy. In the midst of the confusion, excitement, and threatening danger, the Hon. Charles Foster was the most imperturbable man in Congress. On Thursday afternoon Senator Hoar, a member of Congress from Massachusetts, saw Mr. Foster seated at his desk writing as quietly and composedly as if in his private office; he seemed perfectly oblivious to the angry storm which was raging about him. The cold-blooded, conservative New England Senator was as greatly amazed at the serenity of the clear-headed Western Congressman as he was distressed at the impending disaster. He went to Mr. Foster and talked very discouragingly respecting the situation. He said that the Senate was growing impatient at the dilatory conduct of the House, and would probably, at the earliest convenience, send a message to the House demanding that the latter open their doors and admit the Senate to complete the count. Congressman Foster stated to the Senator that the House was not in a temper to be driven; that a resolution of the character of the one proposed would hinder rather than help a peaceful solution of the vexatious count; and that if he would only possess his soul in patience, before the rising of another sun R. B. Hayes would be peaceably and constitutionally declared the President of the United States. And it was even as he said; for before four o'clock the next morning the count was completed, and Hayes declared the President of the United States for the Constitutional term of four years. This is given as one of the many unwritten incidents that occurred during this angry, and, probably, most perilous controversy that ever threatened the life of the American Republic.
A new policy for the South was now inevitable. From October 1876 till March 1877, President Grant had refused to recognize Chamberlain as Governor of South Carolina, or Packard as Governor of Louisiana. He had simply preserved those governments in statu quo. He had heard all that could be said in favor of the Republican side of the question, and seemed to believe that it was now beyond his power to hold up the last of the Negro governments with bayonets. He was right. It would have been as vain to have attempted to galvanize those governments into existence as to have attempted the resuscitation of a dead man by applying a galvanic battery. Governments must have, not only the subjective elements of life, but the powers of self-preservation. The Negro governments at the South died for the want of these elements. It was a pity, too, after the noble fight the Republican party of Louisiana and South Carolina had made, and after they had secured their electoral votes for Hayes, that their State officers who had been chosen at the same time should have been abandoned to their own frail governmental resources. But this was unavoidable. Their governments could not have existed twenty-four hours without the presence and aid of the United States army. And this could not have been done in the face of the sentiment against such use of the army which had grown to be nearly unanimous throughout the country. If the Republicans could have inaugurated their officers and administered their governments they would have received the applause of the administration at Washington and the God-speed of the Republican party of the North; but the moment the United States troops were withdrawn the Negro governments melted into nothingness.
Every thing had been tried but pacification. The men who best understood the temper of that section knew it was incapable, as a whole, of receiving the olive branch in the spirit in which the North would tender it. But a policy of conciliation was demanded; the Northern journals asked it. An ex-Major-General of the Confederate Army was called to the Cabinet of President Hayes, and was given a portfolio where he could do more for the South than in any other place. Gen. Longstreet, a gallant Confederate soldier during the late war, was made Postmaster at Gainesville, Georgia, and afterward sent as Minister to Turkey. Col. Mosby, another Confederate soldier, or guerilla, was sent to China, and Col. Fitzsimmons was made Marshal of Georgia. It was the policy of the Hon. Charles Foster to have the President recognize young men at the South who had the pluck and ability to divide the Bourbon Democratic party of that section, and hasten the day of better feeling between the sections. But the President, either incapable of comprehending this idea, or jealous of the credit that the country had already bestowed upon him, blundered on in selecting men to represent his policy in the South who had no following, and were, therefore, valueless to his cause. His heart was right, but he put too much confidence in Southern statesmen.
The South showed no signs of improvement. White Republicans were intimidated, persecuted, and driven out. The black Republicans were allowed to vote, but the Democrats counted the votes and secured all the offices. The President was under the influence of Alex. H. Stephens, of Georgia, and Wade Hampton, of South Carolina. He expected much; but he received nothing. Instead of gratitude he received arrogance. The Southern leaders in Congress sought to deprive the Executive of his constitutional veto; to starve the army; and to protract the session of Congress. The North had invited its "erring brethren" back, and had killed the fatted calf, but were unwilling to allow the fellow to eat all the veal! The conduct of the South was growing more intolerable every day; and the President's barren policy was losing him supporters. He had not tied to any safe advisers. Hon. Charles Foster, Senator Stanley Matthews, and Gen. James A. Garfield could have piloted him through many dangerous places. But he shut himself up in his own abilities, and left his friends on the outside. The South had gulped down every thing that had been given it, and was asking for more. Every thing had been given except the honor of the cause that the Union army had fought for. To complete the task of conciliation it was only required that the nation destroy the monuments to its hero dead, and open the treasury to the payment of rebel war claims, and pension the men who were maimed in an attempt to shoot the government to death. To the credit of President Hayes let history record that he did not surrender his veto power to arrogant and disloyal Southern Congressmen. He became convinced at last that the South was incapable of appreciating his kindness, and was willing to change front. His policy was inevitable. It did great good. It united the Republican party against the South; and a splendid cabinet, a clean administration, and the resumption of specie payments wrought wonders for the Republican party.
There was a ripe sentiment in the North in favor of "a change" of policy. The very men who had advocated pacification; who had "flowers and tears for the Gray, and tears and flowers for the Blue"; who wanted the grave of Judas equally honored with the grave of Jesus—the destroyer and the Saviour of the country placed in the same calendar;—were the first men to grow sick of the policy of pacification. But what policy to inaugurate was not clear to them.
In the summer of 1878 the Hon. Charles Foster returned to Ohio from Washington City. He had seen State governments in the North slip from the control of Republicans, because of the folly of the Hayes' policy of pacification toward the South. He had the good-sense to take in the situation. He saw that it was madness to attempt any longer to conciliate the South. He saw that the lamb and lion had lain down together, but that the lamb was on the inside of the lion. Brave, intelligent, and far-seeing, on the 1st of August, 1878, he gave the Republican party of the North a battle-cry that died away only amid the shouts of Republican State and National victories in 1880. This was all the North needed. A leader was demanded, and the Hon. Charles Foster sounded the key-note that met with a response in every loyal heart in the country. His idea was that as the South had not kept the faith; had not accorded protection to the Negro voter; had not broken up old Bourbon Democratic organizations, it was the imperative duty of the North to meet that section with a solid front. Hence his battle-cry: "A Solid North against a Solid South." The following is his famous speech—pure gold:
"I happened to be one who thought and believed that the President's Southern policy, as far as it related to the use of troops for the support of State governments, was right. I sustained it upon the ground of high principle, nevertheless it could have been sustained on the ground of necessity. The President has extended to the people of the South the hand of conciliation and friendship. He has shown a desire, probably contrary to the wishes of the great mass of his party, to bring about, by the means of conciliation, better relations between the North and South. In doing this he has alienated from him the great mass of the leading and influential Republicans of the country. He had lost their sympathy, and to a great degree their support. What has he received in return for these measures of conciliation and kindness? How have these measures been received by the South? What advance can we discover in them, of the recognition of the guarantees of the rights of the Colored men under the Constitutional Amendments? We see Jeff. Davis making speeches as treasonable as those of 1861, and these speeches endorsed and applauded by a great portion of their press and people. We see also the declaration of Mr. Singleton, of Mississippi, in answer to a question of mine on the floor of the House, declaring that his paramount allegiance in peace and war was due to his State.
"No gentleman from the South, or even of the Democratic party, has taken issue with him. We see also, all over the South, a disposition to resist the execution of the United States laws, especially in the matter of the collection of internal revenue. To-day there are four U. S. officers under arrest by the authorities of the State of South Carolina, in jail and bail refused, for an alleged crime in their State, while in fact these officers were discharging their duty in executing the laws of the United States in that State. Their State courts and their officers refused to obey the writs of the United States courts in the surrender of these men to the United States authorities. No former act of this treasonable State shows a more defiant attitude toward the U. S. Government, or a greater disposition to trample upon its authority. I trust the Administration will, in this case, assert in the most vigorous manner possible the authority of the United States Government for the rescue and protection of these officers. I have no bloody shirt to wave. If there is one man in this country, more than another, who desires peace and quiet between the sections, I believe I am that man. Gentlemen may philosophize over this question until they are gray, but you cannot escape the discussion of this question so long as a Solid South menaces the peace of the country. A Solid Democratic South means the control of the country by the spirit and the men who sought its destruction.
"My own opinion is that there can be no peace—this question will not down, until the menace of the Solid South is withdrawn. I had hoped that the policy of President Hayes would lead to the assertion, by a very considerable portion of the South, of their antagonism to Bourbon Democracy.
"I confess to a degree of disappointment in this, though I think I see signs of a breaking up of the Solid South in the independent movement that seemed to be gaining a foothold in all sections of that country. But the effective way to aid these independent movements, this breaking up of the Solid South, is for the North to present itself united against the Solid South. A Solid South under the control of the Democratic party means the control of the party by this element. It means the repeal of the Constitutional Amendments, if not in form, in spirit. It means the payment of hundreds of rebel claims. It means the payment of pensions to rebel soldiers. It means the payment for slaves lost in the Rebellion. It means the abrogation of that provision of the Constitution which declares, that the citizens of one State shall have all the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizens of other States.
"If my Democratic friends who seem to be anxious to bring about peace and quiet between the sections are sincere and desire to make their expressions effective, they should act with that party that presents a solid front, a United North, so long as we are menaced with the Solid South.
"If it could be understood in the South that they are to be met with a Solid North, I do not believe that the Solid South would exist in that condition a single year. They retain this position because they believe that they can have the support of a fragment of the North; and thus with this fragment rule and control the country. I would have no fear of the control of the country by the Democratic party if it were made up of something like equal proportion from all sections of the country. I discuss this question, first, because I believe it the most important question at issue in the pending canvass. I repeat that it is the imperative duty of the North to meet the Solid South with a united front."[133]