No sooner had the commons demanded concessions from the royal prerogative, as the only security against the repeated encroachments which had been made on the privileges of the people, than they were impelled, by the insincerity of the monarch, to protect the interest of the subject by every possible means. The right of the sword was looked upon as the exalted claim of the patriot alone; but as either party considered themselves influenced by the sacred love of their country, both made gradual advances to an appeal: the one to protect the liberties of the people; the other, those general interests which seemed connected with upholding the authority of the king. As the commons were sensible that the monarch would seize the first favorable opportunity to reinstate himself in the former excess of his power, the earliest precautions were taken in regard to the military establishments of the country. Amongst these was secured the important fortress of Hull, containing the arms of all the forces which had been levied against the Scots: with these the parliament also assumed to themselves the disposal of the militia, a force indeed collected, but totally untried in the conduct of war. The king, on erecting his standard, opposed to this, as a resource of strength, his Commission of Array. The call of the monarch was obeyed by each county, as the political inclinations of individuals led them, or in submission to the influence and example of those men of fortune, with whose interests that of their tenantry was intimately connected. [11a]
The contest carried on in the south and in the west with vigor, already appeared favorable to the royal cause. In the north, however, it sustained a decided check, by the strong hold which the parliament possessed in the garrison of Hull, then commanded by Lord Fairfax, who, unable to maintain the field against the Marquis of Newcastle, had there retired, determined to repel a siege with courage and ability; and to diminish the strength of his enemy by sudden incursions.
The disposable forces of the parliament, not immediately required for the defence of Hull, were too inconsiderable to oppose the march into the south. Notwithstanding this, the affairs of the king were ruined by confining the efforts of a powerful army to investing this fortress; while the active enemy, though few in number, acquired by their boldness and intrepidity, an effective strength in the field. When Oliver Cromwell, then beginning to signalize himself as the companion in arms of the young and gallant Sir Thomas Fairfax, had by a signal victory at Gainsborough, routed the royal troops; the Marquis of Newcastle, beholding his brother Cavendish dead, amid the noblest and bravest of his soldiers, seemed as if awakened by the calls of vengeance to the necessity of more extensive exertions. He therefore suddenly decided on harassing his opponents, while weak and inefficient, by dispatching a competent force into the heart of Lincolnshire. Cromwell, though a conqueror, was obliged to make a precipitate retreat; and as Lincoln was not defensible, he hastened on the day succeeding his victory to Boston; intending there, with the young Sir Thomas Fairfax, who was proceeding with additional horse from Hull, to concentrate their forces with those of the Earl of Manchester. [11b]
The division of the royal army, destined for these parts, was entrusted to the command of Sir John Henderson, an old and valiant soldier, and to Sir William Widdrington, who was appointed governor of Lincoln. As these leaders were anxious to requite themselves for the defeat which had so recently crowned the conquerors with the applause of heroism, they determined to draw the enemy to an engagement before their reinforcements should arrive: ere this however could be effected, Manchester, upon advice of their intention, after possessing himself of the strong fortress of Lynn, had advanced with the disposable part of the army of the associated counties. Such appeared to be the mutual disposition of affairs in the north, at the beginning of October, 1643, in the first year of the civil war.
The army of the parliament, about six thousand foot, and thirty-seven troop of horse, being concentrated at Boston, it was determined that companies should be distributed into such parts as might secure their early co-operation whensoever occasion should require. Bolingbroke, defended by a castle held by the partizans of the king, called forth into exertion their vigor and the alacrity of their courage. [12] This they decided upon as the place of military operation; whilst as the neighbourhood promised the most favorable circumstances for a field, they would there invite the enemy on to battle. Accordingly ten companies commanded by Major Knight, an officer under Sir Miles Hobart, were disposed of at this place. A regiment commanded by Colonel Russel, was quartered at Stickford, about two miles distant; and three companies of the Earl of Manchester’s own at the village of Stickney. The cavalry were all distributed into the country round, for about eight or ten miles distance.
In the evening after their arrival, the castle of Bolingbroke was summoned. The answer in effect was, that “the commander need not expect that the demands of arrogance alone should win the castle.” From this determined reply promising a strenuous defence, dispositions were immediately taken to acquire it by a regular siege. The church and a neighbouring house were occupied by the assailants, earth works were thrown up, and the assault commenced, but without much effect.
During this time, the royalists, bold, eager, and trusting that a generous heroism would nerve them for victory, waited only the opportunity for attack. Upon learning the arrival of the Earl of Manchester, they lost no time in drawing out all their military from the several garrisons of Lincoln, Newark, and Gainsborough, still stimulated by an undaunted resolution to find out the enemy, and advance to the combat. Hastening on, they arrived, early on the day previous to the battle, at the out-posts of the parliamentary forces.
No sooner had a detachment from the king’s army, advancing on the western road, been observed at Edlington, reconnoitring the lines of their enemy, than word came to Sir Thomas Fairfax, the commandant of the cavalry at Horncastle, that a surprize was expected. Information was accordingly dispatched to the Earl of Manchester: it found him at East Kirkby hill, with Colonel Cromwell, and the Lord Willoughby of Parham, intently observing the progress which the besiegers made against the castle of Bolingbroke, and assiduously ordering the dispositions of attack. Roused at this communication, Cromwell immediately hurried to collect the troops dispersed around. Fairfax was still every where distributing horsemen for the purpose of enquiry, cautious to ascertain and forward such accounts as might be obtained of the progress and number of the royal forces; who though eager for battle, were careful to deliberate on the promises of success. As the party who caused the alarm, suspecting themselves seen, had drawn off with such intelligence as they gathered, there seemed reason to suppose that the main body of the royalists were yet at a considerable distance: Fairfax therefore about sun set, learning nothing additional, proceeded to the quarters at East Kirkby, to confer on the measures proposed for the expected conflict. In the mean time, the Earl of Manchester, with Lord Willoughby and some other officers, had with the like object hastened to Horncastle, previously appointing that at that place the forces should be immediately collected; where, being drawn together, the most effective resolutions might be taken for ensuring a victory, or lessening the calamities of a defeat.
It was not until the dusk of the evening that the royal army, under Sir John Henderson, moved rapidly on to the station of their enemy. They had judged that the dubious light would serve to conceal their true numbers; and that as nothing was known of them with certainty, but their anxious readiness for the encounter; so their opponents, whether few or many, deeming them prepared for every casualty, might, by their indecision, leave an easy conquest to their arms.
The out-posts were surprized by the precipitate advance of these hostile forces; and in the unprepared circumstances of those who maintained them, and the disparity of their numbers, there was afforded them no means of encountering their difficulties, but the hardihood of a cool intrepidity. This indeed was a stern calmness which always pervaded the breast of a Puritan who was a soldier. He did not untremblingly bare his bosom to the steel because, like a Roman, he abstractedly considered fear inconsistent with the nobler qualities of human nature; but because the factitious enthusiasm of his religion had taught him to look with indifference on temporal things. If the general good required the sacrifice of his life, the particular calamities of his family were dismissed with scarce a thought beyond a pious supplication. It was this feeling which finally rendered the parliament victorious in the contest. However in this unlooked-for state the soldiers at the out-posts were exposed to much perplexity, and many were the dangers recited amongst them on the morning of the gathering of their strength for the field of battle. Some finding themselves surrounded, out-numbered, and in all the perilous circumstances of desperate warfare, were obliged to supply by politic conduct the helplessness of their condition. These therefore, hastily mounting their horses, agreed with much resolution to break through the opposing ranks, sword in hand, with the words of mutual encouragement, “Come on! come on! all is our own,” thinking that the royalists, by these ambiguous shouts, fearing an ambuscade, would leave to them an easy passage by the sudden confusion of their alarm. In this manner about four companies encountered two thousand cavalry, with the loss of only three men.