In concluding my remarks on my stay in England I cannot pass over the fact that a portion of the German press was unfortunately lacking both in tactful appreciation of the grief of the English royal family and people, as well as of the obligations which my family relationship and political considerations imposed upon me.
After my return home from England I was able to report to the Chancellor on the good impressions I had received, and particularly that opinion in England was apparently in favor of an understanding and of closer relations.
Bülow expressed himself as satisfied with the results of the journey, after we had talked at length about it at Homburg, and consulted as to how the situation created by the journey should be put to use. I suggested that we should unquestionably come to a good agreement, if an alliance—which I preferred—could not be brought about. In any event, a firm agreement would suffice, I said, and would suit the English; in the long run an alliance might always develop from it.
The opportunity for such an alliance came with unexpected promptness. While I was at Homburg von der Höhe in the spring of 1901, Count Metternich, who was with me as representative of the Foreign Office, brought me a notification from Berlin that Mr. Chamberlain had inquired there as to whether Germany was ready for an alliance with England. I immediately asked: "Against whom?"—since, if England so suddenly offered to make an alliance in the midst of peace, it was plain that she needed the German army, which made it worth while to find out against whom the army was needed and for what reason German troops were to fight, at England's behest, by her side. Thereupon the answer came from London that they were needed against Russia, since Russia was a menace both to India and to Constantinople.
The first thing I did was to call London's attention to the old traditional brotherhood-in-arms between the German and Russian armies, and the close family ties between the reigning dynasties of the two countries; in addition, I pointed out the dangers of a war on two fronts, in case France came in on the side of Russia, and also the fact that we had acted jointly with France and Russia in the Far East (Shimonoseki, 1895) and that there was no reason to unloose a conflict with Russia at this time, when we were in the midst of peace; that the superiority in number of the Russian army on a peace footing was very great and the eastern frontiers of Prussia seriously threatened by the grouping of the Russian forces; that England would not be in a position to protect our eastern province from a Russian attack, since her fleet could accomplish little in the Baltic and would be unable to sail into the Black Sea; that, in case of our making common cause against Russia, Germany would be the only one who would be in great danger, quite independently of the possibility of the entry of France into the fight.
Chamberlain then informed us that a firm alliance should be made, by which England would naturally bind herself to come to our aid.
BRITISH ALLIANCE FAILS
I had also pointed out that the validity of an alliance could only be assured when the English Parliament had placed its approval upon it, since the Ministry might be driven from office by the will of the nation as expressed in Parliament, whereby signature of the Ministry might be rendered null and void and the alliance invalidated, and that we could look upon the Chamberlain suggestion, for the time being, merely as a purely personal project of his own.
To this Chamberlain replied that he would get backing from Parliament in due time and would find the way of winning the Unionists over to his idea; that all needed now was the signature of Berlin. Matters did not progress as far as that, because Parliament was not to be won over to Chamberlain's plan; therefore the "plan" came to nothing. Soon afterward England concluded her alliance with Japan (Hayashi). The Russo-Japanese War broke out, in which Japan—owing to the fact that it fitted in with her schemes—played the rôle of pawn for England's interests, which rôle had originally been reserved for Germany. By this war Russia was thrown from the east back to the west, where she might concern herself again with the Balkans, Constantinople, and India—which was to Japan's advantage—leaving to Japan a free hand in Korea and China.