After the issue of this order, 1st Lieutenant Hasse of General Staff No. 3 arrived and reported that the II. Army had crossed the Sambre to the west of Namur on August 22nd, so that a serious resistance on the part of the enemy on the Meuse was not to be expected. It was intended to give the XII. Army Corps the direction on Anthée; the XIX. Army Corps, on the other hand, was to be taken over the Meuse to the south of Givet. The possibility of getting into touch on the western bank of the Meuse with the General Command (left wing, II. Army) was immediately communicated to the 32nd Infantry Division.

The opinion, seemingly confirmed by an air report received in the meantime that the Corps would get across the Meuse without serious difficulties, was destined to prove incorrect. The 32nd Infantry Division met with serious opposition at Houx and Leffe, and a similar experience befell the 46th Infantry Brigade in burning Dinant. It was only at the crossing-place of the 45th Infantry Brigade at Les Rivages that everything, at first, appeared to go smoothly, so that the 23rd Infantry Division reported at 12.40 a.m. through Major v. Zeschau that they were able to commence the crossing.

It was to be inferred from the reports in general that the crossing, even if beset with difficulties, could still be effected in the afternoon. A Corps command was therefore issued at 5.10 p.m., which assigned Sommière as the objective of the 32nd Infantry Division, and Onhaye that of the 23rd Infantry Division.

The General Staff, in view of the shortly expected crossing, proceeded from Gemechenne to the bend in the road 1.5 kilometres to the east of Dinant. At 2 p.m. the XIX. Army Corps reported that the 24th Infantry Division was crossing at Lenne with a brigade.

The troops of the Corps had, however, at the crossing-places some very severe fighting with the enemy posted on the west bank of the Meuse. This fighting, through the participation of the inhabitants, assumed an especiallv severe character. At the moment when the (Guards) Grenadier Regiment No. 100 had lowered the first pontoons into the water, a violent fire was delivered from the adjacent houses. The troops found themselves in the unpleasant position of being fired at by the infantry and artillery of the enemy on the western bank and by the inhabitants in their rear. The most unsatisfactory result of this fight was that a part of the pontoons had been rendered unserviceable by the bombardment.

Subsequently the crossing of the 23rd Infantry Division proved exceedingly difficult. The material to hand was no longer sufficient for the building of a military bridge. The General in command, who towards 7 p.m. had personally ascertained the position of the 32nd Infantry Division in Leffe, proceeded to the crossing-place of the 23rd Infantry Division, which he reached towards 8 p.m. The position of the Corps at this time was more or less as follows:

In Leffe the 32nd Infantry Division was still fighting for the crossing. At Dinant the 46th Infantry Brigade had been obliged to withdraw to the heights on the eastern bank because it was impossible to remain in the burning town. At Les Rivages a part of the bridge was ready, but the material was not sufficient for its completion, consequently a system of ferrying had to be contrived.

The commander of the 23rd Infantry Division accordingly arranged that a mixed force under Colonel Meister (Grenadier Regiment No. 101, Hussar Regiment No. 20, 1st Section, Field Artillery Regiment No. 12) should first be put across. The (Guards) Grenadier Regiment No. 100 was to follow next, while the remainder of the Army Corps was directed to the bridge of the 32nd Infantry Division at Leffe.

According to an Army Order sent at 7.15 p.m. to the east of Dinant, the pursuit was to be taken up with the available troops on the western bank of Meuse; XII. Army Corps; direction, Philippeville.

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