The cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana to France, which took place in the course of the late war, if carried into effect, makes a change in the aspect of our foreign relations which will doubtless have just weight in any deliberation of the Legislature connected with that subject.
This sentence could have only one meaning: that if France took possession of Louisiana, appropriations would be in order to prevent her from establishing herself permanently in the territory. It was a direct threat of war. The President had apparently given up any hope of reaching an agreement and was yielding to the war party.
On December 17 it was, on motion of Randolph:
Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before this house such papers as are in the possession of the Department of State as relate to the violation on the part of Spain, of the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation, between the United States and the King of Spain.
Jefferson complied with this request on December 22, averring that he "was aware of the obligation to maintain, in all cases, the rights of the nation, and to employ, for that purpose, those just and honorable means which belong to the character of the United States."[435]
There is no doubt that the President himself had lost patience and that the United States were rapidly drifting towards overt acts that could only have war as a consequence. On January 4 it was moved in the House that the President be requested to communicate all the information at his disposal on the reported cession of Louisiana. Then quite unexpectedly, on January 11, Jefferson sent to the Senate a message recommending that James Monroe be appointed special envoy to France with full powers, "jointly with Mr. Livingston to enter into a treaty or convention with the First Consul of France, for the purpose of enlarging and more effectually securing, our rights and interests in the river Mississippi, and in the territories eastward thereof." The next day, the House, on recommendation of a committee which presented a lengthy report, voted an appropriation of "two million dollars to defray the expenses which may be incurred in relation to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations."
The sudden change in Jefferson's attitude can largely be attributed to the fact that, between December 15 and January 11, he had received a letter sent from Paris by Du Pont de Nemours on October 4,[436] submitting a tentative plan for a treaty and discounting the pessimistic reports of Livingston. There is not the slightest doubt that the President was much impressed by Du Pont's letter. On January 18, Madison wrote to Pinckney:
In order to draw the French government into the measure, a sum of money will be made part of our propositions.... From a letter received by the President from a respectable person, it is inferred, with probability that the French government is not averse to treat on those grounds; and that such a disposition must be strengthened by circumstances of the present moment.[437]
Finally Jefferson himself wrote to Du Pont that his letter had been received with particular satisfaction, because while it held up terms that could not be entirely yielded, "it proposed such as a mutual spirit of accommodation and sacrifice may bring to some point of union."[438]
The President indicated, however, that the action of Spain in suspending the rights of deposit had rendered imperative an immediate settlement: "Our circumstances are so imperious as to admit of no delay as to our course; and the use of the Mississippi so indispensable, that we cannot hesitate one moment to hazard our existence for its maintainance." Despite this more conciliatory tone, the President did not recede from the position he had taken previously with Du Pont. He repeated that the country was in no position to offer such a sum as mentioned by Mr. Du Pont (six million dollars) in order to insure the purchase of the said territory.