Thomas Jefferson, the Apostle of Americanism

by Gilbert Chinard

Another solution, favored by such a liberal historian of Jefferson as Mr. A. J. Nock, would have been frankly to recognize the existing situation and to leave the New England merchants free to send out their vessels at their own risk. This would have relieved to a certain extent the economic distress of the northern States, but whether it would have been more honest or more dignified than the embargo is a matter of opinion. Such a policy would have been neutral only in appearance; it would have amounted to a tacit recognition of a British monopoly of the American trade, since England was really the only country to which American ships would have been permitted to go. Granting that the embargo was "the most arbitrary, inquisitorial, and confiscatory measure formulated in American legislation up to the period of the Civil War",[472] I fail to see that the prestige of the United States would have gained much by allowing their citizens to submit to the humiliating Orders in Council of November 11, 1807. Of all policies this would have been the most evasive, most vacillating and least dignified.

It must be furthermore remembered that though he was gifted with remarkable foresight, Jefferson was in no position to guess that the conflict between England and France would last for seven more years. He believed, on the contrary, that the Titanic struggle would come, if not to a definite close, at least to a pause, within a comparatively short time: "Time may produce peace in Europe; peace in Europe removes all causes of difference, till another European war; and by that time our debt may be paid, our revenue clear, and our strength increased."[473] This reasoning reappears in many letters written by Jefferson during the last year of his administration. His correspondence during the months that separated him from rest and philosophical meditation may be devoid of dramatic interest, but a thorough perusal of it would demonstrate that at no time during his long political career were his motives less interested, less partisan and more truly patriotic.

At no time, either, was he more bitterly attacked. He suffered from "the peltings of the storm" and cried out pathetically to Benjamin Rush: "Oh! for the day when I shall be withdrawn from it; when I shall have leisure to enjoy my family, my friends, my farm and books." But the defection of the Republicans in Congress, the divergence of opinions in his Cabinet, the threats of secession, the anonymous letters and the press campaign launched against him had no power to shake his strong negative resolution. Yet in all justice to him it may be seen that his policy was not entirely negative.

First of all his letters show that he never considered the embargo as a permanent cure. As early as March, 1808, writing to Charles Pinckney, the former envoy to Spain, he declared that the effect of the embargo would be "to postpone for this year the immediate danger of a rupture with England." He admitted that a time would come "when war would be preferable to a continuance of the embargo and that the question would have to be decided at the next meeting of Congress unless peace intervened in the meantime."[474] Under these circumstances the repeal of the embargo voted by Congress to take effect after Jefferson's retirement cannot be considered as a rebuke to the President. Moreover, it appears that Jefferson had given some thought to three and not two alternatives: 1, embargo; 2, war; 3, submission and tribute,—the third being exactly that advocated by Mr. Nock. In Jefferson's opinion this third solution was at once "to be put out by every American and the two first considered."[475] Writing to Thomas Leib, earlier in the year, he had already defined his position with regard to this solution, recommended by the mercantile interests: "It is true, the time will come when we must abandon it (the embargo). But if this is before the repeal of the orders of council, we must abandon it only for a state of war. The day is not distant, when that will be preferable to a longer continuance of the embargo. But we can never remove that, and let our vessels go out and be taken under these orders without making reprisal." This is itself evidence, but it has apparently escaped many historians as well as many contemporaries of Jefferson. If the embargo is considered not as a permanent policy but as a political expedient and a political experiment, the greater part of Henry Adams' arraignment of Jefferson's political philosophy falls flat.[476] When, on the other hand, the same writer admits that "the result was that the embargo saved perhaps twenty millions of dollars a year and some thousands of lives which the war would have consumed", we may be permitted to add that Jefferson would not have granted the principle that "the strongest objection to war was not its waste of money or even of life; for money and life in political economy were worth no more than they could be made to produce." If this is economic history, Heaven preserve us from economic policies! As to the accusation that "Jefferson's system was preaching the fear of war, of self-sacrifice, making many smugglers and traitors, but not a single hero", I must humbly confess that one does not see that America would have been much richer for engaging without adequate preparation or even a fair chance to defend herself in a useless and, in last analysis, probably inglorious war.

It is claimed, however, that the embargo caused an economic catastrophe:

As the order was carried along the seacoast, every artisan dropped his tools, every merchant closed his doors, every ship was dismantled. American produce—wheat, timber, cotton, tobacco, rice—dropped in value or became unsalable; every imported article rose in price; wages stopped, swarms of debtors became bankrupt; thousands of sailors hung idle around the wharves.... A reign of idleness began; and the men who were not already ruined felt that their ruin was only a matter of time.[477]

A very pathetic picture this, made even more pitiful by the classic quotation from the British traveler, Lambert, who visited New York in 1808 and described it as a place ravaged by pestilence. But why not quote also from another traveler, John Mellish, who spoke of the impetus given to manufactures and home industries?[478] Why forget to mention Gallatin's report of 1810, pointing out that some basic industries had been firmly established in the United States, such as iron, cotton, flax, hats, paper, printing type, gunpowder, window glass, clocks, etc. Who could deny, at any rate, that manufactures made enormous progress, thanks to the embargo, and that goods formerly imported from England began to be made in America? Even supposing that the picture drawn by H. Adams were true, it would be necessary to admit that there was another side to it and that a few artisans, at least, remained working steadily at their benches.

The last annual message of Jefferson to Congress was noncommittal on the measures to be taken. It presented first a dispassionate recital of the negotiations carried on with France and England to bring them to rescind the most offensive features of their orders and decrees. It recognized that "this candid and liberal experiment had failed." It was left to Congress to determine what course to follow:

Under a continuance of the belligerent measures which, in defiance of laws which consecrate the rights of neutrals, overspread the ocean with danger, it will rest with the wisdom of Congress to decide on the course best adapted to such a state of things; and bringing with them, as they do, from every part of the Union, the sentiments of our constituants, my confidence is strengthened, that in forming this decision they will, with an unerring regard to the essential rights and interests of the nation weigh and compare the painful alternatives out of which a choice is to be made.

This reserved attitude Jefferson intended to maintain during the rest of his term. "I have thought it right to take no part myself in proposing measures, the execution of which will devolve on my successor. I am therefore chiefly an unmedling listener to what others say."[479] But to Doctor William Eustis he protested that "while thus endeavoring to secure, and preparing to vindicate that commerce, the absurd opinion has been propagated, that this temporary and necessary arrangement was to be a permanent system and was intended for its destruction."[480] And this seems to indicate that he was quite definite in his own mind, even if he refrained from expressing his opinion officially.