In 1899 a bar-keeper in Ohio charged a Negro thirty cents for a cocktail, the regular price to white customers being only fifteen cents. The Civil Rights Bill of Ohio did not mention saloons, but said “other places of public accommodation and amusement.” The court[[277]] held that saloons were not included, adding, in the same spirit as the Minnesota court “... nor should we interpret this statute as encouraging a tariff which the clearly defined policy of the State discourages.”
A statute of Louisiana[[278]] of 1908 requires separate saloons for white and colored persons. The Louisiana court,[[279]] in July, 1909, held that the sale of liquor to white and colored persons must not be conducted in the same building, and that the statute is not obeyed by providing separate bars in the same building. The saloon keeper had attempted to avoid paying taxes on two saloons by operating two bars in the same building.
In Atlanta,[[280]] before State prohibition began, there were separate saloons for the white and colored people. An ordinance of Nashville,[[281]] Tennessee, which went into effect July 7, 1907, required the segregation of the races in saloons.
SODA FOUNTAINS
The keeper of a soda fountain in Illinois in 1896 refused to sell cold drinks to a Negro. At that time the law required equal accommodation in inns and “all other places of accommodation and amusement.” The court[[282]] of that State held that a soda fountain is not such a place of accommodation or amusement. “Such a place,” the court argued, “can be considered a place of accommodation or amusement to no greater extent than a places where dry goods or clothing, boots and shoes, hats and caps, or groceries, are dispensed. The personal liberty of an individual in his business transactions, and his freedom from restrictions, is a question of utmost moment, and no construction can be adopted by which an individual right of action will be included as controlled within a legislative enactment, unless clearly expressed in such enactment and certainly included within the constitutional limitation on the power of the legislature.”
THEATRES
The question of the rights of Negroes in theatres has given rise to a number of judicial decisions. Fifteen States provide by statute that there shall be no race distinction in theatres. In 1873, the laws of Mississippi, under the Reconstruction government, declared that all persons, without distinction as to race, color, or previous condition of servitude, should have equal and impartial enjoyment of theatres. One Donnell, held in custody for refusing to pay a fine for violating this law by refusing to sell theatre tickets to two Negroes, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The court[[283]] held that the law was not unconstitutional, because it in no way appropriated private property to public use.
Two years later, in reply to a question whether it was a crime to refuse a Negro equal accommodations in a hotel, Judge Emmons in Tennessee charged the grand jury[[284]] that the Federal government had no right to require individual innkeepers, theatre managers, etc., to entertain Negroes.
In 1876 a Negro in Louisiana bought a ticket to a theatre, which he was not allowed to use on account of his color. He sued for five thousand dollars damages. The Constitution of that State, at the time, guaranteed equal accommodations in public places. The Louisiana court[[285]] held that this law “does not enumerate a mere abstraction, but it guarantees substantial rights.” The Negro’s claim was sustained, but the damages were reduced to three hundred dollars and costs. Both this and the Mississippi case arose in the South and were decided favorably to the rights of the Negro, but both came during the Reconstruction régime. Since then, no such case appears to have risen in the South.
In 1889 a Negro woman in Illinois, having been refused tickets to a theatre, had a white man buy them for herself and her husband. On presenting the tickets they were refused admission to seats in the theatre which the tickets called for. At the resulting trial, the proprietor offered to prove that he had, “in order to avoid collision between the races, adopted a rule (and that such rule was necessary) to the effect that the colored people should have one row to themselves in each part of the house, or as many rows as the tickets which they bought would call for.” This evidence was rejected, the court[[286]] holding that the Civil Rights Bill of Illinois could not be satisfied by separate accommodations.