Coronation Anecdotes

by Giles Gossip

That "the King had the right of being crowned," was a proposition which he thought he should have no difficulty of supporting; and that the Queen enjoyed the same right, he thought he could establish upon exactly the same legal ground. The ground upon which he mainly relied was a uniform, uninterrupted practice, in the sense in which he thought he should be permitted to use and avail himself of these terms in a court of justice, and in which he should be justified in establishing out of them the legal existence of any private right. That some interruptions had arisen in this uniform practice he was prepared to admit and explain, for they were such as did not affect the uninterrupted right; but, in the mode in which he had to account for them, rather sanctioned and confirmed it. There would be two propositions which he entreated their lordships to bear in mind while he went through his narrative of historical facts. The first was the uniform exercise of the right; namely, that no king had ever been crowned, being married at the time of his coronation, without the queen-consort herself partaking with the king in the solemnity of the coronation; and, secondly, that there never was a queen-consort in England who had not partaken of the ceremony of the coronation: but in making these two propositions, he begged of course to be understood, as using them subject to the usual qualifications of general propositions; which were—being bound to show that where any interruptions had existed, they did not compromise the general right. With interruptions, as to the first proposition, he had but one to contend, which was capable of easy solution. As to the second, he could easily and satisfactorily explain whatever exceptions had arisen, for they were few, and tended to confirm the right of the Queen-Consort. The learned gentleman then proceeded to call the attention of the lords of the council to various records which he quoted from English history, in order to establish his proposition,—the right of British queens to be crowned, from the year 784, through the Saxon and Norman lines, down to the house of Tudor. In Henry the Second's reign a remarkable circumstance occurred: the solemnity of crowning his eldest son took place in his father's life-time; the prince was married to a daughter of Louis of France, and she was not crowned although her husband was. The novelty of that omission of what was considered a uniform ceremony, led to a complaint and remonstrance to the king of England, and the result was, that he had recourse for redress to the usual process of kings—to arms, and a declaration of war; and in front of his reasons for taking that step, the French king placed the omission to crown his daughter with her husband. Henry was at length obliged to submit, for he went over to France and entered into some compromise with Louis to avert hostilities, and the daughter of the French king was solemnly crowned at Winchester by bishops and other venerable and distinguished authorities, who were sent over from France to perform the ceremony of her coronation with suitable splendour.

On arriving at the era of Henry the Sixth, the learned counsel said he should refer to the law of Scotland about the period of history at which he was passing. The Scottish documents contained enough to establish the fact, that no king of Scotland who was married at the time of his coronation was ever crowned without his consort; nor, where the marriage took place afterwards, was there an instance in which a Scottish queen was not crowned as soon as possible after she became queen. The learned counsel then referred to the act 1428 in the Scottish statutes, cap. 109, passed in the eighth parliament of James the First, and read the "aith to be made to the queen, be the clergie and the baronnes."

The case of Henry the Seventh's queen was next quoted. She had been crowned two years after the king's coronation. This coronation was announced by proclamation similar to that which had announced his own two years and a month before; and the order of it, as would be seen in the Close Roll, and in Rymer, was similar to that observed at all other coronations of queens-consort. The varying conduct of Henry the Eighth with regard to his queens was then accounted for. Charles the First was crowned without his queen, because of the antipathy of the people against the papists, of whom she was one; yet only nine days before he was himself crowned, a proclamation was issued for the crowning of his queen, but observing the popular feeling to be against such a measure, that ceremony was postponed. The queen was said to have objected to take any part in the coronation unless she could be assisted in it by a popish priest, which the constitution of the country rendered absolutely impossible. The same reasons operated against the crowning of Charles the Second's queen, who was also a papist. James the Second and his queen were crowned together, although they were both Roman Catholics. If he and his consort could reconcile it to themselves to go into a Protestant cathedral, and to partake in the ceremonies of a Protestant ritual, there was an end of the difficulty which he had described as originating from the words of one of the oaths having one sense to one of the parties who took them, and another to the other. Since the revolution every thing regarding this subject was well known, and every king and queen had been regularly crowned. With regard to the queen of George the First, he must beg leave to observe, that as she had never been in this country, he had nothing to do with her. Besides, she was said to have been divorced from her husband by the sentence of a foreign ecclesiastical court before he ascended the throne of this country; so that it was legally impossible that she could be crowned if she had been divorced from her husband, and physically impossible if she had never set foot in the country. Her case, therefore, formed no exception to her present Majesty's right. Whilst he was upon this subject he might be permitted to remark, as not extraneous to it, that he had not expected and did not expect to hear in that court, as a bar to her Majesty's claim, that some proceedings had been instituted against her. He made that assertion not on his own authority, but on the authority of a noble and learned judge, who, in giving sentence on the King and Wolfe, in the court of the highest resort in the country, had said, in consequence of some observations having been made as to the defendant having been guilty of some great offence, "If a man be guilty of ever so great an offence, and the proceedings against him fail in substantiating that offence, he is to be considered in law as innocent as if no such offence had ever been charged against him."

Friday, July 6.—Mr. Brougham rose at a few minutes after ten to resume his speech. He had yesterday gone through a long and unbroken series of precedents, showing that no king of England had ever been crowned, he being married at the time of his coronation, without his consort participating in that ceremony. Having gone so far, he contended that he had a right to assume his larger proposition, that queens-consort had, at all times throughout the ages of English history, themselves enjoyed the ceremony of the coronation. If in one or two instances this was not done at the time when the king's own coronation took place, and supposing that there was an instance or two where the queen-consort became such after the coronation of the king, still he would affirm, that according to all the rules of argument, of law, and of common sense, those few instances, (admitting there were some, though in point of strict fact he believed there were none,) did not in any manner or degree affect his general argument, which he held upon the authorities he had cited to be altogether incontrovertible. He was not before their lordships to show where the right which he asserted in behalf of the queen-consort had been claimed and refused. In every instance, in which it was actually possible for a coronation of a queen to take place, he had shown that it had been solemnized. There was not a single case which, quoad that case, cast a doubt upon the uniform force of his proposition, except that of Henrietta Maria, wife of Charles the First; and he reminded their lordships, it was merely a doubt so far as that particular case went. He had a right then to assume the larger proposition, that all queens-consort of England had, in point of fact, been crowned. Nothing was clearer in the rules of equity and law, than that non-uses did not forfeit, unless where they clearly, from the length of the lapse, involved a waiver of the claim. Where a right had been disputed, and the opposition assented to by the party tacitly, or confirmed by a competent authority, then, of course, there was an end to the legal exercise of such a right. But here the very reverse was the fact. Suppose he were called upon to prove a right of way or a right of common, (the two instances in which the courts of law were most commonly called upon to consider the length of usage,) the principle of law would go with the uniformity, and the absence of exercising the right in one or two particular instances would prove nothing. There were three modes of calling into question the fact of usage; first, as to its uniform enjoyment; next, where the right claimed by the party had been contested, but nevertheless enjoyed by the person exercising it; and the third case was, where the right asserted had been confiscated, and an adjudication passed upon it: that was of course held to be conclusive against the party, where the right claimed was refused, opposed, and not acquiesced in; then he admitted that no long admission of the right could be pleaded without the fatal interruption of the bar. He entreated their lordships to try the usage of the coronation of the queen-consort by these three principles of investigating such rights founded upon immemorial custom. Of the first, namely, uniform enjoyment, they had abundant proof. As to the second, namely, the occurrence of interruption in the exercise of the right, non-acquiescence in that interruption, a successful and most complete resistance to the attempt to withhold the exercise of the right, they had that, fully sustaining his proposition, in the case of the wife of Prince Henry; where Henry thought proper in his lifetime to crown his eldest son without also crowning that eldest son's consort. He had therefore with him the uniform enjoyment of the right her Majesty claimed; then the successful resistance of an attempt, as in Henry's case, to delay the exercise of the right; and lastly, the total absence of any adjudication or confiscation, or any thing like either in any single instance against him. There was, in fact, no other possible way of showing the existence of the right, but in the manner in which he was assuming, proving, and, as he thought, establishing it. How else, before the Court of Claims, were rights of service at the ceremony of the coronation established? How else did the barons of the Cinque Ports show their right to carry the canopy over the king, and to have a part of that canopy for their service? Suppose any instance in which the barons should, for want of specific proof, in the lapse of ages, fail to show that they had exercised that privilege—would that countervail the validity of their claim, founded on repeated usage? Certainly not. He would venture to say that there were at least half a dozen instances in which the barons could not show they had exercised their asserted right: and would any of these instances, where that proof failed, shake the firm hold of their long and undeniable usage? Upon a reference to the services which were to be performed at the ceremony of the coronation, it was clear, from the separate rights held upon the performance of particular kinds of attendance upon the queen, that her part of the ceremony was substantive, independent, and principal; that her right was clearly within herself, and not dependent upon the mere will of the King. So essential, indeed, was it that she should be crowned with all the forms of pomp which belonged to such a solemnity, that the same writs of summons were issued, and nearly the same demands of service made upon officers of state as when the king himself was crowned. The usage clearly governed the right, and more especially in this solemnity of coronation, which was altogether the creature of precedent, and existed only by its authority. The queen's coronation was in itself manifestly a substantive, important, and independent ceremony, illustrative of the right of the one party, and not dependent or contingent upon the mere will of the monarch. The origin of the king's ceremonial was lost in remote antiquity; but the numerous tenures and dependencies determinable by the non-performance of services at the solemnity, showed how important it was intended to be in the eyes of the people. The only grounds of right for the king's coronation, the queen equally had for hers; and there were, as he had already stated, separate forms prescribed for those who were officially to attend her ceremony.

The learned counsel then quoted some passages from the Liber Regalis, being merely directions for particular parts of the ceremonial to be observed on the queen's coronation. Every solemnity of which the origin was lost in distant antiquity, which was in itself of a most high and public nature, and which occupied a great and important space in the history of the country, he would fearlessly assert, must be deemed and taken as the right of the realm, and not as a mere appanage of the king. He held the coronation of the king himself to be a right of this nature; and that, not merely in the present times on account of the coronation oath, (which had been devised by the legislature on the coronation of William and Mary,) but also in times long before them: indeed, it had always been considered as a high and august ceremony with which the monarch himself could not dispense; it being the right of the sovereign, not in his individual but in his political capacity, for the benefit of the whole nation, in which capacity alone the nation knew him at his coronation. So much with regard to the coronation of the king. The coronation of the queen ought to be considered in a similar light, from its having been celebrated almost without interruption with the same publicity, and from being in its nature such as he had repeatedly described it. The king and the queen being both of them the mere creations of the law, the solemnities of their coronations were mere creations of the law also, and were known to it in no other light than as the rights of the whole realm of England. He, therefore, who was ready to take one step, and to get rid of the queen's coronation, as a mere optional ceremony, ought to be ready to take also another step, and to get rid of the king's coronation, on the ground of its being a vain, idle, empty, and expensive pageant. Her claim to a coronation rested upon immemorial usage, and the numerous rights of individuals which were interwoven and connected with it. Indeed, it rested on the same foundation as the king's: it was supported by the same arguments, and the interruptions which it had experienced admitted of the same explanations that he had given to those which had occurred in the case of the king. He had mentioned, in the course of his argument, the rights which belonged to other individuals in consequence of the queen's right to a coronation. If a coronation was not granted to her Majesty, their rights were unavailing to them; and that, in his opinion, formed a very sufficient reason why it should be celebrated. That the coronation was the acknowledgment of the king by the people, he conceived to be a point which it was unnecessary to prove to their lordships: but he might be permitted to remark to them, that the coronation of the queen was even considered as an acknowledgment of her right to enjoy that dignity in an entry in a charter roll of the fifth year of King John, now preserved in the Tower. The entry to which he alluded was the grant of certain lands in dower to his Queen Isabella, and it referred by way of recital to her coronation as queen. This excerpt was of no small importance in the consideration of this question; for it proved to their lordships, that in times when the coronation of the king was positively either his election, or the recognition of his election as monarch, the coronation of the queen was conducted, for the very same reasons, with the same solemnities. This was evident from the description of what was done, and from the manner and the avowed object of doing it. John was crowned to show that he was king—"coronatus in regem." Isabella was crowned to show that she was queen—"in reginam coronata communi consensu archiepiscoporum," &c. &c. The very same persons who elected, or recognised, or only crowned him as their monarch, are, in this passage, recorded to have elected, or recognised, or only crowned her as their queen. Was it intended to be maintained that no right existed, whenever something moving from the crown was necessary to the exercise of it? He would frankly confess that he knew of no right which a subject could enjoy without the interposition of the crown in some manner or other. All writs issued from the crown, and no right could be maintained without them; yet, would any one dispute the right of the subject to obtain them? Supposing a peer were to die, and the crown were to refuse a writ of summons to his eldest son: it was said to be by petition of right alone that he could sue to the crown to be admitted to his father's honours; and yet that petition of right would be considered as a strict undeniable legal right. He could refer also to cases in which the subject could demand, not merely the king's writ, but also the king's proclamation, to which he was entitled, not by a common law right, but by a right given him by an express statute; for instance, in all cases relative to prize-money. Again, supposing that the House of Commons were to die a natural death after sitting for seven years, and the king were to refuse to issue his proclamation to convoke another within three years of that period, as ordered by the first of William and Mary, sec. 2, cap. 2, would it be asserted that the subject would have no right to call for the proclamation of the king to convoke another parliament, because such proclamation could not issue without an act of the crown? He thought that none of their lordships would advocate such an absurdity. But the subject and the country were in full possession of all these rights; and if the Queen's right to a coronation were put upon the same footing, it would be equally clear that she possessed it, and that the necessity of granting it was as obvious as it was imperative. He had heard it said that her Majesty could not claim the honours of a coronation by prescription, because she was not a corporation. This, however, he denied. Her Majesty certainly could prescribe, for what business had they to call her Majesty less a corporation than the King? But still, supposing her not to be a corporation, she had a right to prescribe as a functionary, holding a high dignity and situation. This was evident from Baron Comyn's Digest, who, under the title of Prescription, lays it down that such a functionary can claim by prescription. In conclusion, Mr. Brougham said, their lordships would sit in dignified judgment on the opinion given by the great lawyers of the nineteenth century; and, as he firmly believed, finding they had no difficulties to explain, perceiving that they had no obscurities to clear up, they would not be under the necessity of referring to those remote periods of our history, to which he had been obliged to allude, but would look back to the first decision that ever had been given on this question, with that decided confidence which the names of those privy counsellors before whom the case was argued would in after-times command—a judgment, which he ventured confidently to pronounce, would not derogate from the high character they had so long maintained.

Mr. Denman followed on the same side, and after a long speech, called on their lordships, as a court sitting for legal inquiry, to say whether there ever was a case presented to an inquest, which depended on custom and usage, where a more complete and perfect body of custom and usage had been adduced, than was brought forward on the present occasion? If her Majesty's claim were refused, no dignity was safe, no property was secure, not a single institution could be said to rest on a firm foundation. If the coronation of the Queen could not be supported by custom, the rest of that ceremonial could not be supported. Why was this country governed by a king? Why did we submit to a kingly government? Because the earliest ages, because all times, had recognised that form of government, and because we could trace that custom beyond all time of memory. Nothing could be more dangerous than to separate royalty from the circumstances which belonged to it and added to its dignity. The lives and properties of men depended for their security upon the same principle. Why was there a house of peers, in which noble lords formed a part of the legislature? Why were there commoners, who sat as representatives of the people? Precisely because custom had ordered it so. Custom was the author of the law and the law-makers. Custom authorized the king, lords, and commons, to enact laws for the government of this realm. All property, all dignity, all offices existed, because they were sanctioned by prescriptive custom, or because custom gave a prescriptive right to create them.

Saturday.—The Privy Council resumed this morning, soon after ten o'clock. Below the bar was again crowded to excess.

Counsel were then called in.

Mr. Brougham said, he now held in his hand, and was prepared to lay before the council, the documentary evidence to which he and his learned friend had adverted in the course of their addresses in support of her Majesty's memorial.

Lord Harrowby.—Mr. Attorney-General, have you any observations to offer on what counsel have stated to their lordships?