[194] Bussora, or Basra, was founded by Omar in 636; has a population of sixty thousand at the present time. It is situated on the western bank of the Shat-ul-Arab and seventy miles from its mouth, with an immense trade. It was conquered by the Turks in 1668.
[195] At Tauris, or Tabreez. See Travels of a Merchant, [cap. 7].
[196] This covering, called Peychar, is now only used in Bagdad.
[197] David, last Emperor of Trebizond, was Despina’s uncle. Her father had died before.
[198] Peer Ahmed, who was afterwards defeated and killed in 1486 by Bajazet II, for having aided his brother Zizim in his revolt. See Knolles, Hist. of the Turks, p. 446.
[199] See Angiolello, [cap. 2].
[201] Kinneir, speaking of the Persian soldiery, says:—“What is denominated the standing army of the empire consists of the king’s body-guard, which amounts to about ten thousand men, and the Gholaums or royal slaves, in number about three thousand. The former are a kind of militia, which are obliged to have their habitations in the capital or its vicinity, and are liable to be called out at a moment’s warning: the latter are in constant attendance upon his majesty and more feared and respected than any other troops in his service. But it is the numbers and bravery of the wandering tribes which constitute the military force of the Persian empire. When the sovereign is desirous of assembling an army, the chiefs of the different tribes are commanded to send to the royal camp a number of men proportionate to the power and strength of his tribe: each town and village is also under the necessity of furnishing its quota. The army thus assembled, is consequently entirely irregular, chiefly consisting of cavalry; and, as they seldom receive either clothing or pay, only kept together by the hope of plunder. The present king, as an extreme effort, might probably in this manner be able to collect together a force of a hundred and fifty thousand or perhaps two hundred thousand men. To their cavalry, which is excellent, the rulers of Persia have hitherto, with success, solely entrusted the defence of their dominions. Their arms are a scimitar, a brace of pistols, a carabin, and sometimes a lance, or a bow and arrow—all of which they alternately use, at full speed, with the utmost skill and dexterity. The pistols are either stuck in the girdle or in the holsters of the saddle; the carabin or bow is slung across the shoulder; and the lance, which is light and shafted with bamboo, is wielded in the right hand. There is one great defect inherent in the constitution of their cavalry—a defect which cannot fail of proving highly detrimental to its success in the field, and of repressing the natural impetuosity and courage of the troops. His arms and horse in general belong not to the public, but to the individual; his whole property is often vested in these articles; and, as he receives no compensation in the event of losing them, his whole attention is naturally turned towards their preservation. This single circumstance, as must be obvious, may often be productive of the most disastrous consequences, and has, on more than one occasion, proved fatal to the honour and reputation of the Persian arms. They are not so gaudy in the trappings of their horses as the Turks; their saddles and bridles are more adapted for use than show; and the Arabian bit and stirrup were thrown aside by the orders of Nadir Shah for a plain snaffle and light iron stirrup. The saddle also is much more light than that in use among the Turks or Mamelukes, but somewhat too short in the seat, and inconvenient to a person who has not been accustomed to it. They ride with very short stirrups; but have, notwithstanding, a wonderful command over their horses, and can stop them in an instant in the midst of their career. Their cavalry, like all irregular horse, are incapable of acting in unison or of making any serious impression on a body of troops disciplined in the European fashion: but, as their evolutions and movements are extremely rapid and each individual is aware of the part he ought to act, they are nearly as formidable when broken and dispersed as when united. The Persian armies, as I have said before, receive no regular pay, and are only kept together by the hope of plunder; we therefore find, that it is considered as incumbent on the king to take the field once a year, either against the Russians, Affghans, or Turkomans, his immediate neighbours. They know nothing of the modern science of war, being entirely ignorant of the principles of fortification and of the arts of attack and defence. The field artillery is chiefly composed of zumbarooks or small swivels, mounted on, and fired from, the backs of camels. There are also small field-pieces attached to the army; but the roads on the frontier are but ill adapted for the transportation of cannon, and as the carriages are of a miserable construction, they are either broken by the rocks and precipices, or go to pieces after firing a few rounds. Another great defect in the organisation of the armies of this country is the total want of good officers, and therefore of a proper degree of subordination. Without able and experienced men to direct and command, and a regular system of payment, it is next to impossible that an army can arrive at anything like perfection. There is no separation of the civil from the military authorities. The troops are commanded by the chiefs of their own tribes, who are jealous of each other, and therefore not likely to act in concert or yield that obedience so absolutely necessary in military affairs. In the absence of the King and Prince, the Grand Vizier is the general-in-chief; and, as he is not unfrequently raised to that dignity from offices entirely civil, the army may be commanded by a man who has never witnessed an engagement.”
[202] Peer Ahmed. See [p. 15].
[203] Gerjannes, a district of Erzingan.