"In order to establish and keep up the communication between the upper half of the town, the real point of defence, and the sea-shore, two large stradoni have been opened outside of the town, both of them starting from the neighborhood of the royal palace, and running down to the sea, near to the Villa Giulia, a large public garden adjoining the Marina, and the other passing through the Quartiere dei Quatri Venti, to the Mole. This latter stradone has always been considered as the line of retreat to the place of embarkation, and is flanked by large buildings, the political prison, some barracks, the criminal prison, and finally the works on the Mole itself.
"The plan which Garibaldi conceived from these dispositions, was to surprise the posts in the lower and comparatively ill-defended part of the town, to throw himself into the town, and then gradually work his way from street to street. The two roads leading to this part of the town run almost parallel, and not far from each other. That close to the sea-shore was the least guarded, containing merely a company or so, altogether cut off from all communication. The task would have been easier from this side, had it not been for the fear of the march of a long column being discovered, and thus an alarm given. The second, the highroad from the interior, was therefore chosen as the line of operations. It crosses, about half a mile from the town, the route Del Ammiraglio, leads through a large open street to the stradone on this side of the town, and enters the town at the Porta di Termini. At this gate the Neapolitans had made a sandbag barricade, which was occupied by two companies. The stradone before it was enfiladed by a couple of mountain guns, placed at the gate of Sant' Antonino. Beyond the stradone small forts extended all along the road up to the bridge, and the outposts were just on the other side of the bridge.
"With that just coup d'œil which Garibaldi certainly possesses, he had singled out this point as the most practicable. Having, with the exception of the troops he had brought with him, but rough, undisciplined guerrillas at his disposal, he saw that the best chance was to concentrate all his forces, and surprise or break through by main force. The operation was to be assisted by a general rise of the people in the town.
"Having sketched out his plan, he convoked the different guerrilla chiefs and informed them of his intention. He told them that it was not his custom to have councils of war, but he thought it for once good to consult them, as upon the resolution taken must depend the fate of Sicily, and perhaps of Italy. There were only two things to be done—either to try and get possession of Palermo by a coup de main, or else to withdraw and begin a regular organization in the interior, and form an army. He, for his part, was for a coup de main, which would at once settle the fate of the island. He told them to be brief in their remarks, and not deliberate long. Most were utterly astonished at the boldness of this plan, and some made remarks about the want of ammunition for their men. They were told for the hundredth time, that it was not long shots which imposed on the well-armed Neapolitans, but a determined rush in advance—that they ought not to waste their ammunition and fire off their guns for sport, and were promised whatever could be spared. This objection being waived, all expressed more or less loudly their approbation of the plan, and were dismissed with the injunction to animate their people and keep up their courage."
CHAPTER VIII.
"I saw Garibaldi, and watch'd him nigh;
I saw the lightnings that flash from his eye:
He's not of the dust of which mortals are made,