Garibaldi had now been forbidden by the king to attempt any further conquests, and warned not to attempt to dethrone the King of Naples; and he had declared that he should do both. From that moment Victor Emanuel was virtually proclaimed "King of Italy," in spite of his own will and word. What induced Victor to write that letter may easily be imagined; what induced his prime minister to dictate it, will probably be always a matter of conjecture. Garibaldi's reply, and the measures which he subsequently adopted, with the results to which they led, will ever stand on record, where they can be read by the present and succeeding generations; and the world will form their own opinions of his character and capacity, without the aid of many comments or explanations.
Much was said and conjectured respecting the dissension which had existed before this time, between Garibaldi and Farina, a particular friend of Count Cavour. Garibaldi had appointed Farina counsellor at Palermo, and afterward dismissed him. It appears, even from Farina's own statement, that it did not arise from any disposition in Garibaldi to establish a republic, or otherwise to prevent the final annexation of Sicily to the kingdom of Sardinia, but was merely to postpone it for a time which he thought more favorable. It appears from other evidence, that Farina wished to have severe measures taken against some of the Republicans, but that Garibaldi rejected the proposal with noble scorn; and to prevent his further interference, banished him and two others from Sicily, by the following decree:
"'Signor La Farina, Grasselli and Toti, are affiliated to the police of the Continent. The three were expelled for having conspired against order. The government, which watches over public tranquillity, could not tolerate the presence of such individuals.'
"The 'Opinione National' of Turin, stated that Farina had full power from the Sardinian government to assume the title of royal commissioner, as soon as annexation was declared. Garibaldi, while advocating annexation, thought it advisable that his dictatorship should continue till the whole island was subjected, and finding that the presence of Farina was detrimental to the cause, he ordered him off."
La Farina afterward published the following explanation:
"The causes of my difference with General Garibaldi were as follow: I believed, and still believe, that the only salvation for Sicily is immediate annexation to the constitutional kingdom of Victor Emanuel, the most ardent wish of all the Sicilians, already manifested by the chiefs of more than three hundred municipal bodies. General Garibaldi believed that the annexation should be postponed till the liberation of all Italy, including Venetia and Rome, had been effected. I believed that it was a great act of imprudence to confide a share of authority and of the public forces to unpopular ministers, etc."
There was now a general suspension of hostilities. The entire island of Sicily was quiet, and none of the king's troops remained, except in a few of the fortresses. The circumstances under which some of these had been captured, or been forced to cease resistance, are interesting, but with the exception of Palermo, they have not been given for want of room.
The strait between Sicily and Calabria has been invested with peculiar interest to readers of history from early ages. The rocks and quicksands of Scylla and Charybdis, with the fabulous sirens of which we read in Virgil in our youth, give us impressions which are never lost. But there are more modern associations with that arm of the sea and its shores, of more real importance in the view of persons acquainted with them. American ships have long visited Palermo, Messina, Catania, and some of the other ports of Sicily, and oranges are brought to us from that fruitful island, many of which grow on the opposite coast of Calabria, or Magna Grecia, as it was formerly called. Hills arise from near the water, and mountains appear behind them, where scenes of rocky barrenness are intermingled with valleys of verdure and fertility, inhabited by a population in a simple state of society, the descendants of ancient Greeks, mingled with races which at successive periods came in from different countries. These had been for ages subject to the degrading influences of Romish spiritual rule, and of the despots of various countries, especially those of Spain and the Bourbons. But the seeds of intelligence have been assiduously sown and cherished of late years by the patriotic societies of Italy, who by their cautious, yet often daring and hazardous efforts, have long since brought many of the poor and rude, but brave and faithful Calabrians into the band of Italian unity. The events of late years had proved that the people of that part of the peninsula were to some extent connected with the great union; but the approach of Garibaldi and his reception have since shown that the influences so long and so secretly at work had not been justly appreciated. There was no considerable insurrection in Calabria during the conquest of Sicily, and it might have been presumed, from the general quietness of the population, that they were unable or unwilling to join with the patriots against the government of the King of Naples. Some practised observers of Italian affairs, however, regarded that general tranquillity as the best evidence of a general concert, and looked for a general rising of the people when the hour should arrive, and the signal should be given. Garibaldi, in the whole course of his proceedings, acted as if he had information not known to others; and a review of events, since they have passed, and are now fresh in our memory, is calculated to confirm us in this opinion.
In the long and anxious suspense which occurred before any movement was made against Calabria, questions were asked, how the flotilla of boats, which Garibaldi was collecting on the coast of Sicily, could be risked across the strait without a single ship of war to convoy them, and with only two small steamers and one larger one to tow them, while a squadron of the king's steamers was cruising between the shores, and the landing-place was strongly defended by three forts, with heavy cannon, and the whole Calabrian coast was occupied by royal troops. The currents, so terrible to mariners in ancient times, are still violent and irregular.
It was natural to ask, What is coming? What is about to happen? Are the apprehensions of Victor to be realized? Has the king a clearer sight than his gallant precursor, who has hitherto proved his prudence an equal match with his valor? Is this famous strait to prove its fatal character, so long ago recorded in fable; and is this passage then, so dreadful to mariners, to be the destruction of our noble sailor? Will he pass safely between Scylla and Charybdis, or meet his end on one or the other? On which and how will he be wrecked; and by what unfortunate circumstances? Not far distant from this spot, on a point on the coast of Calabria, the two Bandieras, sons of an Austrian admiral, but true Italian patriots, were decoyed to their death, by means of letters violated in the British postoffice. Has Garibaldi been made a dupe, by any artifice; and has Victor been apprised of danger? Has Louis Napoleon once more changed his policy, and, after favoring Italy in her "latest victories," as Garibaldi recently acknowledged, has he prepared, in consistency with his conduct in 1849, a scheme for something on the opposite side?