THE BATTLE OF PALESTRINA.
The retreat of the French army back to the seashore, and the armistice which occurred after the first battle, of April 30th, afforded a remarkably convenient opportunity to attend to the King of Naples and his army, which amounted to about twenty thousand men. The following is a description of their position, and the marching of the Roman army against them, translated from the beginning of the report of Gen. Roselli, then commander-in-chief. The report includes the time from his leaving Rome, May 16th, until the occupation of Velletri, May 20th, 1849.
"The Neapolitan army occupied the position of Albano, Velletri and Palestrina, and had their line of operations directed towards Rome.
The army of the Republic left Rome, to attack the enemy, on the 16th and 17th, and manœuvred to turn their flanks and cut off their communications with the Neapolitan State. The point of direction of the army was Monte Fortino, whence it might menace all the enemy's communications.
The Neapolitans had no other way but to retreat, or come out and attack us in the positions we had chosen. The army was composed of five brigades, and one of cavalry, with twelve pieces of cannon. The first brigade, with a squadron of lancers and two pieces of artillery, commenced the march. I left Rome at five o'clock, P.M., and took the direction of Zagarola, by the road of Campanelle, to expose the right flank as little as possible. The march was very rapid; we reached Zagarola at ten before noon. The vanguard passed the town rapidly, and encamped on the hills which defend the roads of Palestrina and Albano. According to instructions, the next day it was intended to attack Palestrina, and then march on Velletri; but we learned, from our patrols and information, that the enemy were no longer in Palestrina, having concentrated their forces in Velletri. It was then immediately decided to occupy Monte Fortino.
The order had been given to put the army in movement before daylight; but, from misunderstanding, and insufficiency of the means of transport, the arrival of provisions having been delayed, our brave soldiers were compelled to lose precious time," &c., &c.
The report of the commander-in-chief being deficient in details, I sought for more particulars from Gen. Garibaldi, and soon obtained the following succinct account, written down from his lips, accompanied with a hasty plan of the battle-ground, drawn by his pen. It now became evident that the common opinion was correct, which attributed the two remarkable victories of Palestrina and Velletri to Garibaldi; as the vanguard, led by him, had all the fighting to do; and the main body of the Roman army, under Roselli, did not arrive until the result was mainly secured.